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Resumo
Um: O uso  de  um hipervisor  como  kernel de  separação  em arquiteturas  integradas  está  a  ser
considerado,  visto  que,  um hipervisor  não  só  proporciona  separação  temporal  e  espacial,  mas
também compatibilidade com software  legacy.  No entanto,  nos dias de hoje,  a maior parte dos
hipervisores  baseiam-se  em  paravirtualização  ou  dependem  de  hardware  high-end;  ambas  as
abordagens  não  cumprem  os  requisitos  dos  sistema  embebidos  críticos  para  a  segurança.  A
paravirtualização, por um lado, não proporciona compatibilidade total com software legacy, sendo
necessária  a  sua  modificação  e  adaptação  a  uma  interface  especifica  do  hipervisor  utilizado.
Hardware  high-end,  por  outro lado,  apesar  de proporcionar  compatibilidade total  com software
legacy,  dá  origem a  sistemas  de  grande dimensão,  de  elevado peso,  com elevado consumo de
energia, de elevado custo, etc. Nesta tese, a capacidade da virtualização completa em hardware low-
end para resolver as limitações dos hipervisores existentes é investigada. Para isso, um hipervisor
baseado em virtualização completa em hardware low-end é descrito e é apresentada uma avaliação
da sua performance e do espaço ocupado em memória.
Dois: Métodos de desenvolvimentos convencionais não são capazes de acompanhar os requisitos
dos sistemas embebidos críticos para segurança de hoje em dia. Nesta tese: (a) é apresentada uma
abordagem baseada em modelos já existente, mais especificamente, geração de código baseada em
modelos; (b) são descritas as modificações aplicadas a um compilador de modelos já existente por
forma a que este suporte novas capacidades; e (c) é apresentada uma avaliação sobre a capacidade
da geração de código baseada em modelos de reduzir o esforço de engenharia quando comparada
com abordagens convencionais.
Três: A maior parte dos sistemas operativos de hoje em dia seguem uma arquitetura monolítica; esta
arquitetura,  no  entanto,  está  associada  a  fraca  confiabilidade,  baixa  segurança,  esforço  de
certificação  elevado,  bem  como  baixa  previsibilidade  e  escalabilidade.  Para  colmatar  estes
problemas,  as  soluções  propostas  na literatura apenas  contornam a origem do problema,  i.e.,  a
elevada dimensão do kernel numa arquitetura monolítica, e não o resolvem diretamente. Nesta tese,
functionality farming é proposto para atacar a origem do problema. Functionality farming apenas,
no  entanto,  depende  de  um  esforço  de  engenharia  significativo.  Visto  isto,  esta  tese  também
apresenta  FF-AUTO,  uma  ferramenta  capaz  de  realizar  functionality  farming de  forma  semi-
automática.  Por último,  esta  tese demonstra  como  functionality  farming é  capaz de melhorar  o
design e a performance de um kernel já existente, e demonstra também como FF-AUTO permite uma
redução significativa do esforço de engenharia.
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Abstract
First,  the  use  of  a  hypervisor  as  the  separation  kernel  on  integrated  architectures  has  been
considered, as it not only provides time and space partitioning, but it also provides compatibility
with legacy software. Nowadays, most hypervisors, however, either rely on paravirtualization or
depend  on  high-end  hardware,  both  of  which  do  not  fulfill  the  requirements  of  safety-critical
embedded systems. Paravirtualization does not provide complete legacy compatibility as it requires
legacy software to be modified to fit a hypervisor-specific interface. High-end hardware, on the
other hand, even though it provides complete legacy compatibility, it leads to large system size,
weight,  power  consumption,  cost,  etc.  In  this  thesis,  the  feasibility  of  low-end  hardware  full
virtualization to address the limitations of existing hypervisors is investigated. For that, a hypervisor
based on low-end hardware full virtualization is described and an evaluation of its performance and
footprint is presented.
Second,  conventional  development  methods  are  unable  to  keep  up  with  the  requirements  of
nowadays and future safety-critical embedded systems. In this thesis: (a) an existing model-driven
engineering approach to address the limitations of conventional development methods is presented;
more specifically, a model-driven code generation approach; (b) the modifications applied to an
existing model compiler in order for it to support new features are described; and (c) an evaluation
of whether or not a model-driven code generation approach leads to lower engineering effort when
compared to a conventional approach is presented.
Third, most operating systems, nowadays, follow a monolithic architecture; this, however, leads to
poor reliability, weak security, high certification effort, as well as poor predictability and scalability.
To address this problem, the solutions proposed in the literature just work around the source of the
problem, i.e., the large size of the kernel in a monolithic architecture, and do not address it directly.
In this thesis, functionality farming is proposed to tackle the source of the problem. Functionality
farming alone, however, depends on a significant engineering effort. To address this problem, this
thesis also presents  FF-AUTO, a tool which performs functionality farming semi-automatically. At
last,  this  thesis  demonstrates  how functionality  farming is  able  to  improve the  design  and the
performance of an existing kernel, as well as how FF-AUTO enables a significant reduction of the
required engineering effort.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Full Virtualization on Low-End Hardware
A system is safety-critical if its failure can cause harm to people or the environment  [1]. Such a
failure is also known as a catastrophic failure. In a safety-critical system a missed deadline can
result in a catastrophic failure, and thus, a safety-critical system is also a hard real-time system.
Examples of safety-critical systems include: commercial and military aircraft, automobiles, traffic
lights at an intersection, nuclear power plants, medical devices and implants, among many others.
Within the domain of safety-critical systems, this thesis focuses on the sub-domain of safety-critical
embedded systems. Safety-critical  embedded systems can be distinguished from other computer
systems by especially tight constrains along many axes, including:
• Size, volume, and weight: embedded systems, as the name suggests, are embedded in larger
electrical,  mechanical  or  hydraulic  systems,  and  thus,  are  constrained  to  the  physical
characteristics of a larger system in which they are embedded.
• Power  consumption:  in  many cases,  a  connection  to  a  continuous  power  supply is  not
possible  and embedded systems must  rely on batteries;  therefore,  it  becomes critical  to
reduce power consumption in order to extend battery-life, reduce maintenance, and thus,
increase availability.
• Cost: embedded systems are often mass produced and reducing their manufacturing cost is
critical for profit. In terms of the software, certification, when required, is the most costly
development activity and it is critical to reduce its impact. In terms of hardware, memory is
usually the most expensive resource, and thus, reducing the software's memory footprint is
also important.
In order to assure that a safety-critical system is unlikely to fail (it is not feasible to assure that a
system will never fail), it must be certified by a third party before being deployed for its intended
application.  IEC  61508  [2],  for  example,  is  a  standard  "applicable  to  all
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems irrespective of the application."
Similar  standards  include:  DO-178  [3],  specific  to  airborne  systems,  ISO  26262  [4],  for  road
vehicles, and ISO 62304 [5], for medical devices. In IEC 61508, systems are classified according to
a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) depending on the consequences of failure (i.e., “multiple loss of life”
down to “minor injuries at worst”) and their likelihood (i.e., “frequent” down to “improbable” and
“incredible”); the higher the SIL, the more safety-critical the system is. Certification may require
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specific development methods to be followed, such as extensive testing of the hardware and the
software; the higher the SIL, the more rigorous the certification process. In IEC 61508, systems
classified as SIL 1 (the lowest) can be developed according to quality management standards, such
as ISO 9001 [6]. A system classified as SIL 4 (the highest), on the other end, needs to be verified
and validated using formal methods and redundancy is mandatory. It is well known that certification
of safety-critical systems is a difficult, time consuming and expensive activity, and that it can take
up to seven times longer than other development activities [7].
Traditional large-scale safety-critical systems follow a federated architecture [8]–[10], illustrated in
Figure 1.1. In a federated architecture, a system is composed of multiple computing units (“CU” in
Figure  1.1)  connected  to  one  or  more  buses;  each  computing  unit  is  assigned  with  a  single,
independently  developed  function.  Although  providing  strong  fault  containment  and  isolation
between functions through physical separation, a federated architecture, however, has the following
disadvantages [8]–[10]:
• a long bill  of materials,  which leads to large size and volume, high weight, high power
consumption, and high cost;
• lack of common line replaceable units,  and thus,  high maintenance,  repair  and overhaul
costs, as well as obsolescence problems;
• high hardware development and hardware certification effort, and thus, long time to market
and high cost;
• high hardware fault rate, low reliability, low availability, and therefore, high maintenance
cost;
• few organizations are able to support the life-time costs of the system, leading to a small
market and low profit.
2
Figure 1.1. Illustration of a federated architecture.
A federated architecture may be well suited for small-scale safety-critical embedded systems with a
small number of functions; however, a  federated architecture does not scale well for large-scale
systems, and it is not adequate for highly-constrained safety-critical embedded systems, especially
when the demand for more functions is already high and increasing (e.g., autonomous vehicles).
To address the issues with the federated architecture, integrated architectures have been developed.
Examples include: the integrated modular avionics architecture from the avionics industry  [11],
AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture (AUTOSAR) from the automotive industry [12], and the
integrated  time-triggered  architecture  (DECOS)  from  academia  [13].  Similarly  to  a  federated
architecture,  in  an integrated architecture the system is  composed by multiple  computing units
connected to one or more buses. However, in an integrated architecture, each computing unit may
be assigned with multiple, independently developed functions with different SIL, as illustrated in
Figure 1.2. In this way, an integrated architecture has the following advantages over a federated
architecture [8]–[10]:
• shorter  bill  of materials,  and thus,  smaller  size and volume,  lower weight,  lower power
consumption, and lower cost;
• lower hardware development and hardware certification effort, and therefore, lower time to
market and cost;
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• lower  hardware  fault  rate,  higher  reliability  and  availability,  and  therefore,  lower
maintenance costs;
• lower life-cycle costs, and thus, larger market size and higher profit.
Figure 1.2. Illustration of an integrated architecture.
As illustrated in  Figure 1.2, in an integrated architecture, computing units assigned with multiple
functions rely on a separation kernel. The separation kernel is responsible for providing predictable
execution environments, also called partitions, logically isolated in time (i.e., execution time) and
space (i.e.,  memory and I/O devices) from each other. The separation kernel enforces isolation,
through time and space partitioning, that is: by allocating a fixed memory and I/O space as well as a
predefined execution time slot to each partition, and by allowing only predefined communication
between partitions. The separation kernel guarantees fault containment and isolation by ensuring
that partitions do not interfere with each other and, for example, that a failure in a partition assigned
with a low-SIL function does not interfere with a partition assigned with a high-SIL function. The
separation kernel, nonetheless, must be certified according to at least the highest SIL among the
functions in the computing unit.
The separation kernel concept, by itself, however, does not define the actual execution environment
available to functions (e.g., the available services, their interface), except that these must be time
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Separation kernel
and  space  partitioned.  To  address  this  shortcoming  and  improve  the  interoperability  between
different  vendors  and  suppliers,  a  few  standards,  such  as  ARINC 653  [14] for  the  integrated
modular  avionics  architecture,  have  been  developed,  defining  the  available  services  and  their
interface  (i.e.,  the  execution  environment).  Still,  the  execution  environments  defined  by those
standards do not provide compatibility with legacy software. However, significant investments have
been made in legacy software and, in many cases, developing anew is not possible (e.g., licensing
issues, closed source). To address this problem, using a hypervisor as the separation kernel is being
considered [15]–[19].
A hypervisor can be regarded as a specialization of the separation kernel. As illustrated in  Figure
1.3,  while  a  separation  kernel  provides  partitions,  a  hypervisor  provides  virtual  machines.  A
hypervisor is not only able to do everything that a separation kernel does, such as time and space
partitioning, but it also provides compatibility with legacy software, such as real-time and general-
purpose operating systems and applications. A hypervisor, therefore, enables the software developed
for a legacy federated architecture, for example, to be reused with none or few modification on a
newer integrated architecture. Consequently, using a hypervisor as the separation kernel enables the
transition from a federated to an integrated architecture to be smoother and less costly. Nowadays,
most hypervisors, however, as will be demonstrated in Section 2.2. Virtualization and Hypervisors,
either (1) do not provide complete legacy compatibility as they rely on paravirtualization, which
requires legacy software to be modified to fit a hypervisor-specific, often proprietary, interface, or
(2) do provide complete legacy compatibility, but depend on high-end hardware (i.e., hardware with
virtualization  extensions)  which  leads  to  large  size  and  volume,  high  weight,  high  power
consumption,  and  high  cost.  Full  virtualization  on  low-end  hardware  (i.e.,  hardware  without
virtualization extensions), on the other end, has none of those disadvantages.
Figure 1.3. Illustration of (a) a separation kernel vs. (b) a hypervisor.
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Low-end hardware full virtualization is able to provide the same features as high-end hardware full
virtualization,  but  on  low-end  hardware.  Full  virtualization  on  low-end  hardware  must  be
accomplished  using  mechanisms  which  were  not  originally  designed  for  it.  Therefore,  full
virtualization on low-end hardware is not always possible because the hardware may not fulfill the
necessary requirements  [20].  Furthermore,  it  is  often  claimed  that  it  is  not  feasible  due  to  an
unacceptably high virtualization overhead (e.g., [21]); however, we were unable to find real-world
quantitative results to support those claims..
In this thesis, performance and footprint (i.e., the size of the trusted computing base and memory
footprint) measurements from a case study on low-end hardware full virtualization are presented.
More specifically, a case study to evaluate to what extent low-end hardware full virtualization is an
alternative to high-end hardware full virtualization and paravirtualization, and provide compatibility
with unmodified legacy software with acceptable performance and footprint. At the same time, one
processor  architecture  is  evaluated  in  its  ability  for  the  realization  of  low-end  hardware  full
virtualization, so that the limitations, if any, of this and other similar processor architectures can be
addressed in the future.
In this thesis, first, Rodosvisor, a hypervisor featuring full virtualization of the PowerPC 405 [21]
(i.e., a representative of low-end hardware), is presented. Second, it is described how Rodosvisor
has  been integrated  with  POK  [23],  an  ARINC 653 separation  kernel  (and real-time operating
system), resulting in POK/rodosvisor. Third, an evaluation of the virtualization overhead in a Linux-
based operating system is presented, by comparing several benchmarks performed on bare metal
and as a guest on POK/rodosvisor. This is similar to what is presented in  [24]; there, however, a
hypervisor  based  on  paravirtualization  is  used.  Forth,  a  detailed  look  at  the  performance  of
POK/rodosvisor’s  internal  operation  is  presented  (i.e.,  POK/rodosvisor’s  performance  profile),
namely:  interrupt  handlers  and  context  switching.  Fifth  and  last,  the  size  of  POK/rodosvisor’s
trusted computing base and memory footprint for various configurations are presented.
1.2. Model-Driven Engineering
In  terms  of  requirements  analysis,  software  design,  verification  and  certification,  conventional
development  methods  employ  informal  methods,  prone  to  misunderstanding,  and  where  the
opportunity for automatic generation of the implementation is lost [25], [26]. Furthermore, when it
comes to the implementation, conventional development methods depend on a significant amount
of  manual  and  error-prone  labor,  leading  to  long  time-to-market  [25],  [26].  Knowing  that  the
complexity and the number of safety-critical embedded systems is increasing, it becomes necessary
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to apply methods which reduce the accidental complexity, and thus, accelerate development while
still maintaining or improving quality. Accidental complexity is the complexity associated with a
design or implementation not directly related to the solution space. In the literature many methods
have been proposed to improve upon conventional development methods, such as:
• Computer-aided software engineering (CASE)  [27], [28]: it  emerged when 3rd generation
programming languages started to reveal limitations to cope with complexity, and focused
on general-purpose graphical programming (e.g., state machines, structure diagrams, data
flow diagrams)  to  express  design  intent;  at  the  time,  however,  CASE failed  to  become
widely adopted because the technology was not mature enough, and because programming
languages and platforms evolved, alleviating the need for CASE.
• Component-based software engineering (CBSE) [29], [30]: it defends that systems should be
designed by assembling software components together; CBSE, however, focuses mostly on
reuse  of  components  and  not  on  improving  the  implementation  of  the  components
themselves.
• Software product-line engineering (SPLE)  [31], [32]: it  enables organizations to built an
array of similar software products (applications) from a common (domain specific) and a
variable (application specific) pool of resources, and thus, reduce development effort and
cost, when compared with conventional single system development; the downside of SPLE
is that variability management is still not mature enough, and it requires a significant upfront
investment.
• Model-driven engineering (MDE) [28], [33]: it advocates that development should be driven
by high-level models which raise the abstraction level (when compared with 3rd generation
programming  languages)  and  reduce  the  distance  between  the  problem  space  and  the
solution space, thus facilitating development. MDE technologies are still not mature enough
for wide adoption and a significant upfront investment is also required.
POK, mentioned earlier, through Ocarina [34]–[37], supports MDE. Ocarina is a compiler for the
Analysis & Architecture Description Language (AADL)  [38]. AADL enables the specification of
the  software  and  hardware  architecture,  and  thus,  the  specification  of  the  desired  system
configuration at a high level of abstraction, and features: processors, memories, processes, threads,
subprograms, inter and intra-partition communication, etc. Ocarina is able to transform an AADL
model  into  a  POK configuration,  composed  by C  source  code  and  makefiles.  Ocarina  is  also
capable of generating partitions, if necessary. Ocarina, however, did not support the features that
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have been added to POK, namely: virtual machines and privileged partitions.
In  this  thesis,  it  is  described how Ocarina  has  been extended to  support  virtual  machines  and
privileged partitions. In this way, it is demonstrated: (1) the ability of AADL to represent those
features,  (2)  the  ability  of  Ocarina  to  support  those  representations  and  to  generate  a  POK
configuration accordingly, and (3) their ability to replace conventional approaches. In this thesis, it
is  also  demonstrated  the  ability  of  AADL-based  MDE to  reduce  the  engineering  effort  when
compared to a conventional approach, by comparing the engineering effort required by an AADL-
based with a manual development approach.
1.3. Functionality Farming
Nowadays,  most  operating systems follow a monolithic  architecture  [39]–[41].  In  a  monolithic
architecture  many  of  the  services  provided  by  the  operating  system  (e.g.,  device  drivers  and
protocol stacks) are deployed in the same address space as the kernel. For example, in the Linux
kernel, version 2.6, 88% of the code is related to protocol and device drivers [42]. This, however,
leads to a large kernel, which in turn, is associated with the following drawbacks:
• a large number of bugs and low reliability: a conservative estimate indicates that there are
six bugs per 1,000 source lines of code, and device drivers have bug rates that are three to
seven times higher than normal code [39], [43];
• a large attack surface and weak security: since the kernel is part of the trusted computing
base of the entire system, if even a small function in the kernel is compromised, then, the
entire system is at risk [42], [44];
• a high certification effort: a large kernel is also harder to certify than a small one [41], [45].
Furthermore, most of those services are not explicitly schedulable and “steal” other schedulable
entities' execution time, leading to poor predictability and scalability as well.
To reduce the size of the trusted computing base (TCB), and thus, to improve security and reduce
the certification effort, some authors propose the use of architectures based on: (1) a virtual machine
monitor (or hypervisor) [42], [44], [46], or (2) a microkernel [41], or (3) a combination of the two
(i.e., a microkernel with virtualization support) [47]. In these architecture, the size of the core/root
kernel (and thus, of the TCB) is much smaller than the kernel found in most commodity operating
systems. In these architectures, commodity operating systems are pushed onto a virtual machine (on
a hypervisor-based architecture) or onto one or more user-level servers (on a microkernel-based
architecture), reducing the effects that a compromised commodity operating system can have on the
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system as a whole. Alongside commodity operating systems, critical services are deployed on other
virtual  machines  (or  user-level  servers),  which  depend on a  much smaller  TCB than that  in  a
commodity  operating  system.  These  architectures,  however,  depend  on  an  additional  level  of
indirection which leads to poor performance. Furthermore, on a hypervisor-based architecture in
particular,  virtual  machines  are  often  coarse-grained  and heavyweight  leading to  high  resource
usage.  On  a  microkernel  architecture,  on  the  other  end,  there  is  no  compatibility  with  legacy
software, and the porting effort can be very significant. An architecture based on a “microkernel
with virtualization support” solves the above issues with the other two architectures, at the cost,
however, of a larger size of the kernel. Still, all these architectures depend on the development of a
new kernel, and thus, of a significant upfront investment; if the development of the new kernel fails,
the cost is huge. In the end, these architectures do not tackle the source of the problem, i.e., the large
size of the kernel in commodity operating systems, and just work around it.
In this thesis, functionality farming is proposed, which, instead of a new architecture, consists in
partitioning existing kernels by (1) moving functionality out of the kernel and onto the application
(or partition) level, to reduce the size of the kernel, and by (2) replacing the functionality being
moved with remote procedure calls to the partition level, to bridge the gap between the kernel and
the partition level. This is illustrated in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4. Illustration of functionality farming: (a) before functionality farming; (b) after
functionality farming.
At the partition level,  memory protection is  enforced (space partitioning),  and, previously non-
schedulable entities, become explicitly schedulable (time partitioning). Through space partitioning,
it is possible to reduce the size of the kernel, and thus, improve its reliability and security, as well as
to reduce the certification effort. Additionally, in case of failure only the faulting partition, and not
the  entire  kernel  (and  thus,  not  the  entire  system),  needs  to  be  restarted,  leading  to  higher
availability  as  well.  On the  other  end,  through time  partitioning,  it  is  possible  to  improve the
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kernel's predictability and scalability by making parts of the kernel explicitly schedulable. At the
partition level, moreover, it is easier to distribute the operating system's services across the cores of
a  multicore  processor  architecture,  leading  to  improved  predictability  and  scalability  on  such
platforms.
Unlike other works, functionality farming tackles the source of the problem (i.e., the size of the
kernel in commodity operating systems). It requires a lower upfront investment, since it enables a
progressive reduction of the size of the kernel, instead of an all-or-nothing approach, and thus, it is a
more agile approach as it enables some decisions to be postponed closer to delivery time when
information about the system's requirements is more precise.
Time and space partitioning an existing kernel, nevertheless, is not an easy task. In some cases,
because  of  a  functionality's  level  of  coupling  with  kernel  or  its  functional  requirements  (e.g.,
compatibility  with  hardware-dependent,  kernel-level  software),  ensuring  that  time  and  space
partitioning is possible, and at the same time, fulfilling the functionality's functional requirements
may depend on a significant engineering effort. To address this issue, functionality farming relies on
various partition types. Each partition type provides distinct levels of partitioning (e.g., from time-
only partitioning to both time and space partitioning), as well as they fulfill different functional
requirements  (e.g.,  from  compatibility  with  hardware-dependent,  kernel-level  software  to
compatibility with only hardware-independent software). These different partition types, not only
increase the extent to which functionality farming is more easily accomplished, but also enable an
even more progressive reduction of the size of the kernel.  Thus,  these different  partition types
enable fast design space exploration, and reduce the associated risk. As an example, consider the
following. In the beginning, when a functionality is tightly coupled with the kernel, achieving space
partitioning may require a significant engineering effort, while achieving time partitioning may not
be as hard, then, a partition which provides time-only partitioning can be used. At this stage, it
cannot be expected that the size of the kernel will be reduced; nevertheless, as will be shown later,
time-only partitioning can reveal interesting design alternatives, as well as it enables bad design
alternatives to be ruled out early on. After modifying the functionality to enable space partitioning,
it may still depend on compatibility with kernel-level software, then, a partition providing time and
space partitioning as well as compatibility with kernel-level software can be used. Lastly, after the
functionality is  made hardware-independent,  then,  a lightweight,  hardware-independent partition
can be used.
Functionality  farming  alone,  however,  despite  the  benefits,  still  depends  on  a  significant
engineering effort, as will be shown later, and its effects are often very hard to predict, meaning that
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the associated risk is still high.
This thesis also presents FF-AUTO, a tool which performs functionality farming semi-automatically
in  POK/rodosvisor.  With  FF-AUTO,  the  engineering  effort,  and  thus,  the  risk  associated  with
functionality  farming  is  significantly  reduced,  making  it  also  an  ideal  tool  for  design  space
exploration. As explained earlier, POK/rodosvisor supports three partition types:
• ARINC 653 partitions: support only hardware-independent software but enforce both time
and space partitioning;
• privileged partitions: support all kinds of software (i.e., hardware-dependent and hardware-
independent software), enforce time partitioning but not space partitioning;
• and  virtual  machines:  support  all  kinds  of  software,  and  enforce  both  time  and  space
partitioning (at the cost, however, of a virtualization overhead).
This  thesis  also demonstrates how functionality farming is  able  to  improve the design and the
performance of POK/rodosvisor, as well  as how  FF-AUTO enables a significant reduction of the
required engineering effort. It was not possible to demonstrate a reduction of the size of the kernel
since  POK/rodosvisor  is  already a very small  kernel  (very close to  microkernel).  Finally,  even
though functionality farming and  FF-AUTO,  currently,  target only POK/rodosvisor, its underlying
methodology can be applied to any other operating system.
1.4. Thesis Structure
This rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
In the next chapter, Chapter 2. Rodosvisor, a hypervisor featuring full virtualization of the PowerPC
405 (i.e., a representative of low-end hardware), is described.
The following chapter,  Chapter  3.  POK/rodosvisor, describes how POK has been extended with
support for privileged partitions, and how POK and Rodosvisor have been integrated, becoming
POK/rodosvisor.  Moreover,  the  virtualization  overhead  and  the  performance  profile  of
POK/rodosvisor are presented. POK/rodosvisor's size of the trusted computing base and memory
footprint for various configurations are also presented.
Chapter 4. Model-Driven Engineering using Ocarina explains how support for privileged partitions
and virtual machines has been added to AADL and Ocarina; an evaluation of the reduction of the
engineering effort enabled by AADL and Ocarina is presented as well.
In Chapter  5.  Functionality Farming,  FF-AUTO and its underlying methodology are presented; two
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use cases are also presented, demonstrating that functionality farming is able to improve the design
and the performance of POK/rodosvisor, and that FF-AUTO contributes to a significant reduction of
the required engineering effort, and thus, of the associated risk.
Finally,  Chapter  6.  Conclusion,  ends  this  thesis  with  a  summary  of  the  major  findings  and
contributions.
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2. Rodosvisor
2.1. Introduction
As explained in the previous chapter,  Section  1.1.  Full Virtualization on Low-End Hardware, the
use of a hypervisor as a separation kernel in integrated architectures is being considered, as it not
only provides time and space partitioning, but also provides compatibility with legacy software
[15]–[19]. However, the hypervisors found in the literature, as will be demonstrated in Section 2.2.
Virtualization and Hypervisors, either (1) do not provide complete legacy compatibility as they rely
on paravirtualization, which requires legacy software to be modified to fit a hypervisor-specific,
often proprietary interface, or (2) do provide complete legacy compatibility but depend on high-end
hardware  (i.e.,  hardware  with  virtualization  extensions)  which  leads  to  large  system  size  and
volume,  high  weight,  high  power  consumption,  and  high  cost.  Full  virtualization  on  low-end
hardware (i.e.,  hardware without virtualization extensions),  on the other end, has none of those
advantages.
In this thesis, Rodosvisor, a hypervisor featuring full virtualization of the IBM PowerPC 405 [22],
is presented. The PowerPC 405 has been chosen because (1) it is a simple, low power, low cost
processor,  especially dedicated to embedded system and thus, a good representative of low-end
hardware;  and  because  (2)  Xilinx  [48],  [49] provides  good development  support,  enabling  the
construction and evaluation of various hardware configurations, such as single-core and dual-core
processor configurations. Alternatively, ARM could have been chosen as the processor architecture;
however, a PowerPC-405-equivalent ARM processor is much more complex, and thus, too risky for
this case study. Consider, for example, that an ARMv7, application profile, virtual memory system
architecture  implementation,  features  more  than  20  privileged  instructions  and  more  than  100
privileged registers; the PowerPC 405, on the other end, features 19 privileged instructions and
around 40 privileged registers.
Rodosvisor,  similarly  to  [50] provides  “cycle-accurate”  virtual  processors  (VCPU)  (i.e.,  their
execution time does not effect the execution time of co-existing virtual processors) compatible with
the PowerPC 405 (the CPU). Rodosvisor has not an explicit representation of a virtual machine;
instead,  a  VCPU  is  configured  to  enforce  the  boundaries  of  the  virtual  machine,  such  as  its
dedicated and shared memory address space,  and I/O devices.  Moreover,  Rodosvisor,  by itself,
cannot support a running system (e.g., it does not provide a scheduler); it needs to be integrated into
a host which provides the services required for a running system. As will be explained in Section
2.3. Interface with the Host, the host is responsible for:
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• initialization and scheduling of VCPUs;
• loading, resuming, pausing and saving VCPUs;
• and, whenever a VCPU is running, for redirecting interrupts to the current VCPU.
In the next chapter, Chapter 3. POK/rodosvisor, among other things, the integration of Rodosvisor
with  POK  [23],  an  ARINC 653 separation  kernel,  becoming POK/rodosvisor,  is  described.  An
evaluation  of  the  virtualization  overhead,  POK/rodosvisor's  performance  profile,  as  well  as
POK/rodosvisor's  size  of  the  trusted  computing  base  and  memory  footprint  for  various
configurations are also presented.
Some publications have been made based on a prior version of the Rodosvisor [51]–[53]. In those
publications a bare metal version of Rodosvisor is described. In this thesis, unless otherwise noted,
when  Rodosvisor  is  referred,  it  means  the  newer,  host-assisted  (a.k.a.,  hosted)  version  of
Rodosvisor.
2.1.1.Chapter Organization
This chapter is organized as follows.
In the next section,  Section  2.2.  Virtualization and Hypervisors, background on virtualization and
hypervisors is given.
In  Section  2.3.  Interface  with  the  Host,  the  interface  with  the  host  and  its  responsibilities  are
described.
The methodologies used for full virtualization of the PowerPC 405 are explained in  Section  2.4.
Full Virtualization; this includes virtualization of:
• the instruction set, Section 2.4.1. Instruction Set;
• the timers, Section 2.4.2. Timers;
• the memory management unit, Section 2.4.3. Memory Management Unit;
• and interrupts, Section 2.4.4. Interrupts.
In  Section  2.5.  I/O  virtualization and  Section  2.6.  Paravirtualization,  the  various  mechanisms
available for I/O virtualization and paravirtualization, respectively, are described.
In  Section  2.7.  Future  Work,  future  work  is  proposed  and  finally,  in  Section  2.8.  Summary,  a
summary of this chapter is given.
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2.2. Virtualization and Hypervisors
In the same way as a separation kernel enforces time and space partitioning between partitions, a
hypervisor enforces time and space partitioning between virtual machines, as illustrated in  Figure
2.1. The software running “inside” a partition or virtual machine is called “the guest.” As in [20], "a
virtual machine is taken to be an efficient, isolated duplicate of the real machine," and, a hypervisor:
"first,  [...] provides an environment for programs which is essentially identical with the original
machine; second, programs run in this environment show at worst only minor decreases in speed;
and last, [it] is in complete control of system resources." Furthermore [20] adds:
• "Any  program  run  under  the  [hypervisor]  should  exhibit  an  effect  identical  with  that
demonstrated if the program had been run on the original machine directly, with the possible
exception  of  differences  caused  by the  availability  of  system resources  and  differences
caused by timing dependencies."
• "It  demands that a statistically dominant subset of the virtual processor's instructions be
executed directly by the real processor, with no software intervention by the [hypervisor]."
(This in particular, distinguishes software virtualization from software emulation.)
• "The [hypervisor] is said to have complete control of ... resources if (1) it is not possible for
a program running under it in the created environment to access any resource not explicitly
allocated to  it,  and (2) it  is  possible under  certain circumstances for the [hypervisor]  to
regain control of resources already allocated."
Figure 2.1. Illustration of (a) a separation kernel vs. (b) a hypervisor.
Through time and space partitioning a hypervisor enforces workload isolation, and thus, enables
workload consolidation. Workload isolation guarantees that the behavior of a virtual machine, such
as  a  failure,  will  not  affect  the  rest  of  the  system  (i.e.,  other  partitions  and  the  hypervisor).
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Furthermore, with workload isolation, the guests can be developed independently of each other,
leading  to  lower  development  and  certification  effort.  On top  of  workload  isolation,  workload
consolidation enables a single computing unit to perform the same functions as multiple physically
independent computing units, leading to: shorter bill of materials, lower size/volume and weight,
lower power consumption, lower hardware development effort and cost, lower life-cycle costs, etc.
[9], [54]. For example, a hypervisor enables a single computing unit to hold different operating
system with different API  (e.g.,  ARINC 653, OSEK, AUTOSAR, POSIX), leading to improved
compatibility with legacy software, improved reuse and higher variability. The distinctive feature of
a hypervisor  is  compatibility with legacy software,  from simple applications with no operating
system up to full fledged operating systems (e.g.,  Linux, Windows). As result, a hypervisor can
improve reuse and reduce development and certification effort.
There are two types of virtualization,  namely: full virtualization and paravirtualization. With full
virtualization, the virtual machines established by the hypervisor provide an interface identical to
that of the underlying hardware platform (i.e., the physical/real machine); therefore, such a virtual
machine is  capable of  hosting legacy software with no modifications.  There are,  however,  two
approaches for the realization of full virtualization: (1) low-end hardware full virtualization, and (2)
high-end  hardware  full  virtualization.  Low-end  hardware  full  virtualization  relies  on  the
mechanisms provided by the underlying hardware platform, which, however, were not originally
thought for the realization of full virtualization, and therefore, not all hardware platforms fulfill the
necessary  requirements  [20].  Moreover,  it  is  often  claimed  that  it  is  not  feasible  due  to  an
unacceptably high virtualization overhead; (e.g., [21]); however, we were unable to find real-world
quantitative results to support those claims. High-end hardware full virtualization, on the other end,
depends  on  hardware  with  virtualization  support  [55]–[59],  which  lead  to  a  large  system size,
weight, power consumption, and cost. With paravirtualization, an alternative to full virtualization,
the (para)virtual machines established by the hypervisor do not provide an interface identical to the
underlying  hardware  platform,  and  instead,  provide  a  different,  more  efficient  interface.
Paravirtualization should provide better performance than low-end hardware full virtualization, and
it  is  the  only  option  on  hardware  platforms  which  do  not  fulfill  the  requirements  for  full
virtualization. When paravirtualization is used, however, the guests need to be modified to fit a
hypervisor-specific, often proprietary interface. In  Table 2.1, it can be seen that most hypervisors
provide high-end hardware full virtualization and or paravirtualization; only Proteus [60], [61], and
Rodosvisor, presented in this thesis, do support low-end hardware full virtualization. The authors of
Proteus, however, failed to back their claims by demonstrating compatibility with legacy software,
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such as a general-purpose operating system like Linux.
Table 2.1. Comparison of existing hypervisors in terms of low-end hardware full virtualization (LH-
FV), high-end hardware full virtualization (HH-FV), and paravirtualization (PV).
Hypervisor LH-FV HH-FV PV
AIR [136], [137] x
ARLX [19], [135] x x
Bruns, 2013 [138] x
Codezero [140] x
Denali [121]–[123] x
Green Hills Integrity Multivisor [18] x x
Joe, 2012 [64] x
KVM [62], [63] x
LynxSecure Separation Kernel Hypervisor [16] x x
NOVA [139] x
OKL4 [47] x x
PikeOS [17] x x
Proteus [60], [61] x x
QNX Hypervisor [141] x
Real Time Systems GbmH Hypervisor [125] x x
SierraVisor [134] x x
Spumone [126] x
Wind River VxWorks (Virtualization Profile) [127] x x
X-Hyp [128] x
Xen [129] x x
XtratuM [15], [130]–[132] x
Zampiva, 2015 [133] x x
Independently of the type of virtualization, a hypervisor can be classified as bare metal (or type 1),
or  as  hosted  (or  type  2).  Figure  2.2 illustrates  the  difference  between  bare  metal  and  hosted
hypervisors. A bare metal hypervisor,  Figure 2.2(a), sits directly on top of the hardware platform
and has full control over it. A hosted hypervisor, Figure 2.2(b), sits on top of an existing operating
system, i.e., the host operating system (e.g., Linux, Windows), with which it cooperates. A hosted
hypervisor usually requires special support from the host operating system (e.g., kernel modules),
usually  provided by the  same vendor  as  the  hypervisor  application.  Some authors  refer  to  the
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combination of operating system support for virtualization and the hypervisor application as a type
1.5 hypervisor, illustrated in  Figure 2.2(c). With complete control over the hardware platform, a
bare metal hypervisor is able to provide higher performance than a hosted hypervisor. On the other
end, a hosted hypervisor can use the services provided by the host operating system to simplify its
design and implementation. Moreover, a hosted hypervisor enables the host operating system to
support workloads other than virtual machines. Of all the hypervisors shown in  Table 2.1, only
KVM  [62],  [63] and  Joe,  2012  [64],  are  hosted  hypervisors;  all  the  others  are  bare  metal
hypervisors.  Rodosvisor,  developed  during  this  work,  by itself,  can  be  considered  as  a  hosted
hypervisor; POK/rodosvisor, i.e., the result of the integration of Rodosvisor and POK, on the other
end, can be considered as a bare metal hypervisor.
Figure 2.2. Hypervisor types: (a) bare metal, (b) hosted, and (c) type 1.5.
Historically, virtualization was first introduced in the 1960s by IBM with CP/CMS [65]. First, to
solve the problem of hardware scarcity, enabling the same hardware to be shared among multiple
users, and shortly thereafter to enable reuse of legacy software [66]. It became “meaningless” with
the explosion of the personal computer but reappeared on the server side of the Internet to improve
resource utilization and reduce power consumption  [66], and it is now finding its way to highly-
constrained embedded systems.
2.3. Interface with the Host
The expected interface between the host and a VCPU is illustrated in Figure 2.3. When a VCPU is
scheduled,  its  partition  window  begins,  and  the  host  must  “load”  the  VCPU  through  the
corresponding “load” method in the VCPU's interface. The “load” method requires as a parameter
the duration of the partition window (a.k.a., quantum). After a VCPU has been loaded, it assumes
full control over the CPU and, when the partition window is over, the VCPU is responsible for
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returning control back to the host. The VCPU, when requested to load, updates its internal state for
the time since it was last unloaded/saved, and sets part of the CPU state to reflect the current state of
the VCPU. The part of the CPU state that is set is such that it does not interfere with the operation
of the VCPU (e.g., configure the memory management unit but do not enable it); this decreases the
effort required for resuming and pausing the VCPU, described below, which need to be performed
far more often.
Figure 2.3. Illustration of the interaction between the host, the VCPU and the guest.
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After loading the VCPU, or after calling one of the VCPU interrupt-handlers described below, the
host must “resume” the VCPU. The VCPU, when requested to resume, updates the remaining state
of the CPU (i.e., not updated by “load”) to reflect the current state of the VCPU and resumes the
execution of the guest.
After the execution of the guest has been resumed, any CPU interrupt will be first handled by the
host. The host is then responsible for:
1. saving the guest's user mode state in the VCPU's register file;
2. pausing the VCPU by calling the corresponding method in the VCPU's interface (“pause” is
the inverse of “resume,” i.e.,  it  saves and updates the part of the CPU state which may
interfere with the operation of the VCPU);
3. calling the corresponding VCPU interrupt-handler.
A special interrupt is the one that signals the end of the VCPU partition window; in the PowerPC
405 this  is the programmable-interval timer (PIT) interrupt, described in more detail in  Section
2.4.2. Timers. Like any other interrupt, the host is responsible for pausing the VCPU and calling the
respective  VCPU  interrupt-handler.  However,  upon  finding  that  a  particular  PIT  interrupt  is
signaling the end of the partition window, the VCPU calls the host's “systick” method. (In Section
2.4.2 Timers, it is described how the VCPU finds that a particular PIT interrupt is signaling the end
of the partition window.) The host, in turn, is responsible for saving the VCPU and calling the
scheduler, effectively returning control back to the host. When a VCPU is requested to “save,” it
saves and updates the remaining part of the CPU state to reflect the host's expected state of the
CPU.
2.4. Full Virtualization
In  the  following  subsections  the  methodologies  used  to  accomplish  full  virtualization  of  the
PowerPC  405  are  described.  This  includes  virtualization  of  the  instruction  set,  Section  2.4.1.
Instruction Set, of time and of the timers, Section 2.4.2. Timers, of the memory management unit,
Section 2.4.3. Memory Management Unit, and of the interrupts, Section 2.4.4. Interrupts.
2.4.1.Instruction Set
The instruction set of the PowerPC 405 is divided in two subsets: (1) the privileged instruction
subset, and (2) the user (or non-privileged) instruction subset. The PowerPC 405 also provides two
execution modes: privileged mode, and user mode (a.k.a., problem state or non-privileged mode). In
privileged mode, the PowerPC 405 allows the execution of the entire instruction set: the privileged
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and user instruction subsets. In user mode, however, only the user instruction subset is allowed to be
executed, and an attempt to execute a privileged instruction leads to the generation of a program
exception (or interrupt). This is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4. A sequence diagram illustrating how the PowerPC 405 handles the user and privileged
instruction subsets when in the user and privileged modes.
When  a  guest  is  running,  the  CPU  is  always  in  user  mode,  where  execution  of  privileged
instructions is not allowed. In privileged mode, with direct access to the privileged instruction set,
the guest would have full control over the CPU, and could violate time and space partitioning. The
guest, however, expects access to the privileged instruction set and associated functionality, and
thus, access to the privileged instruction set is provided indirectly, while guarantying that time and
space partitioning is not violated, as will be explained.
When a guest  is  running,  the CPU is  always in  user  mode and, therefore,  whenever  the guest
executes a user instruction, that instruction is executed directly by the CPU; however, whenever the
guest  attempts  to  execute  a  privileged instruction  a  program interrupt  is  generated  instead.  As
explained in Section 2.3. Interface with the Host, whenever a CPU interrupt is generated, it is first
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handled by the host which, in turn, calls the corresponding VCPU interrupt-handler, in this case, the
VCPU program interrupt-handler. As illustrated in Figure 2.5, the VCPU program interrupt-handler,
checks the condition which lead to the generation of the program interrupt and then:
C1.If the condition was an attempt to execute a privileged instruction with the CPU configured
in user mode, but the VCPU is in privileged mode (condition C1), then, the guest expects the
privileged  instruction  to  be  executed  normally  and  thus,  the  program  interrupt-handler
“manually” fetches, decodes, and emulates the execution of the privileged instruction.
C2.For all other conditions (condition C2), a program interrupt request is issued to emulate the
generation of the original program interrupt in the VCPU. Interrupt requests and dispatching
are discussed in Section 2.4.4. Interrupts.
Figure 2.5. A sequence diagram illustrating how emulation of privileged instructions is
accomplished.
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In this section, it is only explained how privileged instructions are trapped, up to the point where the
corresponding emulation routine is called; actual emulation is explained in the following sections.
2.4.2.Timers
The PowerPC 405 provides four timer units, namely: (1) the Time Base, (2) the Programmable-
Interval Timer, (3) the Fixed-Interval Timer, and (4) the Watchdog. First, the Time Base, illustrated
in Figure 2.6, is a 64-bit counter which increments, depending on the hardware configuration, at the
same rate as the CPU's clock or according to an external clock signal. The current value of the Time
Base is accessible for reading and writing from two Special-Purpose Registers (SPR): (1) the Time-
Base Lower (TBL) for the least significant 32 bits; and (2) the Time-Base Upper (TBU) for the
most significant 32 bits.
Figure 2.6. The Time Base and the Programmable-Interval Timer in the PowerPC 405.
Second, the Programmable-Interval Timer, also illustrated in  Figure 2.6, is a 32-bit timer which
decrements  at  the  same  rate  as  the  Time-Base,  and  its  current  value  is  accessed  through  the
Programmable-Interval Timer register (PIT). When its current value decrements from one to zero,
the timer overflows, the PIT Interrupt Status (PIS) bit field in the Timer Status Register (TSR) is set
and, if enabled, a PIT interrupt is generated. The PIT interrupt is enabled through the PIT Interrupt
Enable (PIE) bit field in the Timer Control Register (TCR), and by the External interrupt Enable
(EE) bit field in the Machine State Register (MSR).
Third, the Fixed-Interval Timer, illustrated in Figure 2.7, keeps track of changes in specific bits of
the  Time Base;  when a selected  bit  changes  from zero  to  one,  the  timer  “overflows,” the  FIT
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Interrupt Status (FIS) bit field in the TSR is set and, if enabled, a FIT interrupt is generated. The
specific bit of the Time Base is selected through the FIT Period (FP) bit field in the TCR, and the
FIT interrupt is enabled through the FIT Interrupt Enable (FIE) bit field in the TCR, and by EE in
the MSR.
Figure 2.7. The Fixed-Interval Timer and the Watchdog in the PowerPC 405.
Forth and last, the Watchdog, also illustrated in  Figure 2.7, similarly to the Fixed-Interval Timer,
also keeps track of changes from zero to one (i.e., an “overflow”) on selected bits of the Time Base.
When there is an overflow, the Enable Next Watchdog (ENW) bit field in the TSR is set; if there is
an overflow and ENW is already set, the Watchdog Interrupt Status (WIS) bit field in the TSR is
also set and, if enabled, a Watchdog interrupt is generated; if, however, there is an overflow and
ENW and WIS are both set, the CPU will perform one of the following four actions: (1) no action;
(2) a core-reset; (3) a chip-reset; or (4) a system-reset. The specific bit of the Time Base is selected
through the Watchdog Period (WP) bit field in the TCR, and the action performed by the CPU when
there is an overflow and both ENW and WIS are set is selected by the Watchdog Reset Control
(WRC) bit field in the TCR. The Watchdog interrupt is enabled through the Watchdog Interrupt
Enable (WIE) bit field in the TCR, and by the Critical interrupt Enable (CE) bit field in the MSR.
In summary, the timer units are configured through the following registers: TBL and TBU, TCR,
PIT, and MSR; however, with the progression of time the following register are “silently” updated:
(1) TBL, TBU, and PIT are updated at the same rate, as explained above; and (2) TSR is updated
whenever there is an overflow of the timers.
All of the register mentioned above are accessible through the Move To Special Purpose Register
(MTSPR) instruction for writing, and through the Move From Special Purpose Register (MFSPR)
instruction for reading. These instructions are considered privileged instructions if the register being
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accessed is also a privileged register;  otherwise,  they are considered user instructions. With the
exception of TBL and TBU, all of the register mentioned above are privileged. TBL and TBU have
two alias: (1) one read/write privileged register, and (2) one read-only user register.
In the rest of the section, it is described how access to the various registers is emulated and, as a
consequence, how the behavior of the PowerPC 405 timer units is emulated. Currently, changing
the value of the VCPU's TBL and TBU is not supported, and thus, this is not described. Guests,
however, can still read the current value of the TBL and TBU, either through the privileged or the
user alias. For improved performance and accuracy, the user alias is preferable as it is executed
directly by the CPU. Similarly, emulation of the Watchdog is currently unsupported and it is not
described.
2.4.2.1. PIT
As explained in Section 2.3. Interface with the Host, the CPU's PIT is used to keep track of the end
the partition window and, at the same time, to emulate the behavior of the VCPU's PIT. This is
accomplished by configuring the CPU's PIT with the alternative that will generate an interrupt first:
(1) the time until the end of the partition window (a.k.a., the quantum), or (2) the VCPU's time until
the next PIT interrupt (Tnpi). Tnpi is infinite, if the VCPU's PIT interrupt is disabled; otherwise, if
the VCPU's PIT interrupt is enabled,  Tnpi is equal to the value of the VCPU's PIT. As shown in
Figure 2.8, the CPU's PIT will be loaded with the quantum (Q), if Tnpi is larger than the quantum
(i.e., the associated interrupt will occur at a later time). Conversely, the CPU's PIT will be loaded
with the value of the VCPU's PIT, if  the  Tnpi is smaller than the quantum (i.e.,  the associated
interrupt will occur sooner).
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Figure 2.8. A sequence diagram illustrating the configuration of the CPU's PIT with either (1) the
time until the end of the partition window (a.k.a., the quantum, or Q), or (2) the VCPU's time until
the next PIT interrupt (Tnpi).
After loading the CPU's PIT, when it is necessary to update the quantum or the VCPU's PIT, if the
CPU's PIT has been loaded with the quantum (i.e., if Q ≤ Tnpi), then, as illustrated in Listing 2.1:
• The updated quantum (Q') is the current value in the CPU's PIT (i.e., Q' = CPU PIT).
• The updated VCPU's PIT (VCPU PIT'), on the other end, depends on the last known value
of the VCPU's PIT (VCPU PIT) (i.e., the value of the VCPU's PIT at the time when the CPU
PIT was last loaded). If VCPU PIT is smaller than the time elapsed since the quantum was
last  loaded (i.e.,  if  VCPU PIT  ≤ Q -  Q',  where  Q is  the  last  known quantum,  and,  as
described above, Q' the updated quantum), then, there is an overflow and the VCPU TSR's
PIS is set to one. Moreover, if auto-reload is enabled (i.e., if VCPU TSR ARE == 1), the
auto-reload value is calculated, and VCPU PIT' is set to that value; otherwise, if auto-reload
is disabled, VCPU PIT' is set to zero (i.e., the timer is stopped). If, however, VCPU PIT is
larger than the time elapsed since the quantum was last loaded (i.e., if VCPU PIT > Q - Q'),
then, the updated VCPU's PIT is: VCPU PIT' = VCPU PIT - (Q - Q').
When, on the other end, it is necessary to update the quantum or the VCPU's PIT, but the CPU's PIT
has been loaded with the value of the VCPU's PIT (i.e., if Q > Tnpi), then, as illustrated in Listing
2.1:
• The updated VCPU's PIT (VCPU PIT') is the current value in the CPU's PIT (i.e., VCPU
PIT' = CPU PIT).
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• The updated quantum is:  Q'  = Q - (VCPU PIT - VCPU PIT'),  where Q' is the updated
quantum, Q the last known quantum, VCPU PIT the last known value of the VCPU's PIT,
and, as described above, VCPU PIT' the updated value of the VCPU's PIT.
1 if Q <= Tnpi
2 
3     Q' = CPU PIT
4     
5     if VCPU PIT <= Q - Q'
6 
7         VCPU TSR PIS = 1
8 
9         if VCPU TSR ARE == 1
10           VCPU PIT' = auto_reload()
11         else
12           VCPU PIT' = 0
13         endif
14 
15     else
16 
17         VCPU PIT' = VCPU PIT - (Q - Q')
18     endif
19     
20 else
21 
22     VCPU PIT' = CPU PIT
23     Q' = Q - (VCPU PIT - VCPU PIT')
24 endif
Listing 2.1. Pseudo-code illustration of the procedure used to update the quantum and the VCPU's
PIT.
Hence,  when a guest  requests  the value of the VCPU's  PIT,  then,  as  shown in  Figure 2.9,  the
quantum and the VCPU's PIT are updated as described above, and the updated value of the VCPU's
PIT is returned to the guest.
27
Figure 2.9. VCPU operation when a guest requests the value of the VCPU's PIT.
Conversely, when a guest requests a change to the value of the VCPU's PIT, then, as illustrated in
Figure 2.10:
1. The quantum and the VCPU's PIT are updated as described above.
2. The VCPU's PIT is overwritten with the value provided by the guest.
3. Based on the new VCPU's PIT and on the updated quantum, the CPU's PIT is loaded with
the configuration which will generated an interrupt sooner (i.e., “loadPIT” in Figure 2.10),
as explained earlier.
Figure 2.10. VCPU operation when a guest requests a change to the value of the VCPU's PIT.
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2.4.2.2. TSR
When a guest request the current value of the VCPU's TSR, then, as illustrated in Figure 2.11:
1. The VCPU TSR's PIS is updated, as explained in the previous section.
2. The VCPU TSR's FIS is updated as follows: if the current CPU TSR's FIS is set, then, set
the VCPU TSR's FIS; otherwise, the VCPU TSR's FIS remains unchanged.
Figure 2.11. VCPU operation when a guest requests the value of the VCPU's TSR.
The TSR is a clear-on-write register: an input bit set to one, clears the corresponding bit in the TSR;
an input bit set to zero, keeps the corresponding bit in the TSR unchanged. As shown in Figure 2.12,
when a guest writes to the VCPU's TSR:
1. The VCPU TSR's PIS and FIS are updated, as explained above.
2. The input value is used to clear-on-write (COW) the updated VCPU's TSR.
3. The input value is used to clear-on-write only the CPU TSR's PIS and FIS.
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Figure 2.12. VCPU operation when a guest writes to the VCPU's TSR.
2.4.2.3. TCR
When a guest requests a change to the current value of the VCPU's TCR, the CPU's TCR is updated
as shown in Table 2.2. The CPU's TCR not only depends on the VCPU's TCR but it also depends on
the VCPU's MSR; therefore, whenever the VCPU's MSR is updated, the CPU's TCR is updated as
well. The VCPU's TCR is never “silently” updated, therefore, when a guest requests the current
value of the VCPU's TCR, then, the current value of the VCPU's TCR is returned without the need
for any additional operation.
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Table 2.2. Setting of the CPU's TCR based on the VCPU state.
CPU's TCR Setting
WP
(Watchdog Period)
Always set to zero. Setting this field to a value different than zero
is currently not supported.
WRC
(Watchdog Reset Control)
Always set to zero. Setting this field to a value different than zero
is currently not supported.
WIE
(Watchdog  Interrupt
Enable)
Always set to zero. Setting this field to a value different than zero
is currently not supported.
PIE
(PIT Interrupt Enable)
Always set to one (i.e., PIT interrupts enabled). The CPU's PIT is
always set to generate either quantum-related interrupts or VCPU
PIT interrupts.
FP
(FIT Period)
According to the VCPU TCR's FP.
FIE
(FIT Interrupt Enable)
According to the VCPU TCR's FIE if and only if the VCPU MSR's
EE is set to one (i.e., external interrupts enabled); otherwise, set to
zero.
ARE
(Auto Reload Enable)
Always set to zero. Setting this field to a value different than zero
is currently not supported.
2.4.2.4. Interrupts
As explained before, when there is a CPU PIT interrupt, and the system is in state P1 (i.e., the
CPU's PIT contains the quantum), that interrupt marks the end of the partition window and the host
is called to handle the event (i.e., save the VCPU, call the scheduler, etc.). Otherwise, if the system
is in state P2 (i.e., the CPU's PIT is an alias of the VCPU's PIT), that interrupt marks a VCPU PIT
interrupt and, as illustrated in Figure 2.13, in such case:
1. The CPU TSR's PIS is cleared to prevent further CPU PIT interrupts.
2. The VCPU TSR's PIS is set, and an interrupt request is performed. Interrupt requests and
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dispatching are discussed in Section 2.4.4. Interrupts.
3. The VCPU's PIT and the quantum are updated, based on the last known value of the VCPU's
PIT, and the current time (found in the Time Base), similarly to what has been explained in
Section 2.4.2.1. PIT.
4. Based on the updated VCPU's PIT and the updated quantum, load the CPU's PIT with the
shorter configuration, as explained before.
Figure 2.13. VCPU operation when there is a CPU PIT interrupt and the system is in state P2.
A FIT interrupt, on other end, always marks a VCPU FIT interrupt and, as shown in Figure 2.14,
when that occurs:
1. The CPU TSR's FIS is cleared to prevent further CPU FIT interrupts
2. The VCPU TSR's FIS is set, and an interrupt request is performed. Interrupt requests and
dispatching are discussed in Section 2.4.4. Interrupts.
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Figure 2.14. VCPU operation when there is a CPU FIT interrupt.
2.4.2.5. Preemption
Whenever a VCPU is not loaded, elapsed time must still be accounted for. Therefore, when a VCPU
is saved, the preemption time is saved and then, when a VCPU is loaded again, the time elapsed
since the last preemption time is used to update all the timers.
2.4.3.Memory Management Unit
In  the  following  subsections,  the  methodologies  used  for  the  virtualization  of  the  memory
management unit (MMU) in the PowerPC 405 are described. First, in Section 2.4.3.1. PowerPC 405
Memory Management Unit, the PowerPC 405's MMU is described. Second, an overview of the
MMU's virtualization is given in Section 2.4.3.2. Overview. Third and forth, the mappings required
between the VCPU's real and virtual modes and the CPU's virtual mode, are explained in Section
2.4.3.3. Real Mode Translation and Section 2.4.3.4. Virtual Mode Translation, respectively.
2.4.3.1. PowerPC 405 Memory Management Unit
In the PowerPC 405 the address  specified by an instruction fetch or a  data  load/store (i.e.,  an
effective  address)  always  goes  through the  memory management  unit  (MMU),  as  illustrated  in
Figure  2.15.  The  MMU  provides:  (1)  address  translation,  (2)  access  control,  and  (3)  storage
attributes. Address translation is enabled for instruction fetches through the instruction relocation
(IR) bit field, and for data loads and stores by the data relocation (DR) bit field, both in the Machine
State Register (MSR); if set to 1, address translation is enabled; otherwise (i.e., if set to 0), address
translation is disabled.
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Figure 2.15. The logical connections between the cache units, the memory management unit and the
405 processor within a PowerPC 405.
When address translation is disabled (i.e., real mode), an effective address (EA) is considered a real
address (RA) and is used to address the resources outside the CPU (e.g.,  memory and I/O), as
illustrated  in  Figure  2.15 by  the  connection  between  the  “Fetch  and  Decode  Logic”  and  the
“Instruction Cache,” and by the connection between the “Execution Unit” and the “Data Cache.” In
real mode, the MMU also provides storage attributes, which will be described later in this section.
When address translation is enabled (i.e., virtual mode), on the other end, an effective address (EA)
is considered a virtual address (VA) and goes through the Translation Look-aside Buffer (TLB)
where it is translated to a real address (RA) which is then used to access the resources outside the
CPU; this is illustrated in Figure 2.15 by the connections from the “Fetch and Decode Logic” and
the “Execution Unit” to the TLB.
The TLB is composed by 64 entries, and each TLB entry is divided into TLBHI and TLBLO, as
shown in  Figure 2.16.  Each TLB entry specifies  a  virtual  address  space and a  translation to  a
corresponding real/physical address space. In  Table 2.3, the fields of a TLB entry related to the
virtual address space and translation are described; the remaining fields are used for access control
and storage attributes and will be described later in this section.
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Figure 2.16. TLBHI and TLBLO.
Table 2.3. The bit fields in a TLB entry controlling address translation.
Field Description
Effective 
Page 
Number 
(EPN)
Defines  the  start  of  the  virtual  address  space;  it  is  compared with  the  most
significant bits of the virtual address specified by an instruction fetch or data
load/store.  If  EPN,  together  with  SIZE,  does  not  match  the  virtual  address
specified, for all of the TLB entries, then, a TLB-miss interrupt is generated: (1)
an instruction TLB-miss interrupt if it is an instruction fetch, or (2) a data TLB-
miss interrupt if it is a data load/store.
SIZE Defines the size of the virtual address space; it also defines how many bits of the
virtual address are compared with EPN. Available sizes include: 1 KB, 4 KB, 16
KB, 64 KB, 256 KB, 1 MB, 4 MB, and 16 MB.
Valid (V) Indicates  whether  or  not  the  entry  is  valid,  and  thus,  if  it  can  be  used  for
translation or not.
Translation 
ID (TID)
If not equal to zero, this field is compared with the value in the Process ID (PID)
special-purpose register; if there is no match a TLB-miss interrupt is generated.
If equal to zero, no comparison is performed.
Real Page 
Number 
(RPN)
When the virtual  address matches  all  the other  fields,  this  field replaces the
upper  bits  of  the  virtual  address  to  form a  real/physical  address.  The actual
number of bits replaced depends on SIZE.
Apart from address translation, the PowerPC 405's MMU also provides access control and storage
attributes. Access control provides protection against execution as well as reading and writing from
memory; violation of the access control configuration results in the generation of an instruction or
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data storage interrupt, depending on the type of access. Access control is available only in virtual
mode. Storage attributes, on the other end, enable, among other things, different sections of the
address space to be handled differently depending on their contents (e.g., memory or I/O); violation
of the restriction associated with some of the storage attributes may also result in the generation of
an instruction or data storage interrupt.  Storage attributes are  available in both real and virtual
modes.
In real mode, storage attributes are configured by a set of Special-Purpose Registers (SPR), each
dedicated  to  a  specific  storage attribute.  Each SPR is  32-bit,  and each bit  controls  the  storage
attribute of a unique 128 MB section (from a total of 4 GB) of the real mode address space, as
illustrated in Table 2.4. On the other end, in virtual mode, access control and storage attributes are
controlled by the TLB and the Zone Protection Register (ZPR). Each TLB entry, enforces access
control and storage attributes to the corresponding virtual address space or, after translation, to the
corresponding real address space.
Table 2.4. Bit fields in a SPR controlling a real mode storage attribute and the corresponding 128
MB sections of the real address space affected (big-endian notation).
Bit Begin End
0 x'0000 0000' .. x'07FF FFFF'
1 x'0800 0000' .. x'0FFF FFFF'
N (x'0800 0000' × N) (x'0800 0000' × (N + 1) - 1)
31 x'F800 0000' x'FFFF FFFF'
In Table 2.5, access controls available in virtual mode is shown alongside the SPR and or the fields
in a  TLB entry which control  them. Access control  is  only applicable in  virtual  mode.  Access
control is configured by the following:
• TLB[EX],  Execute  enable  in  a  TLB entry:  enables  execution  of  instructions  within  the
associated address space.
• TLB[WR], Write enable in a TLB entry: enables data stores within the associated page
• TLB[ZSEL], Zone Select field in a TLB entry: selects one of 16 protection zones from the
ZPR. A protection zone can override the access control configuration specified by TLB[EX]
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and TLB[WR], as explained in Table 2.6.
• ZPR, Zone Protection Register: enables the definition of 16 protection zones which may or
not  override  the  access  control  configuration  specified  by  TLB[EX]  and  TLB[WR],  as
explained in Table 2.6.
Table 2.5. Access control and its configuration in virtual mode.
Access control Virtual mode
No access TLB[ZSEL], ZPR
Write-enable TLB[ZSEL], TLB[WR], ZPR
Execute-enable TLB[ZSEL], TLB[EX], ZPR
Table 2.6. Bit fields in the Zone Protection Register and their effect in user and privileged modes.
Fields Setting User mode Privileged mode
Z0 -- Z15 b'00' No  access:  data  load  and  store
operations are not permitted.
Access  controlled  by  TLB[EX]
and TLB[WR].
b'01' Access  controlled  by  TLB[EX]
and TLB[WR].
Access  controlled  by  TLB[EX]
and TLB[WR].
b'10' Access  controlled  by  TLB[EX]
and TLB[WR].
No access restrictions.
b'11' No access restrictions. No access restrictions.
Similarly, Table 2.7 shows that the following storage attributes are available:
• Guarded storage: controls whether or not the processor can perform speculative memory
accesses to improve performance; it is controlled by the Storage Guarded Register (SGR), or
by the Guarded (G) field in a TLB entry.
• Instruction  cacheability:  this  storage  attribute  enables  or  not  the  instruction  cache;  it  is
configured by Instruction Cacheability Control Register (ICCR), or by the Inhibit cache (I)
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field in a TLB entry.
• Data cacheability: this storage attribute enables or not the data cache; it is controlled by the
Data Cacheability Control Register (DCCR), or by the I field in a TLB entry.
• Write strategy: when the data cache is enabled, this storage attribute controls whether a data
store  should  update  only  the  cache  (write-back)  or,  if  both  the  cache  and  the  external
memory should be updated (write-through); it is controlled by the Data Cache Write-through
Register (DCWR), or by the Write-through (W) field in a TLB entry.
• Endianess: specifies whether the data is big-endian or little-endian; it is controlled by the
Storage Little-Endian Register (SLER), or by the Endian (E) field in a TLB entry.
• User-defined 0: in the PowerPC 405, when this storage attribute is enabled, an interrupt is
generated for any data load/store; it  is controlled by the Storage User-defined 0 Register
(SU0R), or by the User-defined 0 (U0) field in a TLB entry.
Table 2.7. Storage attributes, and their configuration in real mode and virtual mode.
Storage attribute Real mode Virtual mode
Guarded storage SGR TLB[G]
Instruction cacheability ICCR
TLB[I]
Data cacheability DCCR
Write strategy DCWR TLB[W]
Endianess SLER TLB[E]
User-defined 0 SU0R TLB[U0]
In summary,  the PowerPC 405's  MMU provides  address translation,  access control and storage
attributes; when address translation is disabled, storage attributes are controlled by a set of SPR and
there is no access control; when address translation is enabled, virtual-to-real address translation,
access control and storage attributes are controlled by the TLB, the PID and the ZPR.
2.4.3.2. Overview
After reset, like the CPU, the VCPU is set to operate in real mode (i.e., instruction and data address
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translation  disabled).  The guest  modifies  the  VCPU's  MMU configuration  (e.g.,  mode,  address
translation,  access  control,  storage  attributes)  through  the  execution  of  privileged  instructions
which, as explained in Section 2.4.1. Instruction Set, lead to the generation of a program interrupt
and  the  execution  of  the  corresponding  emulation  routine  in  the  VCPU.  The  guest,  however,
executes always in the CPU's virtual mode, and the CPU's virtual mode is used to emulate the
VCPU's real and virtual modes, as will be explained later. This approach is necessary because the
CPU's real mode does not provide access control, and thus, the guest would be able to read, write
and execute from anywhere in the memory address space, including other virtual machine's and the
hypervisor's code and data. In other words, it is not possible to enforce space partitioning in real
mode.
As illustrated  in  Figure  2.17,  whenever  the  guest  requests  a  change to  the  VCPU's  real  mode
configuration:
1. The real mode configuration in the VCPU's register file is updated.
2. The VCPU's real mode configuration is translated to a CPU's virtual mode configuration
which emulates  the  behavior  of  the  VCPU's  real  mode configuration  (this  translation  is
described in Section 2.4.3.3. Real Mode Translation).
3. If the VCPU is in real mode, the CPU's virtual mode configuration is also updated.
Figure 2.17. Handling of a change to the VCPU's real mode configuration.
Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 2.18, whenever the guest requests a change to the VCPU's virtual
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mode configuration:
1. The virtual mode configuration in the VCPU's register file is updated.
2. The VCPU's virtual mode configuration is translated to a CPU's virtual mode configuration
which emulates the behavior of the VCPU's virtual mode configuration (this translation is
described in Section 2.4.3.4 Virtual Mode Translation).
3. If  the VCPU is  currently in  virtual  mode,  the CPU's virtual  mode configuration is  also
updated.
Figure 2.18. Handling of a change to the VCPU's virtual mode configuration.
Unlike the PowerPC 405's MMU, independent control over instruction and data address translation
is  not  supported:  either  instruction  and  data  translation  are  both  enabled,  or  both  disabled.
Independent control over instruction and data address translation would lead to the following issues:
• Knowing that the VCPU's real and virtual modes are emulated by the CPU's virtual mode, a
conflict between the two configurations could occur such that more than one TLB entry
would be matched for the same effective address.
• Similarly,  knowing that  the  VCPU's  real  and virtual  modes  are  emulated  by the  CPU's
virtual mode, the CPU's virtual mode would have to be dynamically managed between the
two modes.
A throughout  study  has  not  been  performed  to  evaluate  the  true  extent  of  the  feasibility  of
40
independent control over instruction and data address translation. We have considered the reasons
above enough to stop us from doing so, and postpone that for future work. Furthermore, use of this
feature is rare; during this work, we have found that only Linux used this feature, in a routine to
flush the  cache  during initialization;  we have easily modified that  routine to  work around this
limitation.
2.4.3.3. Real Mode Translation
The  translation  between  the  VCPU's  real  mode  configuration  and  the  CPU's  virtual  mode
configuration is illustrated in  Figure 2.19. In  Table 2.8 and Table 2.9, the translation between the
VCPU's real mode configuration and the CPU's virtual mode configuration is described. Table 2.8
shows  the  translation  between  the  VCPU's  real  mode  configuration  and  the  CPU's  TLB  (i.e.,
realTLB), and Table 2.9 shows the translation between the VCPU's real mode configuration and the
CPU's PID and ZPR (i.e., realPID and realZPR). Translation is performed only once, whenever the
VCPU's real mode configuration is changed, and it is saved in the VCPU's register file: “realTLB”
corresponds to the CPU's TLB, “realPID” to the CPU's PID and “realZPR” to the CPU's ZPR after
translation.
Figure 2.19. Translation between the VCPU's real mode configuration and the CPU's virtual mode
configuration.
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Table 2.8. Translation between the VCPU's real mode configuration and the CPU's TLB (i.e.,
realTLB).
realTLB
entry bit
field
Setting
EPN EPN is set during initialization and never changes; it is set to the guest real/physical
start address of the “ith” page of the guest-physical address space. EPN, RPN, and
SIZE,  together,  define  the  guest-physical  address  space  and  map  it  to  the
hypervisor-physical address space.
SIZE The SIZE field, similarly to EPN and RPN, is set during initialization and never
changes; it is set to the size of the “ith” page of the guest-physical address space.
V All of the entries required to map the guest-physical address space are valid (i.e.,
V = 1); all other entries are invalid (i.e., V = 0). The “realTLB” can have up to 64
entries; however, in most cases, only a few entries are need.
E E = bita(EPN / 227, SLER). Copy the bit in SLER which has an effect on the guest-
physical address space defined by EPN, SIZE and RPN.
U0 U0 = bita(EPN / 227, SU0R). Copy the bit in SU0R which has an effect on the guest-
physical address space defined by EPN, SIZE and RPN.
TID TID = 0. Always disable PID-TID comparison; it is not required.
RPN RPN is  set  during  initialization  and never  changes;  it  is  set  to  the  hypervisor-
physical start address of the “ith” page of the guest-physical address space.
ZSEL ZSEL is always set to select the Zone 0 in ZPR, which as shown in Table 2.9, is set
to  override  the  write-enabled  (WR) and execute-enable  (EX)  fields  and always
grant write and execute permission.
EX Overridden by ZSEL and ZPR.
WR Overridden by ZSEL and ZPR.
W W = bita(EPN / 227, DCWR). Copy the bit in DCWR which has an effect on the
guest-physical address space defined by EPN, SIZE and RPN.
I Refer to Table 2.10.
G G = 1. Always disable speculative memory accesses.
abit: a function which extracts the “nth” bit, as specified by the first argument, from the second one (big-
endian notation).
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Table 2.9. Translation between the VCPU's real mode configuration and the CPU's PID and ZPR
(i.e., realPID and realZPR).
SPR Setting
realPID Ignored; PID-TID comparison is always disabled.
realZPR Zone 0 = b'11': execute and write permissions granted.
Zones 1 through 15: not used, ignored.
Table 2.10. Translation between the VCPU's ICCR and DCCR, and the I bit field in the CPU's TLB.
ICCR DCCR I Remarks
0 0 1 Data and instruction cacheability disabled as expected.
0 1 0 Instruction cacheability unexpectedly enabled.
1 0 1 Instruction cacheability unexpectedly disabled.
1 1 0 Data and instruction cacheability enabled as expected.
As  explained  in  Section  2.4.3.1.  PowerPC 405  Memory  Management  Unit,  real  mode  storage
attributes are controlled by 32-bit special-purpose register (SPR) where, each bit controls a 128 MB
section of the real mode address space. When translating the VCPU's real mode configuration to the
CPU's  TLB,  EPN  is  used  to  calculate  the  corresponding  128  MB  section  and  extract  the
corresponding bit from the SPR. For SLER/E, SU0R/U0, and DCWR/W, the mapping is direct, as
shown in Table 2.8.
However, for the real mode storage attribute controlled by SGR no identical virtual mode storage
attribute can be found. The closest virtual mode storage attribute is G (guarded); however, in virtual
mode, an instruction fetch to guarded storage generates an exceptions, while in real mode, nothing
happens. To overcome this difference, storage is never marked as guarded in the “realTLB.” The
consequence is that, when guests execute in the VCPU's real mode, the CPU will speculatively
fetch  instructions  (the  PowerPC  405  does  not  perform  speculative  data  accesses).  If  this  is
undesired, guests should use other methods to prevent speculative instruction fetches, as described
in [22], such as using virtual mode. As future work, we propose the evaluation of alternatives to this
translation, which may be acceptable for some guests.
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Similarly to SGR, there is no direct mapping between DCCR and ICCR, and the “realTLB.” While
DCCR and ICCR provide independent control over data and instruction cacheability, respectively,
the I bit field, on the other end, either inhibits data and instruction cacheability altogether, or not. To
overcome this problem the mapping between DCCR and ICCR, and the I field in the “realTLB” is
performed as shown in  Table 2.10. It  can be summarized as follows: if DCCR is set to enable
cacheability,  then  enable  cacheability;  otherwise,  disable  it;  ICCR  is  basically  ignored.  This
particular mapping has been chosen because after a careful analysis of the instruction set, it has
been verified that the “dcba” and “dcbz” user instructions behave differently when data cacheability
is enabled and when data cacheability is disabled. More specifically, when cacheability is enabled,
“dcba” is able to indirectly modify the contents of main memory, and when cacheability is disabled,
the  execution  of  “dcbz”  always  causes  an exception.  Therefore,  if  the  CPU's  data  cacheability
configuration  did  not  reflect  the  VCPU's  configuration,  main  memory  could  be  inadvertently
modified or an exception could be inadvertently generated. The same cannot be said for the CPU's
instruction cacheability configuration,  which does not affect the behavior of any non-privileged
instructions. This mapping is such that:
• When  the  VCPU  configuration  enables  instruction  cacheability  but  disables  data
cacheability,  the  I  bit  field will  be set  to  disable  both data  and instruction cacheability,
resulting in lower instruction access performance than what would be normally expected.
• When  the  VCPU  configuration  disables  instruction  cacheability  but  enables  data
cacheability, the I bit field will be set so that that data and instruction cacheability are both
enabled.  This  mapping has  the  following two issues.  First,  if  some memory address  is
modified and then flushed by the data cache, that change will not be immediately visible to
the instruction cache as it would if instruction cacheability was disabled. To overcome this,
guests need only to append an “icbi” and an “isync” instruction to the code which may
modify memory containing  executable  code.  Second,  the  instruction  cache  will  become
"polluted" and the processor may access parts of the memory it would not normally access
(e.g., to fill an instruction cache line the PowerPC 405 may read up to 8 instruction). To
overcome this:  (1) guests should safeguard their code to prevent unexpected accesses to
memory, as described in [22]; and (2) guests should not rely on the data that is returned by
the “icread” instruction after setting this particular configuration.
Despite the issues with the mapping between DCCR and ICCR, and the I bit field, the problematic
conditions occur rarely and can be easily overcome, as described above. As future work, we propose
the evaluation of alternatives to this translation, which may be acceptable for some guests.
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During the execution of the guest, in real mode, the following interrupts, related to the MMU, can
be generated: storage interrupts and TLB-miss interrupts. Data and instruction storage interrupts are
always forwarded to the VCPU and subsequently to the guest. A careful analysis of the conditions
for data and instruction storage interrupts revealed that, whenever they occur, they need only to be
redirected to the VCPU. When a data or instruction TLB-miss interrupt is generated, however, it
indicates that the guest tried to access an address outside its dedicated address space; in this case,
the VCPU exception handler is called, which may choose to ignore the error, generate a machine
check interrupt, among other things. In Section 2.5. I/O virtualization, it is described how the VCPU
exception handler is used for I/O virtualization.
2.4.3.4. Virtual Mode Translation
The  translation  between  the  VCPU's  virtual  mode  configuration  and  the  CPU's  virtual  mode
configuration is illustrated in Figure 2.20. In Table 2.11, Table 2.12, and Table 2.13 the translation
between  the  VCPU's  virtual  mode  configuration  and  the  CPU's  virtual  mode  configuration  is
described.  As shown in  Table 2.11,  most  of  the  fields  of  a  VCPU's  TLB entry do not  require
translation. The only exceptions are the V and RPN bit fields because of the translation required
between the guest-physical and the hypervisor-physical address spaces.
Figure 2.20. Translation between the VCPU's virtual mode configuration and the CPU's virtual
mode configuration.
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Table 2.11. Translation of the VCPU's TLB to the CPU's TLB (i.e., the translatedTLB).
translatedTLB
entry bit field
Translation
EPN No translation.
SIZE No translation.
V Marked as valid (i.e., V is set to 1), only if RPN, together with SIZE, are legal,
and the original V is set to valid; otherwise, it is marked as invalid (i.e., V is set
to 0).
TID No translation.
RPN Translated  to:  (RPN – G)  + H,  where  G is  the  start  address  of  the  guest-
physical  address  space  containing  RPN,  and  H  is  the  start  address  of  the
corresponding  hypervisor-physical  address  space.  The  RPN  specified  by  a
guest  is  always  guest-physical;  therefore,  RPN must  be translated  from the
guest-physical  address  space  to  the  hypervisor-physical  address  space.  The
VCPU must find the corresponding hypervisor-physical address space which
has been mapped to the guest-physical address space containing RPN. If any
part of the address space defined by RPN and SIZE cannot be found in the
guest-physical address space, the TLB entry is considered illegal and is marked
as invalid.
ZSEL No translation.
EX No translation.
WR No translation.
W No translation.
I No translation.
M No translation.
G No translation.
U0 No translation.
In Table 2.12 only ZPR requires translation. The ZPR is interpreted differently when the CPU is in
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privileged mode and when the CPU is in user mode.  Guests always  run in  user  mode and,  to
emulate the effect of the ZPR in privileged mode, the mapping shown in Table 2.13, is performed
when the VCPU is in privileged mode: the CPU's privileged mode behavior is mapped to the CPU's
user mode behavior.
Table 2.12. Translation of the VCPU's PID and ZPR to the CPU's PID and ZPR.
SPR Translation
PID No translation.
ZPR When the VCPU is in privileged mode, translation is according to Table 2.13. When the
VCPU is in user mode, there is no translation.
Table 2.13. Translation of the VCPU's ZN (ZPR).
VCPU's ZN Translation
b'00' b'01' or b'10'
b'01' b'01' or b'10'
b'10' b'11'
b'11' b'11'
ZN ZN | b'01'
The VCPU's TLB and the translatedTLB as well as the VCPU's ZPR and translatedZPR are all
saved  in  the  VCPU's  register  file  in  order  to:  (1)  retain  the  original  VCPU's  virtual  mode
configuration,  and  (2)  so  that  translation  is  performed  only  once.  An  alternative  would  be  to
maintain only one of them and to perform translation between the two whenever necessary; even
though  this  would  lead  to  lower  memory footprint,  it  would  also  lead  to  higher  virtualization
overhead.
As in real mode, during the execution of the guest, in virtual mode, the following interrupts related
to the MMU, can be generated: storage interrupts and TLB-miss interrupts. Data and instruction
storage interrupts  are  always forwarded to  the VCPU and subsequently to  the guest.  A careful
analysis of the conditions for data and instruction storage interrupts revealed that, whenever they
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occur, they need only to be redirected to the VCPU. Data and instruction TLB-miss interrupts, on
the  other  end,  can  occur  under  two  conditions.  One:  the  VCPU's  TLB  and  the  VCPU's
translatedTLB do not contain a matching TLB entry. When this is true, the data or instruction TLB-
miss interrupt is forwarded to the VCPU. Two: the VCPU's TLB contains a matching TLB entry, but
the  translatedTLB does  not  contain  a  matching  TLB entry.  This  happens  when  a  entry  in  the
VCPU's  TLB maps  an  address  space  outside  the  VCPU's  address  space,  and  thus,  the  VCPU
“refuses” to translate such an entry.  In bare metal, this  is equivalent to a memory access to an
address that is not mapped to memory or I/O. In bare metal, however, such an access, can have the
following outcomes: (a) a data or instruction storage interrupt, if the TLB entry is configured to
deny data or instruction memory access; (b) a machine check interrupt, if none of the conditions for
a storage interrupt are met, and if there was an external bus error while performing the memory
access; or (c) nothing, if the conditions for (a) and (b) are not met. Therefore, whenever a data or
instruction TLB-miss is generated, and it is true that the guest tried to perform an access outside the
VCPU's dedicated address, then, if the conditions for a storage interrupt are met, a corresponding
storage interrupt is requested; otherwise, the VCPU exception handler is called, which may choose
to ignore the error, generate a machine check interrupt, among other things. In  Section  2.5.  I/O
virtualization, it is described how the VCPU exception handler is used for I/O virtualization.
2.4.4.Interrupts
Whenever the VCPU detects a (virtual) interrupt condition, it  performs an interrupt request. An
interrupt request can occur while a VCPU is being loaded or in any of the VCPU interrupt-handlers,
as illustrated in Figure 2.21. An interrupt request must not occur while the VCPU is being resumed,
paused, or saved. A higher priority interrupt request replaces a lower priority interrupt request. An
interrupt request by itself does not mean that that interrupt will be actually generated. Only when
the VCPU is being resumed does an interrupt request (i.e., the highest priority interrupt request)
actually  gets  generated,  during  interrupt  dispatch,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  2.21.  This  particular
approach is necessary because several interrupt conditions can be reached simultaneously, but only
the highest priority interrupt among them can actually be generated.
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Figure 2.21. VCPU interrupt requests and dispatching.
2.5. I/O virtualization
In the PowerPC 405, access to I/O devices can be performed on two different buses: the memory
bus and the Device Control Register (DCR) bus. Access on the memory bus is performed through
data  load  and data  store  instruction  for  reading or  writing  data,  respectively.  A data  load/store
instruction specifies a 32-bit address and data (byte-wise, 2-byte-wise, or 4-byte-wise). Similarly,
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the DCR bus is accessed through the Move To/From Device Control Register privileged instructions
(MTDCR and MFDCR), which specify a 10-bit address and data (only 32-bit data is supported, but
the receiving end can ignore unneeded bits).
In  terms  of  memory-mapped  devices  the  VCPU provides  two  access  mechanisms:  bypass  and
supervised. In bypass, the address space of the memory-mapped device is part of the VCPU address
space, as described in Section 2.4.3. Memory Management Unit, and thus, the VCPU has no control
over the access to the device. It is possible to map the same device in different VCPU; however, the
VCPUs  are  responsible  for  coordinating  access  using,  for  example,  shared  memory  or
paravirtualization,  explained  in  Section  2.6.  Paravirtualization.  By mapping  the  same memory
device, or part thereof, in different VCPUs, it is possible for VCPUs to share memory.
The  second  mechanism  available  for  memory-mapped  devices  is  supervised.  With  supervised
memory-mapped I/O, the address space of the device is not part of the VCPU address-space, and
thus, as explained in Section 2.4.3. Memory Management Unit, whenever the guests tries to access
the device, a data TLB-miss interrupt will always be generated. The VCPU, in the data TLB-miss
interrupt  handler  upon discovering  that  the guest  tried to  access  an address  outside the VCPU
address space, calls the exception handler (EH) to handle the “error,” as illustrated in Figure 2.22.
The EH, in turn, may choose to emulate the access on a real or virtual device. If the EH is unable to
handle the access, it may choose to ignore it or to request an interrupt. With supervised memory-
mapped I/O it is possible to share a single device among more than one VCPU in a controlled way.
Each  VCPU can  have  its  own dedicated  EH;  therefore,  different  VCPU can  be  assigned  with
different memory-mapped devices.
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Figure 2.22. Supervised memory-mapped I/O.
In terms of DCR-mapped devices, there is only one mechanism available: supervised DCR-mapped
I/O. DCR-mapped devices are only accessible through privileged instruction which, as explained in
Section 2.4.1. Instruction Set, will always lead to the generation of a program interrupt. Similarly to
supervised memory-mapped I/O, in the MTDCR and MFDCR emulation routines, the VCPU calls
the EH which, in turn, may choose to emulate the access on a real or virtual device, as illustrated in
Figure 2.23. If the EH is unable to handle the access, it may ignore the error, generate an interrupt,
etc. Each VCPU can have its own dedicated EH, and thus, each VCPU can be assigned with a
distinct set of DCR-mapped devices.
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Figure 2.23. Supervised DCR-mapped I/O.
2.6. Paravirtualization
The VCPU provides three mechanisms dedicated to paravirtualization: (1) hypercall detection based
on the system call interrupt, (2) hypercall detection based on access to supervised memory; and (3)
hypercall  detection  based  on  access  to  supervised  DCR.  These  three  mechanism  enable  the
detection of a “hypercall condition” and, subsequently, the execution of a corresponding handler.
When  “hypercall  detection  based on the  system call  interrupt”  is  enabled,  whenever  the  guest
executes a System Call instruction (SC), generating, in turn, a system call interrupt, and the VCPU
is in privileged mode, the exception handler (EH) is called. The EH, then, can decode the hypercall
and call the respective handler. This is illustrated in Figure 2.24.
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Figure 2.24. Sequence diagram illustrating hypercall detection based on the system call interrupt.
The two other mechanisms are realized as explained in  Section  2.5.  I/O virtualization. Whenever
there is an access to supervised memory or to supervised DCR, the EH, depending on a predefined
memory address or on a predefined DCR signaling a hypercall, can decode the hypercall and call
the respective handler.
The “hypercall detection based on the system call interrupt” may not be suitable if the guest relies
on the  CPU's  original  behavior  (i.e.,  the  generation  of  a  system call  interrupt).  The two other
mechanisms, on the other end, resemble I/O devices and are always “safe” to use. The overhead of
“hypercall detection based on the system call interrupt,” however, is lower than the other two, as
will be shown in Section 3.5.3. Hypervisor's Performance Profile. Finally, the three mechanisms are
not mutually exclusive and, if required, can be simultaneously enabled.
2.7. Future Work
In the context of this section, we propose the following for future work:
• Currently, the minimum size of a VCPU address space is 16 MB. This limitation however, is
only a limitation of the implementation and not of the hardware, and therefore, we propose
the removal of this limitation.
• Virtualization of some parts of the CPU are still unsupported (e.g., Watchdog), and thus, we
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propose the development of the necessary methods.
• Evaluate  different  translations  between the VCPU's MMU configurations and the CPU's
virtual mode configuration, which may lead to improved performance when acceptable for
some guests which do not use all of the features provided by the CPU.
• Find  new  method  to  fix  or  work  around  the  limitations  of  the  PowerPC  405  for  full
virtualization (e.g., limitations of the MMU).
• Move the virtualization of the Programmable-Interval Timer outside the VCPU and onto the
host; this would remove the need to stop the host's scheduler while a VCPU is scheduled.
• Further  decomposition  of  the  implementation  and  improvement  of  its  configurability,
enabling, for example, the VCPU to include only the functionality actually required by the
guest  (i.e.,  partial  virtualization),  leading  to  lower  virtualization  overhead  and  smaller
footprint.
• Apply the same methodologies to other processor architectures in an attempt to find out the
most common and most efficient design patterns, so that these can be optimized and easily
reused in other processor architectures.
• Study the feasibility and the impact of the certification of Rodosvisor using, for example,
formal methods.
• Based on the PowerPC 405 limitations concerning full virtualization, extend Popek's et al.
requirements for virtualization [20] to accommodate the PowerPC 405 and similar processor
architectures. This would facilitate the development of future processor architectures with
support for low-end hardware full virtualization.
2.8. Summary
In  this  chapter,  background  has  been  given  on  hypervisors  and  virtualization  and,  it  has  been
demonstrated that, nowadays, most hypervisors either do not provide complete compatibility with
legacy software or lead to large system size, weight,  power consumption, and cost. It has been
shown how to accomplish low-end hardware full virtualization in general, and of the PowerPC 405
in particular. It has been explained how to virtualize the instruction set using a trap-and-emulate
mechanism, and how to virtualize the time and the timer units.  It  has been described how the
memory management unit is virtualized: by mapping the VCPU's real and virtual modes onto the
CPU's virtual mode. It has also been explained how interrupts are virtualized. It has been shown that
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full virtualization of the PowerPC 405, nevertheless, is not completely possible; this can be used to
extend  Popek's  et  al.  requirements  for  virtualization  [20] and  to  improve  future  processor
architectures in supporting low-end hardware full virtualization. Finally, in this chapter, the various
mechanisms available for I/O virtualization and for paravirtualization have been described.
In this chapter, it has been shown that low-end hardware full virtualization is heavily dependent on
the target architecture. We believe that porting this implementation to a target architecture in the
same family should not be difficult. However, porting this implementation to a different architecture
is not feasible nor recommended. We believe it is better to start from scratch. Still, some of the
design patterns used in this implementation can be reused or taken as a reference.
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3. POK/rodosvisor
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, first, background on ARINC 653 [14] and POK [23] is provided. POK is an ARINC
653 separation kernel (and real-time operating system) for safety-critical embedded system. POK is
configurable and enables, among other things, the realization of ARINC-653-compliant systems.
POK relies  on a  preprocessor-based compile-time variability management  system and on static
allocation  of  resources  to  configure  and customize  the  kernel  according to  application-specific
requirements. In the final kernel image it is included only the functionality that is actually necessary
(i.e., unused functionality is trimmed out).
POK, however, did not support the PowerPC 405; it did, nevertheless, support the PowerPC 440.
POK, therefore, has been extended to support the PowerPC 405 using the PowerPC 440 hardware
abstraction layer as a starting point.
POK has been chosen because,  to best  of our knowledge, it  is  the only ARINC-653-compliant
solution that is freely available, and because, together with Ocarina  [34]–[37] and AADL [38], it
enables  a  model-driven  engineering  environment.  Model-driven  engineering  is  the  subject  of
Chapter 4. Model-Driven Engineering using Ocarina.
In this chapter, it is also described how support for privileged partitions has been added to POK.
Privileged partitions are a requirement of functionality farming for enforcing time-only partitioning
while retaining compatibility with legacy software. Functionality farming is the subject of Chapter
5.  Functionality  Farming. In  summary,  adding support  for privileged partitions  required a  new
partition type,  a different compilation and initialization process,  and a new set of configuration
options. The impact on the size of the trusted computing base and memory footprint by privileged
partitions is also presented in this chapter.
In this chapter, it is also explained the integration of Rodosvisor's virtual processors (VCPU), and
thus, virtual machines, described in the previous chapter, with POK. As explained in the previous
chapter, Rodosvisor provides “cycle-accurate” virtual machines, which are compatible with ARINC
653 system partitions. The reason for the integration of Rodosvisor with POK is, as explained in the
previous chapter, that Rodosvisor by itself is unable to support a running system and thus, needs to
be integrated with a host, which, in this case is POK. In summary, POK/rodosvisor's integration
required the following:
• a  new partition type,  and more  specifically,  a  new thread type  which  takes  care of  the
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interface with host, described in Section 2.3. Interface with the Host;
• modified  interrupt  handling  which  either  redirects  interrupts  to  the  current  VCPU or  to
POK's default interrupt handlers;
• a new set of configuration options which provide control over the features of Rodosvisor's
VCPUs.
The  impact  of  virtual  machines  on  the  trusted  computing  base  and  memory  footprint,  the
cumulative virtualization overhead and POK/rodosvisor's performance profile are presented in this
chapter as well. Virtual machines are another requirement of functionality farming: they enforce
time and space partitioning while retaining compatibility with legacy software.
3.1.1.Chapter Organization
This chapter is organized as follows.
In the next section, Section 3.2. ARINC 653, the ARINC 653 standard and how it is realized in POK
is described.
In Section 3.3. Privileged Partitions, it is described how support for privileged partitions was added
to POK.
Next, in Section 3.4. POK and Rodosvisor Integration, the integration of Rodosvisor with POK is
explained.
Then, in Section 3.5. Evaluation, the impact on the trusted computing base and memory footprint by
privileged partitions as well  as by virtual  machines,  the cumulative virtualization overhead and
POK/rodosvisor's performance profile are presented and discussed.
In Section 3.6. Future Work, future work is proposed.
Finally, in Section 3.7. Summary, a summary of the major findings and contributions in this chapter
is given.
3.2. ARINC 653
ARINC 653 [14] belongs to a group of standards (e.g., ARINC 650, ARINC 651) which attempt to
standardize and regulate the use of the integrated modular avionics architecture [11], thus improving
interoperability  between  different  vendors  and  suppliers,  and  facilitating  the  integration  of
components of-the-shelf.
ARINC 653 defines  an  application  programming  model  by defining  the  services  that  must  be
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available  to  partitions,  namely,  a  hierarchical,  two-tier  scheduling  policy  and  the  APplication
EXecutive (APEX). The software architecture specified by ARINC 653 is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The separation kernel sits on top of the hardware alongside system/application-specific functions
and has full control over the hardware. The separation kernel is responsible for enforcing time and
space partitioning and for managing the execution of the partitions. ARINC 653 distinguishes two
types of partitions: application partitions and system partitions. Application partitions interact only
with  the  separation  kernel  through  the  APEX;  application  partitions  may  interact  with  other
partitions indirectly, through the services provided by the APEX. System partitions, on the other
end, are application-specific and the standard does not specify upon them.
Figure 3.1. ARINC 653 software architecture.
ARINC 653 defines an hierarchical scheduling scheme with two schedulable entities: partitions at
the  top,  and threads  at  the  bottom-level.  (In  the  standard  “threads”  are  actually  referred  to  as
“processes;” POK, however, uses “threads” and, in this work, it  has been chosen to use POK's
nomenclature as it accurately represents POK's implementation.) Partitions by themselves are not
executable, their threads are. Partitions are scheduled according to a statically defined fixed-cycle
scheduling  scheme,  thus  enforcing  the  necessary  time  partitioning.  Partition  scheduling  is
accomplished by dividing the time into major frames, which are subsequently divided into minor
frames or partition windows, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Each partition is then assigned to one or
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more partition windows in the major frame. The duration of a major frame and the duration of all
partition windows are defined at compile-time. If, at a given time, a partition is not doing anything
(i.e., it is idle), its partition window is still not reused by other partitions.
Figure 3.2. ARINC 653 major and minor frames.
After partition scheduling, the second level of scheduling follows, that is, thread scheduling. Thread
scheduling is performed only among the threads of the currently scheduled partition, and it depends
on the partition's current operating mode. The first time a partition is scheduled its operating mode
is COLD_START, illustrated in  Figure 3.3. In COLD_START only the main thread, or the error
thread in case of error, can execute and the thread scheduler is actually inhibited. The main thread is
responsible for, and is the only thread allowed to: initialize the partition, create other threads, create
communication ports,  etc.  When the main thread successfully completes its  task it  requests  the
operating mode of the partition to be changed to NORMAL, also illustrated in  Figure 3.3, and
consequently,  activating  the  thread  scheduler;  the  thread  scheduler,  however,  is  not  activated
immediately, but only at the next partition window, and until then, the partition will be idle. In the
NORMAL operating mode, ARINC 653 specifies a priority preemptive scheduling policy between
threads. In the IDLE operating mode, thread execution is completely inhibited, including the main
and error threads, and the partition is considered stopped.
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Figure 3.3. ARINC 653 partition's operating modes.
When an error is detected, thread scheduling is inhibited, if not already, and the partition's error
thread is scheduled to handle the error. Error types include: configuration errors, invalid requests,
illegal memory access, illegal instructions, hardware errors, errors explicitly raised by the partition,
etc. If the error thread has not been created, or if the error thread is unable to handle the error, or if
an error occurs in the error thread itself, a dedicated partition error handler in the separation kernel
is called to handle the error. An error handler (i.e., an error thread or a partition error handler) may
request the operating mode of a partition to change to WARM_START, COLD_START, or IDLE, as
illustrated in Figure 3.3. The COLD_START and WARM_START operating modes are very similar;
nevertheless,  in  COLD_START  the  state  of  the  partition  is  completely  reset,  while  in
WARM_START, part of the previous state of the partition may have been preserved; therefore, a
COLD_START must always precede a WARM_START.
Apart from an hierarchical scheduling scheme, ARINC 653 also defines the APEX (APplication
EXecutive), a programming interface for:
• partition managements: get partition status, change the partition's operating mode;
• thread management: create a thread, get thread status, start, suspend, resume, stop a thread;
• time management: get current time, suspend a thread for a specified amount of time;
• inter-partition communication: sampling (unbuffered) and queuing (buffered) ports, create
port, send and receive data, get port status;
• intra-partition communication: blackboard (unbuffered) and buffer'ed ports, semaphores and
events for synchronization and mutual exclusion;
• health monitoring: get error status, create error handler, raise an error.
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There are two ways in which the APEX is commonly implemented. As illustrated in Figure 3.4(a),
the APEX can be directly provided by the separation kernel, or, as illustrated in Figure 3.4(b), the
APEX can be  implemented  on top  of  the  separation  kernel's  middleware.  POK uses  the  latter
approach, and provides libpok which based on POK's middleware implements the APEX.
Figure 3.4. Implementation of the APEX: (a) implemented in the separation kernel, (b) implemented
by partitions based on the separation kernel's middleware.
ARINC 653 also specifies that all resources (e.g., partitions, threads, communication ports) must be
statically allocated during compile-time and cannot change at  run-time; if a partition requests a
resource that has not been specified during compile-time, that request must fail.  This improves
predictability,  prevents  the  system from running  out  of  resources  unexpectedly,  and  facilitates
certification.
There  are  only a  few known implementations  of  the  ARINC 653 standard.  Most  of  them are
commercial or access to the source code and its underlying design is not possible (e.g., [17], [67]–
[71]).
Simulated Integrated Modular Avionics (SIMA) [72]–[74] is a particular deployment of ARINC 653
dedicated to simulation. It is based on Linux 2.6 in which partitions correspond to POSIX processes
and threads correspond to POSIX threads. The APEX is provided as a static library, named Partition
Operating System (POS), which is statically linked with every partition. The ARINC 653 thread
scheduler is implemented on top of the POSIX FIFO scheduler by POS. The Module Operating
System (MOS), also a POSIX process, controls all the other partitions: the ARINC 653 partition
62
(a)
Separation Kernel
Partitions
Hardware
APEX
(b)
Separation Kernel
Partitions
Hardware
APEX
Middleware
scheduler  and  the  health  monitoring  services  are  implemented  by  the  MOS.  The  MOS
communicates with the POS layer through signals and shared memory.
Distributed  Integrated  Modular  Avionics  (DIMA, a.k.a.,  IMA 2G)  [75]–[79] is  currently  being
studied has a natural evolution of IMA. Unlike IMA which limits itself to a single computing unit,
DIMA encompasses the computing units and the communication between them. DIMA, however, is
still a work in progress and many issues need to be solved before it can be deployed in a real-world
scenario. One of the most interesting outcomes of DIMA might be the ability of enabling dynamic
reconfiguration so as to limit the impact of hardware and software failures on the overall reliability.
Alternatives to ARINC 653, include AUTOSAR [12] and OSEK/VDX [80]; these however, have a
different scope and do not provide the same features as ARINC 653, most notably, time and space
partitioning.
3.3. Privileged Partitions
Figure 3.5 illustrates the difference between an ARINC 653 partition and a privileged partition. An
ARINC 653 partition,  Figure  3.5(a),  is  space  partitioned (denoted  by a  solid  line  between the
ARINC 653 partition and the APEX layers), and thus, only has access to a dedicated address space
and to the APEX. A privileged partition, Figure 3.5(b), on the other end, is not space partitioned and
has full access to the hardware, including all memory and I/O devices as well as access to the APEX
and to POK. A privileged partition executes in the same address space as the kernel and with the
same level of privilege. By not enforcing space partitioning, a privileged partition has the following
benefits over an ARINC 653 partition:
• With full access to the hardware, and by executing in the same address space as the kernel
and with the same level of privilege, a privileged partition is compatible with legacy kernel
and user-level software.
• With an ARINC 653 partition, I/O can only be performed directly by the kernel. With a
privileged  partition,  however,  those  operations  can  be  offloaded  from  the  kernel  to  a
privileged partition, enabling a reduction of the complexity and size of the core kernel (i.e.,
the  kernel,  not  including  privileged  partitions),  and  thus,  an  improvement  of  its
predictability and lower certification effort. Similarly, other operations requiring kernel-level
privileges,  such  as  inter-partition  communication  and  health  monitoring,  can  also  be
offloaded to a privileged partition, further reducing the complexity and the size of the core
kernel.
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• A privileged partition  facilitates  control  over  kernel-level  software,  such as  establishing
application-specific run-time environments in an efficient manner (e.g., OSEK/VDX, virtual
machines). A privileged partition therefore, also improves variability management.
Figure 3.5. Comparison between (a) ARINC 653 partitions and (b) privileged partitions.
Without space partitioning, however, a privileged partition is part of the trusted computing base
(TCB) and the system is especially sensitive to errors that may occur within a privileged partition.
Nonetheless, since a privileged partition does not enforce a protected address space, for any given
system only one  privileged partition  is  required,  and thus,  the  impact  on the  TCB is  low and
scalable. The modification applied to POK to support privileged partitions are described next.
For every thread (i.e., the basic execution unit of a partition), POK allocates a stack in the kernel
address space. This kernel-level stack is used whenever the intervention of the kernel is required
(e.g., a system call, a scheduling point). This kernel-level stack is, among other things, initialized
with:
• The configuration of the CPU, including the configuration of the memory management unit
(MMU), which will be set on the CPU during the execution of the associated thread.
• The thread's entry point (within the partition's address space).
• A pointer to the first stack frame of the thread (within the partition's address space).
For ARINC 653 partitions the configuration of the MMU is set to enforce space partitioning by
mapping only the partition's dedicated address space. Conversely, as illustrated in Figure 3.6, for a
privileged partition, the MMU configuration is set to not enforce space partitioning. Similarly, the
CPU configuration for ARINC 653 partitions is set to deny access to the privileged instruction set,
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which  can  be  used,  accidentally  or  maliciously,  to  violate  time  and  space  partitioning.  For  a
privileged  partition,  however,  the  CPU  configuration  is  set  to  grant  access  to  the  privileged
instruction set, enabling a privileged partition to have full access to the CPU's instruction set and to
support software which cannot be supported by ARINC 653 partitions (e.g., hardware-dependent
software); at the cost, nevertheless, of a larger TCB.
Figure 3.6. Initialization process of a thread's stack for an ARINC 653 or privileged partition.
While the entry point and the first stack frame of an ARINC 653 partition's thread (an ARINC 653
thread for short) are within the partition's dedicated address space, those of a privileged partition are
within the kernel address space. The entry point of an ARINC 653 partition is extracted at run-time
from the respective executable (partitions' executables are bundled together with the kernel in a
dedicated section of the kernel executable), while the entry point of a privileged partition must be
specified at compile-time through the associated global function name, as shown in  Figure 3.6.
Moreover, while an ARINC 653 thread requires two different stacks, one in the kernel address space
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and another at the partition's dedicated address space, a privileged partition requires only one stack
in the kernel address space. As shown in Figure 3.6, when an ARINC 653 thread is created, another
stack is allocated in the partition's dedicated address space and the first stack frame pointer is set to
point to this stack, as illustrated in Figure 3.7(a). Conversely, for a privileged thread, the stack in the
kernel address space is  reused and the first  stack frame pointer is set  to point to this stack,  as
illustrated  in  Figure  3.7(b).  A privileged partition,  therefore,  also  benefits  from lower  memory
footprint than ARINC 653 partitions as they do not require a dedicated address space nor a second
stack.
Figure 3.7. Stacks required (a) by an ARINC 653 partition and (b) by a privileged partition.
When an ARINC 653 partition issues a system call (e.g., an APEX service call) through the system
call (SC) instruction, as illustrated in Figure 3.8, a CPU interrupt is generated, partially switching
the context to the kernel. Then, in POK's system call interrupt-handler:
1. The  context  switch  to  the  kernel  is  completed  (e.g.,  switch  from  the  current  thread's
partition-level stack to the corresponding kernel-level stack).
2. The system call arguments are decoded from partition to kernel-level.
3. The specified system function is called.
4. And, when the system function returns, a context switch back to partition-level is performed,
resuming the execution of the partition.
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Figure 3.8. An APEX call by an ARINC 653 partition.
A privileged partition, on the other end, runs at kernel-level and has direct access to the system
functions. Therefore, a privileged partition does not need to issue a system call and can instead call
the system function directly.  So,  it  is  not necessary to trigger an expensive context switch and
decode  the  system  call.  Nevertheless,  because  system  functions  do  not  support  preemption,
preemption  must  be  disabled  prior  to  calling  the  system function  (delaying,  for  example,  the
generation of a timer interrupt), and re-enabled when the system function returns, as illustrated in
Figure 3.9. A privileged partition, thus, also benefits from lower system call overhead than ARINC
653 partitions due to a reduction in address space crossings. In other words, where ARINC 653
partitions require an expensive “upcall” and a corresponding, expensive “downcall,” a privileged
partition  requires  none.  To make this  difference  between ARINC 653 and privileged partitions
transparent  to  partition developers,  two system call  libraries  are  available:  (1)  the  ARINC 653
partition library which issues system calls by generating a CPU interrupt, as described above, and
(2) the privileged partition library which disables preemption,  calls the desired system function
directly, and re-enables interrupts when the system function returns.
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Figure 3.9. An APEX call by a privileged partition.
As illustrated in Figure 3.10, ARINC 653 partitions are compiled and linked independently of the
kernel; then,  in the link stage of the kernel,  ARINC 653 partitions executables are all wrapped
together in a special section of the kernel executable; at run-time, during initialization, the kernel
sets  up  each  partition's  dedicated  address  space  with  the  respective  executable.  A privileged
partition, on the other end, is compiled, but not linked, independently of the kernel; in the link stage
of the kernel, privileged partitions are linked and integrated with the kernel. A privileged partition
does not require a dedicated address space, and common code and data can be shared with the
kernel and other privileged partitions, such as standard run-time environments and libraries (e.g.,
C/C++ run-time). As a result, a privileged partition also benefits from faster boot times and lower
memory footprint than ARINC 653 partitions.
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Figure 3.10. POK/rodosvisor compilation process.
As explained earlier, POK implements a preprocessor-based compile-time variability management
system which, according to the desired system configuration, compiles a kernel containing only the
functionality that is actually needed. Privileged partitions have been included in that system. A new
configuration  option  (i.e.,  POK_CONFIG_PARTITION_TYPE)  enables,  if  necessary,  the
specification of which partitions are ARINC 653 partitions and which are privileged partitions.
When this option is specified, support for privileged partitions is included in the kernel; conversely,
if this option is not specified, support for privileged partitions is not included in the kernel, leading
to a smaller footprint.
The number of new and modified source lines of code (SLOC) required in order to add support for
privileged partitions  to  POK is  shown in  Table 3.1.  Table 3.1 also shows an estimation of the
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development effort, schedule, number of developers and cost, based on the basic Constructive Cost
Model (COCOMO) [81].  Table 3.1 shows that only 52 new/modified SLOC of C were required,
with an estimated cost of about $1200.
Table 3.1. The number of new and modified source lines of code (SLOC), and an estimation of the
development effort, schedule, number of developers and cost, required in order to add support for
privileged partitions to POK.
Metric Value
Architecture-independent (SLOC), C programming language 26
Architecture-dependent (SLOC), C programming language 26
Total (SLOC) 52
Development Effort Estimate (Person-Months) 0.11
Schedule Estimate (Months) 1.07
Estimated Average Number of Developers (Effort/Schedule) 0.10
Total Estimated Cost to Develop (average salary = $56,286/year, overhead = 2.40) $1211
3.4. POK and Rodosvisor Integration
For each thread of a “real” partition (i.e., an ARINC 653 or privileged partition), a kernel-level
stack is allocated and initialized so that its first stack frame points to the “pok_arch_rfi” function, as
illustrated in Figure 3.11(a). When there is a context switch to this stack for the first time, the CPU
program counter will be set to point to “pok_arch_rfi” which, in turn, will set up the execution
environment  of the partition based on how the stack has been initialized,  and then resume the
execution of the partition.
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Figure 3.11. Kernel-level stack (a) for a real partition and (b) for a virtual machine.
Virtual machines,  on the other end, first,  have only one thread.  Second, and similarly to “real”
partitions, a stack is allocated and initialized for its only thread; this stack, however, is initialized so
that  its  first  stack  frame  points  to  the  “pok_arch_virt”  function,  instead  of  “pok_arch_rfi”,  as
illustrated in Figure 3.11(b). Therefore, when there is a context switch to this stack for the first time,
the CPU program counter will be set to point to “pok_arch_virt” which, in turn and as illustrated in
Figure 3.12:
1. Creates a VCPU.
2. Loads  the  VCPU,  passing  the  duration  of  the  corresponding  partition  window  (a.k.a.,
quantum) as an argument.
3. Sets “__VM” (a global variable) to point to the VCPU context.
4. Finally, resumes the VCPU, thus resuming the execution of the guest.
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Figure 3.12. Sequence diagram for “pok_arch_virt” in POK/rodosvisor.
After resuming the execution of the guest, whenever an interrupt occurs, it is always handled first
by POK (the host) which, as illustrated in Figure 3.13:
• If “__VM” is not null then, it will redirect interrupts to the corresponding VCPU interrupt
handlers;
• Else, if “__VM” is null, POK's default interrupt handlers are called.
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Figure 3.13. Interrupt handling in POK/rodosvisor.
As explained in  Section  2.3.  Interface with the Host,  when the end of  the partition window is
reached,  the VCPU calls  “systick” which,  as  illustrated in  Figure 3.14,  performs the following
operations:
1. Save the VCPU.
2. Set “__VM” to zero.
3. Update POK's scheduler tick counter to reflect the execution time of the VCPU (when a
VCPU is scheduled, POK's scheduler is suspended).
4. Call the scheduler.
5. At last, when the scheduler returns (i.e., when the context is switched again to the VCPU),
perform a “longjmp” to “pok_arch_virt”, step #2 above, and the cycle is restarted.
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Figure 3.14. Sequence diagram for POK/rodosvisor's systick.
Like ARINC 653 partitions, guests of a virtual machine must be compiled and linked independently
of the kernel, and during the link stage of the kernel, guests' executables are bundled together with
the kernel in a dedicated section of the kernel executable, as explained in the previous section.
Similarly to what has been done for privileged partitions, new configuration options have been
added to POK's variability management system. These new configuration options enable:
• the selection of which partitions are virtual machines and which are “real” partitions;
• the configuration of each VCPU address space (includes memory and memory-mapped I/O
devices);
• and, the configuration of whether or not a VCPU requires a virtual interrupt controller, and
which devices are connected to the virtual interrupt controller.
Table 3.2 presents the number of new and modified source lines of code (SLOC) required for the
integration of Rodosvisor with POK as well as an estimation of the development effort, schedule,
number of developers and cost, based on the basic Constructive Cost Model (COCOMO) [81]. It
shows that almost 2000 SLOC were added/modified, with an estimated cost of $32660.
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Table 3.2. The number of new and modified source lines of code (SLOC), and an estimation of the
development effort, schedule, number of developers and cost, needed for the integration of
Rodosvisor with POK.
Metric Value
Architecture-dependent (SLOC), C++ programming language 470
Architecture-dependent (SLOC), C programming language 98
Architecture-dependent (SLOC), Assembly (PowerPC) 630
Total (SLOC) 1198
Development Effort Estimate (Person-Months) 2.90
Schedule Estimate (Months) 3.75
Estimated Average Number of Developers (Effort/Schedule) 0.77
Total Estimated Cost to Develop (average salary = $56,286/year, overhead = 2.40) $32660
3.5. Evaluation
3.5.1.Evaluation Platform
The results shown in the following sections have been collected on a hardware platform with the
architecture depicted in Figure 3.15. It consists of:
• a PowerPC 405 at 300 MHz;
• a memory controller (i.e., Xilinx Multi-Port Memory Controller, version 4.03a) connected to
256 MB of DDR SDRAM;
• a serial port (i.e., Xilinx XPS UART Lite, version 1.00a) with one start bit, one stop bit, and
a baudrate of 115200;
• an ethernet media access controller (MAC) (i.e., Xilinx XPS Ethernet Lite Media Access
Controller, version 2.00b), which supports the IEEE 802.3 media independent interface to
industry standard physical layer devices, and provides 10/100 Mbps interfaces;
• an interrupt controller (i.e., Xilinx XPS Interrupt Controller, version 1.00a) connected to the
serial port's and the ethernet MAC's interrupt request signals;
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• three  processor  local  buses  (PLB),  version  4.6:  two of  them connect  the  PowerPC 405
exclusively  to  the  memory  controller  for  improved  performance  (one  for  fetching
instructions and another for data load/store operations); the third, connects the PowerPC 405
to memory-mapped I/O devices, namely, the ethernet MAC, the serial port, and the interrupt
controller.
Figure 3.15. Hardware architecture of the evaluation platform.
The PowerPC 405 [22] is a 32-bits Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) processor with a five-
stage  pipeline;  it  is  a  low  power  processor  (0.9  mW/MHz)  designed  for  high  performance
embedded systems. The PowerPC 405 features: a hardware multiply/divide unit; 16 KB two-way
set-associative  instruction  cache  and  16  KB  two-way  set-associative  data  cache;  a  memory
management  unit  with a  software-managed 64-entry translation look-aside buffer;  several  timer
units; debug facilities; etc.
The hardware platform just described has been realized on a Xilinx University Program Virtex-II
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Pro  Development  System  (XUPV2P)  [82].  The  XUPV2P  is  equipped  with  a  Virtex-II  Pro
(XC2VP30)  field-programmable  gate  array  (FPGA)  [83],  [84] which  is  surrounded  by  a
comprehensive  collection  of  input  and  output  devices  which  can  be  used  to  create  a  complex
computing platform. Some of the features of the Virtex-II Pro FPGA are shown in Table 3.3. The
XUPV2P is equipped with the following devices and ports:
• Power supplies
• Power-on reset circuitry
• 100 MHz system clock
• 75 MHz SATA clock
• User clocks (2)
• RS-232 DB9 serial port
• PS/2 serial ports for mouse and keyboard
(2)
• 10/100 Fast Ethernet transceiver and port
• Video  DAC and  15-pin  high-density  D-
sub  connector  for  XSGA output,  up  to
1200 x 1600 at 70 Hz
• AC-97  audio  CODEC  with  audio
amplifier  and  speaker/headphone  output
and line level output
• Microphone and line level audio input
• LED (4)
• Switches (4)
• Push Buttons (5)
• 184-pin  dual  in-line  memory  module
(DIMM)  for  Double  Data  Rate  (DDR)
Synchronous  Dynamic  RAM  (SDRAM)
with up to 2 GB
• CPU trace and debug port
• Serial  Advanced  Technology Attachment
(SATA)  ports  (two  Host  ports  and  one
Target port)
• Sub-Miniature A port (SMA)
• High-speed expansion connector
• Low-speed expansion connectors (6)
• etc...
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Table 3.3. Features of the Virtex-II Pro (XC2VP30).
Feature Virtex-II Pro (XC2VP30)
Logic Cells 30816
Slices 13969
Array Size 80 X 46
Distributed RAM 428 Kb
Multiplier Blocks (18 x 18 bit) 136
Block RAM 2448 Kb
Digital Clock Managers 8
PowerPC 405 2
Multi-Gigabit Transceivers 8
Xilinx  Embedded Development  Kit,  version  10.1  [48],  has  been  used  to  create,  configure  and
generate the hardware platform, on a Fedora 19 host.
All of the software has been compiled on a Fedora 19 host using freely available tools such as GNU
make [85], a GCC cross-compiler for the PowerPC 405 [86], version 4.8.1, among others. All of the
software has been compiled with optimizations enabled (“-O2” compiler option), unless otherwise
noted. The following compiler options were also used when compiling C++ code:
• -fno-rtti: “Disable generation of information about every class with virtual functions for use
by the C++ run-time type identification features (dynamic_cast and typeid). If you do not
use those parts  of the language,  you can save some space by using this  flag.  Note that
exception  handling  uses  the  same  information,  but  G++  generates  it  as  needed.  The
dynamic_cast  operator  can  still  be  used  for  casts  that  do  not  require  run-time  type
information, i.e. casts to void * or to unambiguous base classes“ [86].
• -fno-threadsafe-statics: “Do not emit the extra code to use the routines specified in the C++
ABI for thread-safe initialization of local statics. You can use this option to reduce code size
slightly in code that does not need to be thread-safe” [86].
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• -fno-exceptions:  “[Disable]  exception  handling.  [When  enabled,]  generates  extra  code
needed to propagate exceptions. For some targets, this implies GCC generates frame unwind
information for all functions, which can produce significant data size overhead, although it
does not affect execution“ [86].
3.5.2.Cumulative Virtualization Overhead
In this section, the cumulative virtualization overhead in a Linux-based operating system, as a guest
on top of POK/rodosvisor, is presented, for three different types of workloads, namely: compute-,
I/O- and CPU-management-intensive workloads. For that two configurations have been developed
and tested:
(L1) A system based on Linux 2.6.39, with a small RAM-based file system (i.e.,  initramfs),
running on bare metal, as illustrated in Figure 3.16(L1).
(L2) A system based on POK/rodosvisor, with one virtual machine whose guest is the same
Linux-based  operating  system described  in  L1,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  3.16(L2).  The
virtual machine is configured: (1) to have direct access to the serial port and to the ethernet
MAC;  and  (2)  with  a  virtual  interrupt  controller  which  emulates  a  physical  interrupt
controller. Direct access to a physical interrupt controller is not given because it can be
configured  to  bypass  the hypervisor  (i.e.,  POK/rodosvisor)  and violate  time and space
partitioning.
Figure 3.16. Configurations (L1) and (L2).
As explained in Section 2.4.3. Memory Management Unit, independent control over instruction and
data  address  translation,  a  feature  of  the  PowerPC  405,  is  currently  not  supported  by
POK/rodosvisor. Linux, however, uses this feature when flushing the cache during initialization.
Therefore, the Linux kernel's source code has been modified (for both L1 and L2) to work around
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this limitation, requiring 34 new/modified source lines of code. Other than that, no modifications
were necessary.
On top of the two configurations described above, several benchmarks have been executed.  Table
3.4 presents  the  results  of  those  benchmarks,  the  associated  virtualization  overhead,  and  their
respective type.
Table 3.4. The results of several benchmarks, performed on top of a Linux-based operating system,
running on bare metal (i.e., L1), or as a guest on POK/rodosvisor (i.e., L2). For each benchmark,
the associated virtualization overhead, in percentage, and its type are also shown.
L1 L2 Overhead (%) Type
Boot (seconds)
Decompression 36 36 0 Compute
Linux 2.9 4.2 44.83 CPU mgmt.
Shell 1 4 300 CPU mgmt.
Total 39.9 43.2 8.27
Dhrystone (Dhrystones per Second)
577800.9 566989.9 1.91 Compute
Whetstone (C Converted Double Precision Whetstones (MIPS))
3.8 3.7 2.7 Compute
Netperf (Mbit/s)
TCP_STREAM 17.4 13.9 25.18 I/O
The following benchmarks can be found in Table 3.4.
Boot, Decompression: The boot process of the Linux-based operating system has been divided into
3  stages,  and  this  result  corresponds  to  the  first  stage.  It  corresponds  to  the  time  required  to
decompress  the  Linux  kernel  image  (including  the  initramfs).  In  this  stage,  the  use  of  CPU
management  operations  (e.g.,  privileged  instructions,  interrupts)  is  negligible,  and  thus,  this
benchmark has been classified as compute-intensive (i.e., “Compute” in  Table 3.4). Results show
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that the virtualization overhead is non-existent. This is expected since there is very little use of CPU
management operations, and therefore, the hypervisor is rarely activated.
Boot, Linux: This is the second stage of the boot process of the Linux-based operating system, and
it corresponds to the initialization of the Linux kernel. In this stage the use of CPU management
operations is  high,  therefore,  this  benchmark has been classified as CPU-management-intensive
(i.e.,  “CPU  mgmt.”  in  Table  3.4).  Results  show  that  the  virtualization  overhead  is  high  (i.e.,
44.83%), which is expected, since the use of CPU management operations is high and, therefore,
the  hypervisor  is  activated  often.  This  overhead,  however,  includes  not  only  the  hypervisor's
overhead,  but  also  the  overhead  caused  by  cache  trashing  during  the  interaction  between  the
hypervisor and the Linux kernel.
Boot,  Shell: This  is  the  third  and  last  stage  of  the  boot  process,  which  corresponds  to  the
initialization  of  a  Buildroot-based  shell  [87].  Similarly  to  the  previous  stage,  the  use  of  CPU
management  operations  is  significant,  thus,  this  benchmark  has  been  classified  as  CPU-
management-intensive.  Compared to  the previous  stage,  however,  the use of CPU management
operations is even higher as this stage begins with the execution of the “init” process, on top of
Linux,  and  with  the  activation  of  process  scheduling,  context  switching,  system  calls,  etc.
Therefore, as the results show, the virtualization overhead is also higher than in the previous stage.
Dhrystone and Whetstone: Dhrystone  [88] is a benchmark which measures the performance of
integer  and string operations,  and Whetstone  [89] is  a  benchmark which measures,  mainly,  the
performance of floating-point arithmetic. These two benchmarks have been classified as compute-
intensive. Results show that the virtualization overhead is low, but noticeable. It was expected that,
similarly to the first stage of the boot process, the virtualization overhead would be negligible, as
the operations being benchmarked do not rely on CPU management operations, and thus, do not
lead to  the activation of  the hypervisor.  What  these results  show is  the virtualization overhead
during the execution of the benchmark, caused by Linux's normal operation (e.g., scheduling) as
well as the overhead caused by cache trashing during the interaction among the hypervisor, the
Linux kernel, the benchmark process, and other processes running concurrently on top of the Linux
kernel.
Netperf: Lastly,  Netperf  [90] is  a  benchmark  which  measures  the  throughput  and  latency for
various  kinds  of  network connections  (e.g.,  TCP,  UDP).  To perform this  benchmark,  netserver
executed  on  the  target  while  netperf executed  on  a  Fedora  19  host.  This  benchmark has  been
classified as I/O-intensive (i.e., “I/O” in Table 3.4). The results for the TCP_STREAM test profile,
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which measures throughput over a TCP connection, are shown. It can be seen that L1's maximum
throughput is 25% higher than that of L2's. In this benchmark, the virtualization overhead includes
not only the overhead caused by CPU management operations (in the Linux kernel, in the device
drivers,  in  the protocol  stack,  etc.),  but  also the  virtualization  overhead of  the  virtual  interrupt
controller which is connected to the ethernet MAC. Considering the complexity of this benchmark,
which includes two device drivers (i.e.,  one for the ethernet MAC and another for the interrupt
controller) and a protocol stack, we expect the virtualization overhead to be much lower for most
I/O-intensive workloads, which are not as complex.
To sum up, these results show that:
• for  compute-intensive workloads,  the virtualization overhead is  low and, in  some cases,
negligible;
• for  I/O-intensive  workloads,  the  virtualization  overhead  is  significant,  but  for  most
workloads, we expect it to be low;
• for  CPU-management-intensive  workloads,  however,  the  virtualization  overhead  can  be
quite significant.
This  indicates that  low-end hardware full  virtualization is  more adequate for compute-intensive
workloads, with moderate use of I/O, and with low use of CPU management operations. Some of
the reasons for this  behavior will  become much more clear in the next section,  which presents
POK/rodosvisor's performance profile.
By showing the results of some benchmarks executed on top of a Linux-based operating system as a
guest  on POK/rodosvisor,  it  demonstrates,  indirectly,  compatibility with legacy software (i.e.,  a
complete Linux-based operating system), despite some minor modifications that had to be applied
to the Linux kernel's source code. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work ever to present
performance measurements about a Linux-based operating system as a guest on top of a hypervisor
based on low-end hardware full virtualization, and therefore, demonstrating compatibility with a
common real-world scenario.
3.5.3.Hypervisor's Performance Profile
To obtain the hypervisor's performance profile, configuration L2, described in the previous section,
was  reused.  POK/rodosvisor's  built-in,  custom  profiler  was  enabled  and  profiling  data  were
collected during 90 seconds since boot (it includes almost 45 seconds required to boot the Linux-
based operating system, and another 45 seconds of idle time).
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The profiling data is composed of several probes, each associated with a specific code path. For
each probe the following data were collected: the number of samples (or activations), the minimum,
the maximum and the total execution time; the average execution time was obtained by dividing the
total execution time by the number of samples.
In Table 3.5, the number of samples, the total and the average execution times per probe are shown
(only probes with a number of samples greater than zero are presented). This table includes all the
interrupt handlers that have been activated (e.g., program, instruction and data TLB-miss), as well
as the time to context switch in and out of the virtual machine. It can be seen that:
• The  program  interrupt  handler,  which  is  responsible  for  the  emulation  of  privileged
instructions, makes up for 91.7% of the total execution time. However, it is also, by far, the
most activated interrupt handler (i.e., 96.9%), and it actually has a low average execution
time.  This  partially  explains  why CPU-management-intensive  benchmarks  performed  so
poorly in the previous section.
• Next to the program interrupt handler, the instruction and data TLB-miss interrupt handlers
make up for  8% of  the total  execution  time even though their  contribution  to  the  total
number of samples is less than 3%. This happens because of the high (actually, the highest)
average execution time for these two interrupt handlers.
• The remaining interrupt handlers and context switching make up for less than 0.4%, which
compared with the ones discussed above is negligible.
• Finally, the average execution time of the data TLB-miss interrupt handler is higher than the
system  call  interrupt  handler,  indicating  that,  as  mentioned  in  Section  2.6.
Paravirtualization, the overhead of “hypercall detection based on the system call interrupt”
is lower than “hypercall detection based on access to supervised memory.”
To sum up, these results  indicate,  similarly to the previous section,  that  low-end hardware full
virtualization is a serious alternative for workloads which do not rely heavily on CPU management
operations.
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Table 3.5. The number of samples, the average and the total execution times per probe. Execution
times are given in CPU clock cycles. In parenthesis, the ratio to the summation of all the values in
the same column is given, in percentage.
No. samples Average Total
Program 1841211 (96.857%) 511 868824642 (91.639%)
Data TLB-Miss 29310 (1.542%) 1356 39366270 (4.152%)
Instruction TLB-Miss 22824 (1.201%) 1594 36074969 (3.805%)
System Call 4800 (0.253%) 419 1945588 (0.205%)
Data Storage 1875 (0.099%) 364 657625 (0.069%)
PIT 475 (0.025%) 1312 616728 (0.065%)
Context Switch In 90 (0.005%) 3247 292259 (0.031%)
Context Switch Out 89 (0.005%) 1815 161549 (0.017%)
Instruction Storage 253 (0.013%) 522 128658 (0.014%)
External 28 (0.001%) 988 27300 (0.003%)
3.5.4.Footprint
3.5.4.1. Trusted Computing Base
In  Table 3.6 the  number of  source  lines  of  code  (SLOC) in  Rodosvisor  alone is  presented,  as
measured  by  SLOCCount  [91].  Alongside,  an  estimation  of  the  development  effort,  schedule,
number of developers and total cost, based on the basic Constructive Cost Model (COCOMO) [81],
is  also shown. It  can be seen that Rodosvisor is  made of around 8.5 KSLOC, with a schedule
estimate of around 8 months (using 2.77 developers), and a total estimated cost of $254509.
84
Table 3.6. Rodosvisor's trusted computing base in terms of source lines of code (SLOC), and an
estimate of the respective development effort, schedule, number of developers and total cost.
Metric Value
C++ (SLOC) 8294
Assembly (PowerPC 405) (SLOC) 172
Total (SLOC) 8466
Development Effort Estimate (Person-Months) 22.61
Schedule Estimate (Months) 8.18
Estimated Average Number of Developers (Effort/Schedule) 2.77
Total Estimated Cost to Develop (average salary = $56,286/year, overhead = 2.40) $254509
Similarly,  Table 3.7 shows the number of POK/rodosvisor's SLOC, as measured by SLOCCount,
and an estimation of the development effort, schedule, number of developers and total cost. Table
3.7 shows that POK/rodosvisor is composed by 15.2 KSLOC, with a schedule estimate of around 10
months (using 4.04 developers), and a total estimated cost of $469219.
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Table 3.7. POK/rodosvisor's trusted computing base in terms of source lines of code (SLOC), and
an estimate of the respective development effort, schedule, number of developers and total cost.
Metric Value
C (SLOC) 5640
C++ (SLOC) 8792
Assembly (PowerPC 405) (SLOC) 728
Total (SLOC) 15160
Development Effort Estimate (Person-Months) 41.68
Schedule Estimate (Months) 10.32
Estimated Average Number of Developers (Effort/Schedule) 4.04
Total Estimated Cost to Develop (average salary = $56,286/year, overhead = 2.40) $469219
3.5.4.2. Memory Footprint
In order to evaluate the impact of the various partition types in terms of memory footprint, the
following three sets of configurations have been developed:
(A) Configurations with one up to ten ARINC 653 partitions as illustrated in  Figure 3.17(a);
each  partition  has  two  threads  (a  mandatory  main  thread,  and  a  worker  thread  which
performs no operation).
(P) Configurations with a single privileged partition composed of a mandatory main thread and
one up to ten worker threads which perform no operation as illustrated in  Figure 3.17(b).
While  ARINC 653 partitions  and virtual  machines  enforce a  protected  address  space,  a
privileged partition does not; therefore, a system with more than one privileged partition,
even though it is possible, brings no advantages, and leads to higher memory footprint.
(V) Configurations with one up to ten virtual machines, as illustrated in Figure 3.17(c); the guest
is the same for all virtual machines and performs no operation.
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Figure 3.17. Configurations based on (a) ARINC 653 partitions, (b) a privileged partition, and (c)
virtual machines.
All of the configuration described above have been compiled, and from the compilation results, the
following has been measured: (1) the size of the code; (2) the size of read-only data; (3) the size of
read/write data; and (4) the combined size of all stacks.
In Figure 3.18 the size of the code measured from all of the configurations is shown. It can be seen
that:
• ARINC 653  partitions  lead  to  the  smallest  code  size  and,  as  the  number  of  partitions
increase,  the code size remains approximately constant.  Differences in code size are the
result from the optimizations performed by the compiler.
• A privileged partition leads to slightly larger code size than ARINC 653 partitions and, as
the number of worker threads increase, the code size remains approximately constant. The
configurations  used  for  these  results,  however,  are  composed  of  worker  threads  which
perform no operations,  their  size  is  very small,  and  therefore,  their  impact  on  memory
footprint goes almost unnoticed. If the worker threads were larger their impact on memory
footprint  would  also  be  larger.  As  explained  in  Section  3.3.  Privileged  Partitions,  a
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privileged partition is always part of the kernel.
• Virtual  machines  lead  to  the  largest  code  size:  around  25  KB  larger.  From  this,  the
Rodosvisor's  code size can be derived,  i.e.,  25 KB. As the number of  virtual  machines
increase,  the  code  size  also  increases  due  to  optimizations  for  speed  performed  by the
compiler (e.g., loop unrolling).
Figure 3.18. Code size for all configurations.
In Figure 3.19 the size of read-only data for all of the configuration is shown. It can be seen that:
• An ARINC 653 partition has a higher impact on the size of read-only data than a privileged
partition's thread. This has to do with the fact that the size of many configuration structures
is  directly  proportional  to  the  number  of  partitions,  and  independent  of  the  number  of
threads.
• Compared with ARINC 653 partitions,  a  privileged partition's  thread  leads  to  a  slightly
smaller size of read-only data. However, as explained previously, if the size of the worker
thread's read-only data was larger, the overall read-only data would also be larger.
• Configurations based on virtual machines lead to a size of read-only data that is up to two
orders of magnitude higher than configurations based on other partition types. The main
reason  for  this  is  that  three  large  jump  tables  are  required  for  emulation  of  privileged
instruction.
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Figure 3.19. Read-only data size for all configurations. When there is only one ARINC 653
partition, the size of read-only data is zero (data point not shown).
Figure 3.20. Size of read/write data for all configurations.
In Figure 3.20 the size of read/write (RW) data from all of the configuration is shown. It can be seen
that:
• Compared with ARINC 653 partitions, privileged partitions, in these particular cases, lead to
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a smaller size of RW data. However, if the size of the worker thread's RW data was larger,
the overall RW data would also be larger. Still, the size of many configuration structures is
directly proportional to the number of partitions, and independent of the number of threads.
• Configurations based on virtual machines, lead to a large size of RW data. The main reason
for this is the large register file (around 3 KB) required per virtual machine.
In  Figure 3.21, the combined size of all stacks for all configurations is shown (only kernel-level
stacks are considered). Stacks may be considered RW data; they have been distinguished from other
RW data in order to reveal other properties. It can be seen that:
• ARINC 653 partitions lead to the largest combined size of the stacks. Each ARINC 653
partition requires one stack for the main thread, and an additional stack for each worker
thread. Each main/worker thread stack has a size of 8 KB; an additional idle thread with a
size of 1 KB is also required for all configurations.
• Compared with ARINC 653 partitions, a privileged partition leads to a smaller combined
size  of  the  stacks.  The  stack  requirements  for  privileged partitions  are  the  same as  for
ARINC 653 partitions; however, since for any given system, only one privileged partition is
required, then, only one main thread's stack is required, leading to a smaller combined size
of the stacks.
• Configurations based on virtual machines lead to the smallest combined size of the stacks
since each virtual machine requires only one thread, and thus, only one stack.
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Figure 3.21. Combined size of all stacks for all configurations.
Figure 3.22. Combined size of (1) the code, (2) read-only and (3) read/write data, and (4) the
combined size of all stacks, for all configurations.
At last, in Figure 3.22, the combined size of the code, read-only data, read/write data, as well as the
combined size of the stacks for all configurations is presented. It can be seen that:
• Configurations based on a privileged partition lead to the smallest size; the size increases
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with the number of partitions, mainly because of the combined size of the stacks.
• Configurations  based on ARINC 653 partitions  lead to  a  larger  size than configurations
based on a privileged partition, mostly because of the additional stack requirements.
• For  a  configuration  with  a  small  number  of  partitions  (less  or  equal  than  six),  virtual
machines leads to larger size than ARINC 653 partitions. However, for a configuration with
a large number of partitions (more than six), virtual machines lead to a smaller size.
3.6. Future Work
As future work we propose:
• Taking into account the bottlenecks found in Rodosvisor's VCPUs, find new methods to
improve its performance.
• Integrate Rodosvisor with another kernel or operating system (e.g., FreeRTOS, Linux) in
order to further evaluate and improve its design and reusability.
• Integrate POK's interrupt-handlers with Rodosvisor's VCPU interrupt-handlers and reduce
the size of the TCB and improve performance.
• Implement all partition types in terms of privileged partitions. This will enable a reduction
of the complexity and coupling in the core kernel; it will also foster decoupling between the
various functionalities provided by the kernel.
3.7. Summary
In this chapter, it has been described how support for privileged partitions has been added to POK
as well as how Rodosvisor has been integrated with POK. It has been shown that the engineering
effort required for adding support for privileged partitions was very low and, similarly, that the
engineering effort required by POK/rodosvisor's integration was also low.
Performance and footprint measurements from POK/rodosvisor have also been presented.
The evaluation of the virtualization overhead, and POK/rodosvisor's performance profile showed
that, low-end hardware full virtualization is more adequate for compute-intensive workloads, with
moderate use of I/O, and with low use of CPU management operations. Compatibility with legacy
software has been demonstrated by showing the results of some benchmarks executed on top of a
Linux-based operating system as a guest on POK/rodosvisor.
In terms  of  footprint,  it  has  been shown that  the  kernel's  footprint  for  a  virtual-machine-based
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system  can  be  lower  than  the  kernel's  footprint  for  an  ARINC-653-compliant  system,  which
indicates  that  the  requirements  of  low-end  hardware  full  virtualization  regarding  the  kernel's
footprint are not high.
Altogether, we believe that these results demonstrate that, for many applications, low-end hardware
full  virtualization  can  be  a  serious  alternative  to  high-end  hardware  full  virtualization  and
paravirtualization, enabling:
• a reduction of system size,  weight,  power consumption,  cost,  etc.,  when compared with
high-end hardware full virtualization;
• a reduction (in many cases, elimination) of the effort required to port legacy software to a
hypervisor-specific interface, when compared with paravirtualization;
• as well as, in some cases, a reduction of the kernel's footprint, when compared with ARINC-
653-based systems.
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4. Model-Driven Engineering using Ocarina
4.1. Introduction
As explained in  Section  1.2.  Model-Driven Engineering,  conventional development methods are
unable to keep up with the requirements of modern safety-critical systems. Many methodologies are
proposed in the literature to address this problem, such as computer-aided software engineering,
component-based  software  engineering,  software  product  line  engineering,  and  model-driven
engineering, all of which are described in Section 4.2. Development Methods: State of the Art.
POK,  mentioned  throughout  this  thesis,  through  Ocarina  [34]–[37],  supports  a  model-driven
engineering approach which advocates that engineering/development should be driven by high-level
models; more specifically, code generation based on high-level models.
Ocarina is a compiler for the Analysis & Architecture Description Language (AADL) [38]. AADL
enables the specification of the software and hardware architecture, and thus, the specification of
the  desired  system configuration  using  a  high-level  abstraction  language  featuring:  processors,
memory, partitions, virtual machines, threads, inter and intra-partition communication, etc. Ocarina
is able to transform an AADL model into a POK configuration composed by C source code and
makefiles; Ocarina is also capable of generating partitions, if necessary. Ocarina, however, did not
support  some  of  the  features  added  to  POK  during  this  work,  namely:  virtual  machines,  and
privileged partitions.
In this  chapter,  it  is explained how AADL is used to represent some of the features developed
during  this  work,  namely:  privileged  partitions  and  virtual  machines.  At  the  same  time,  it  is
explained how Ocarina has been modified to support those new representation, and generate a POK
configuration  accordingly.  In  this  way,  it  is  demonstrated  the  ability  of  AADL and Ocarina  to
support privileged partitions and virtual machines, and thus, their ability to replace conventional
development  methods.  In  this  chapter,  the  source  lines  of  code  (SLOC)  of  all  AADL models
developed for this thesis are also compared with the corresponding SLOC of generated code, to
demonstrate the ability of AADL to reduce the development effort.
4.1.1.Chapter Organization
This chapter is organized as follows.
In  Section  4.2.  Development  Methods:  State  of  the  Art, it  is  reviewed  some  novel  software
engineering  methods,  proposed  in  the  literature,  which  attempt  to  address  the  limitations  of
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conventional development methods.
In  Section  4.3.  Architecture Analysis & Design Language and  Section  4.4.  Ocarina,  AADL and
Ocarina are described, respectively.
The way in which we have chosen to represent privileged partitions and virtual machines in AADL,
and how Ocarina has been modified to support those representations, are described in Section 4.5.
Privileged Partitions and Section 4.6. Virtual Machines, respectively.
In Section 4.7. Evaluation, a comparison between the SLOC of all AADL models developed for this
thesis and the corresponding SLOC of generated code is presented, and the ability of AADL-based
model-driven engineering to reduce the development effort demonstrated.
Proposals for future work can be found in Section 4.8. Future Work.
Finally, in Section 4.9. Summary, a summary of the chapter is given.
4.2. Development Methods: State of the Art
4.2.1.Computer-Aided Software Engineering
The first major effort to evolve past 3rd Generation Programming Languages (3GPL) was computer-
aided software engineering (CASE) [27], [28]. At the time 3GPL started to reveal their limitations
to cope with system complexity and the semantic gap between the problem and the solution spaces
was very high. CASE focused on general-purpose graphical programming (e.g.,  state machines,
structure diagrams, data flow diagrams) to express design intent. Major goals of CASE included:
• Analysis of graphical programs (less complex than conventional 3GPL);
• Synthesization of implementation artifacts from graphical programs.
CASE, however, failed to become widely adopted. The technology was not mature enough to have
wide applicability. At the same time, programming languages and platforms evolved (e.g., abstract
data  type,  objects,  and  object-oriented  programming),  raising  the  abstraction  level,  and  thus
alleviating the need for CASE.
Nowadays,  3GPL are again no longer  able  to  control  the complexity of new software.  System
complexity has grown fast and 3GPL are unable to express domain concepts effectively. 3GPL are
abstractions of the underlying computing environment (the solution space) and do not enable the
actual design intent to be expressed effectively (in the problem space). There is a semantic gap
between the design intent and the expression of this intent in source code.
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Furthermore,  nowadays  software  (e.g.,  firmware)  is  often  designed  using  informal,  resistant  to
change, error prone and tedious methods (e.g.,  designs on paper  or white boards)  [92].  Design
decisions, important for the success of long-lived products, are easily lost, as well as opportunities
for automation. After design, software is implemented “manually” using languages such as C/C++,
Ada, Java, etc. The current size of the software however, makes these long and difficult processes,
with consequences on the resulting quality and time-to-market.
4.2.2.Component-Based Software Engineering 
Component-based  software  engineering  (CBSE)  defends  that  systems  should  be  designed  by
assembling software components together [29], [30]. Components' configuration may evolve (even
during run-time) as a response to changing requirements or to the environment [93], [94]. CBSE has
the following advantages:
• Components  clearly  separate  implementation  from interface,  and  thus  reduce  coupling,
improve separation of concerns, and improve reuse [93], [95].
• CBSE facilitates variation in structure (the architecture) and content (the implementation)
[30].
• CBSE  fosters  independent  development  of  components,  and  thus,  contributes  to  lower
development time [30], [96].
• CBSE enables that which is absolutely necessary to be included in the final system [93].
• High reuse, and thus, lower fault rate, lower development time and cost [93].
CBSE however, is not without limitations, namely:
• A trade-off between performance (e.g., throughput, latency) and flexibility has often to be
made  [94],  [95].  However,  the  overhead  introduced  by  CBSE,  if  any,  is  “negligible”
according to [95].
• Component-based architectures for the embedded systems' domain are not mature enough.
There has been a wide adoption of CBSE in the enterprise computing domain (e.g., .Net, J2EE,
CORBA's CM). Results in that domain however, cannot be applied directly to embedded systems
because of the different constrains, such as tight resource budget, performance constrains, and so
on.
In the past, the concept of CBSE has been introduced into the mainstream through Object Oriented
97
Programming (OOP) where classes separate  interface from implementation.  OOP, however,  has
limitations and is too fine-grained [30].
THINK  [93] is  a  CBSE  framework  which  provides  flexible,  efficient  binding  of  components
(establishing  communication,  send and receive  data).  There  are  many forms of  bindings  (from
simple pointers to complex distributed channels), and a lot of backstage support is necessary, such
that a framework has been created to manage all that. Other known examples of the application of
CBSE for embedded systems include: CAmkES [96], TinyOS [97], Hartex [98], and KOALA [30].
4.2.3.Software Product Line Engineering
Software Product Line Engineering (SPLE)  [31], [32] enables organizations to built an array of
similar  software  products  (applications)  from  a  common  (domain  specific)  and  a  variable
(application  specific)  pool  of  resources,  and  thus,  reduce  development  effort  and  cost,  when
compared  with  conventional  single  system  development.  SPLE  takes  advantage  of  the
commonalities between the software in a particular domain while enabling control over product-
specific variability. SPLE emerged as a way to address a demand for highly personalized software
systems [32].
At the core of SPLE are the software product lines which are usually split into two major processes,
as  illustrated  in  the  Figure  4.1:  domain  engineering  and  application  engineering.  Domain
engineering focuses on the commonalities of the domain and where product-specific variability may
be necessary.  The result from domain engineering is a framework enabling developers to reuse a
common  set  of  artifacts,  obeying  to  a  specific  architecture/paradigm.  Application  engineering
focuses on reusing the artifacts developed during domain engineering and on the development of
application-specific  artifacts  to  build  a  particular  product.  These  two  processes  (domain  and
application  engineering)  can  be  further  split  into  the  conventional  software  engineering  sub-
processes,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  4.1,  namely:  requirements  engineering,  design,
realization/implementation,  and quality assurance/testing.  The major advantage of SPLE is  high
reuse,  and thus,  improved quality,  improved variability  management,  and lower  time-to-market
[31], [32]. On the other end, the major limitation of SPL is that development of a SPL requires an
upfront investment; however, according to  [31], the return of investment is commonly achieved
after 3 products developed from the SPL.
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Figure 4.1. Domain and application engineering in SPLE (adapted from [124]).
4.2.4.Model-Driven Engineering
Model-driven engineering  (MDE)  [28],  [33] advocates  that  engineering/development  should  be
driven by high-level models. High-level models raise the abstraction level (when compared with
3GPL) and reduce the distance between the problem space and the solution space, thus facilitating
development.  Models  have  formal  semantics  and,  therefore,  implementation  artifacts  can  be
automatically generated from those models. These models may represent the software architecture,
its  behavior,  structure and content,  as well as domain-specific concepts (e.g.,  real-time systems,
databases). Although models are clearly distinguished from 3GPL, the two are essentially the same:
abstractions of the solution space. Models, however, raise the abstraction level much higher than
3GPL, enabling them to express complex concepts effectively and closer to the problem space [99].
MDE has the following advantages over conventional development methods [34], [99], [100]:
• Lower accidental complexity and lower learning curve, and thus, improved communication
between stakeholders with different backgrounds.
• In the design phase, it enables early design analysis and error detection (e.g., violation of
domain-specific constrains), and thus, it facilitates the job of finding a design that fulfills the
requirements.
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• It  enables  automated  synthesization  of  implementation  artifacts  (e.g.,  boilerplate  code
generation); furthermore, compilers can perform a better job at optimizing their output, and
thus, produce highly efficient systems.
MDE, however, also has the following limitations [25], [100]:
• A trade-off must be made between raising the abstraction level and oversimplification.
• Redundancy:  To properly model  a  system there  has  to  be  a  set  of  models,  all  of  them
modeling the same systems but from different perspectives.
• Round-trip: With multiple levels of abstraction, a change in a lower abstraction level must
be propagated to the higher abstraction levels. That however, is not an easy thing to do.
• One can be moving complexity instead of reducing it.
• Expertise is required: In order to fully understand a MDE development environment, one
has to have an understanding of all the abstraction layers, and, for example, understand the
effect that a change in some abstraction level will have on the other levels.
• Existing modeling languages (e.g., UML) are known for its complexity, and, in some cases,
imprecise semantics or none at all.
• Limited tool support: That however, is starting to change together with the development in
MDE and other tightly related areas (e.g., Eclipse Modeling Framework).
A particular  realization  of  MDE is  the  model-driven architecture  (MDA) from OMG  [101].  It
defines that business logic should be implemented in a platform independent model (PIM) which is
subsequently translated into one or more platform specific models (PSM). A PSM describes the
implementation of the PIM in terms of the target platform. Other realization of MDE include: Agile
MDE, domain-oriented programming, software factories, etc.
Hutchinson  et.  al,  2011  [102],  evaluated  how  three  commercial  organizations  adopted  MDE,
through in-depth semi-structured interviews, in order to contribute to the very limited number of
empirical studies on MDE and its application in the “real world.” In this study, they focus on the
“organizational,  managerial  and  social  factors”  which  contribute  to  the  success  or  failure  of
introducing  MDE;  technical  factors  are  not  considered.  For  the  study  three  companies  were
considered: “the printer company,” “the car company,” and “the telecom company.” With this study
the authors identified that:
• The success of the deployment of MDE should be done in a “progressive and iterative”
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manner, instead of an “all or nothing” approach.
• The  users,  developers  and maintainers  of  the  MDE framework must  be  committed  and
motivated to do so.
• MDE's stakeholder must be committed to respond to any issues that may come up and to
adopt new methods of working.
• MDE must have a clear business goal.
One  interesting  outcome  of  this  study  is  the  realization  that  MDE,  besides  the  technicalities
involved, requires a strong cultural change and commitment.
4.3. Architecture Analysis & Design Language
The Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL) [38] is an architecture description language
which can be represented as text, graphically, or using XML Metadata Interchange (XMI). AADL
has  been  developed  by  academic  and  industrial  partners  and  standardized  by  the  Society  of
Automotive Engineers. AADL has been developed for modeling distributed real-time embedded
systems,  and  to  support  the  complete  engineering  life-cycle,  including:  specification,  analysis,
tuning, integration, and upgrade.
AADL is based on a  component model  which distinguishes interface from implementation and
where an implementation is a particular realization of a specific interface. As illustrated in Listing
4.1 and Listing 4.2, an interface is specified by a type declaration (e.g., lines 7-11 and 24-28), and
an implementation is specified by an implementation declaration (e.g., lines 15-20 and 31-40). In a
type declaration the externally visible interface of a component is specified in terms of “features”
(e.g.,  lines  8-10  and  25-27).  On  the  other  end,  in  an  implementation  declaration  the  internal
structure  of  a  component  is  defined;  the  internal  structure  of  a  component  may  include  sub-
components  (i.e.,  other  components)  (e.g.,  lines  32-33  and  53-54),  connections  between  sub-
components, and connections between the component interface and the sub-components interfaces
(e.g., lines 34-36 and 55-57).
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1 -- an AADL comment is preceded by "--" 
2 package example -- beginning of the "example" package 
3 public -- public contents of the "example" package 
4 
5 -- a subprogram type declaration 
6 
7 subprogram compute 
8 features -- interface 
9    i : in parameter integer; 
10    o : out parameter integer; 
11 end compute; 
12 
13 -- a subprogram implementation declaration 
14 
15 subprogram implementation compute.impl 
16 properties 
17    source_language => C; 
18    source_text => ("compute.o"); -- object file name 
19    source_name => "do_compute"; -- function name 
20 end compute.impl; 
21 
22 -- a thread type declaration 
23 
24 thread thread_compute 
25 features 
26    inp : in event data port integer; 
27    outp : out event data port integer; 
28 end thread_compute;
Listing 4.1. An example of an AADL model (continued in Listing 4.2).
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29 -- a thread implementation declaration
30 
31 thread implementation thread_compute.impl 
32 calls 
33     c1 : { comp : subprogram compute.impl; }; 
34 connections 
35     port inp -> comp.i; 
36     port comp.o -> outp; 
37 properties 
38     period => 500 ms; 
39     deadline => 100 ms; 
40 end thread_compute.impl; 
41 
42 -- a process type declaration 
43 
44 process process_type 
45 features 
46    data_in : in event data port integer; 
47    data_out : out event data port integer; 
48 end process_type; 
49 
50 -- a process implementation declaration 
51 
52 process implementation process_type.impl 
53 subcomponents
54     th : thread thread_compute.impl; 
55 connections 
56     port data_in -> thread_compute.inp; 
57     port thread_compute.outp -> data_out; 
58 end process_type.impl; 
59 
60 end; -- end of the “example” package
Listing 4.2. An example of an AADL model (continuation of Listing 4.1).
In  AADL,  all  type  and  implementation  declarations  are  associated  with  a  specific  component
category. The category of component defines what is expected of the component during run-time,
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restricting the interface and implementation that is possible. AADL specifies four sets of component
categories: (1) software, (2) execution platform, (3) composite, and (4) abstract.
First, the set of software component categories, enable modeling of source text (e.g., C/C++, Ada,
Java),  concurrent  tasks,  protected  and  virtual  address  space,  among  others.  More  specifically,
software component categories include:
• subprogram: models source text that is executed sequentially (e.g., lines 7-11 and 15-20);
graphically,  a  subprogram should  be represented  as  a  solid  line ellipse,  as  illustrated in
Figure 4.2, based on Listing 4.1 and Listing 4.2.
• thread: models concurrent tasks, the basic unit of execution and schedulability (e.g., lines
24-28 and 31-40); graphically, a thread should be represented as a dashed line parallelogram,
as illustrated in Figure 4.2, based on Listing 4.1 and Listing 4.2.
• process: models a protected or virtual address space, and must contain at least one thread
(e.g., lines 44-48 and 52-58); graphically, a process should be represented as a solid line
parallelogram, as illustrated in Figure 4.2, based on Listing 4.1 and Listing 4.2.
• data: models static data in source text; graphically, a data components should be represented
by a solid line rectangle, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.2. Standard AADL graphical representation of the model in Listing 4.1 and Listing 4.2.
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process_type.impl
thread_compute.impl
compute.impl
Figure 4.3. Standard AADL graphical representation for some AADL components.
Second, the set of execution platform component categories represent a combination of hardware
and  software  capable  of  supporting  the  execution  of  software,  storage,  and  communications.
Execution platform components include:
• processor: a combination of hardware and software responsible for protected address spaces
and for scheduling threads; graphically, a processor should be represented by a solid line
rectangular parallelepiped, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
• virtual processor: a logical resource which provides an additional level of schedulability, and
which enables the specification of virtual machines; graphically, a virtual processor should
be represented by a dashed line rectangular parallelipiped, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
• memory:  represents  randomly  accessible  physical  storage  such  as  ROM  and  RAM;
graphically, memory should be represented by a cylinder, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
• device: represents a component capable of interacting with the external environment (e.g.,
sensors, actuators); graphically, a device should be represented as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
• bus: a physical or logical communication channel between execution platform components;
graphically,  a  bus  should  be  represented  by a  solid  line  double  edged  block  arrow,  as
illustrated in Figure 4.3.
• virtual bus: a virtual communication channel or a communication protocol built on top of a
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bus; graphically, a virtual bus should be represented by a dashed line double edged block
arrow, as illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Third,  the set  of composite component categories, is only composed by the system component.
Software components cannot  be sub-components of  hardware components,  and vice versa.  The
system component  enables  the  integration  of  the  two,  and  enables  software  components  to  be
mapped onto execution platform components; for example: mapping a process to memory, mapping
a process to a processor or virtual processor, etc. Graphically, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, a system
should be represented by solid line rounded rectangle.
Forth  and  last,  the  set  of  abstract  component  categories,  is  only  composed  by  the  abstract
component which can be refined into any other component category.
The interface  of  a  component  is  specified  in  terms  of  “features,”  as  explained above,  and the
connections between components are defined by connections between “features.” Each component
category supports a different set of features, such as:
• data port: models transfer of state data (e.g., sensor data);
• event port: models transfer of control, through events (e.g., set-point reached, start thread);
• event data port: models transfer of events with data (e.g., logging) (e.g., lines 26, 27, 46 and
47);
• subprogram parameters: models the inputs and outputs of subprograms (e.g., lines 9 and 10).
Properties are name/value pairs which can be used to characterize a component, such as the period
and deadline of threads (e.g., lines 38 and 39), or the source text associated with a subprogram (e.g.,
lines  17-19),  among  many others.  Properties  can  be  declared  within  type  and  implementation
declarations;  properties  declared  in  a  type  declaration  are  inherited  by  an  implementation
declaration. There are a set of standard properties and standard property types; additional properties
can  be  added  through  custom  property  sets.  Standard  properties  sets  include:  real-time,
communication, data representation, error handling, code generation, deployment, etc.
AADL has  been  chosen  for  this  work  because  it  provides  the  necessary  abstraction  for  the
representation of ARINC 653 partitions, privileged partitions, and virtual machines. Furthermore, it
is supported by Ocarina, described in Section 4.4. Ocarina, a free and open source AADL compiler
with one back-end for POK, used in this work.
Many architecture description languages can be found in the literature. Most of then, however, are
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too broad and generic [103]–[105]. AADL, on the other end, is well established and standardized,
and it is not overly specific yet defines precise semantics.
4.4. Ocarina
Ocarina is an open source compiler with several front-ends and several back-ends. The front-ends
include: AADL versions 1 and 2, and Requirement Enforcement Analysis Language (REAL) [106],
[107]. REAL is a language which  enables the specification of constrains associated with AADL
models, and thus, the verification of AADL models against those constraints; in this work, REAL
has not been used. On the other end, it includes back-ends such as: POK, Linux, ORK+, PolyORB
and PolyORB-HI, XtratuM, among many others.
As illustrated in  Figure  4.4,  Ocarina,  after  initialization  and after  processing all  command line
arguments,  operates  according  to  following  process.  First,  it  performs  syntactic  and  semantic
analysis on all input AADL models and on all standard AADL property sets required by all input
models; at the end of semantic analysis an abstract syntax tree (AST) is obtained which mirrors the
structure of the input models. Second, the AST obtained after semantic analysis  is instantiated.
Instantiation consists in reducing the AST by eliminating unused nodes, by binding related nodes
with each other, and, depending on the back-end, by associating extra information with nodes in the
AST.  At  the  end  of  this  stage,  the  “instantiated  AST”  is  obtained.  Third,  it  runs  through  the
instantiated AST several times, transforming it into a language-specific AST (e.g., C, Ada). This
process is also known as model transformation, that is, the input AADL model is transformed into
another language model. At the end of this stage, the “final AST” is obtained. POK's final AST is
composed by:
• Kernel configuration code.
• Partitions' implementation and configuration code, if specified in the input model.
• Common implementation and configuration code which is responsible for integrating the
partitions and the kernel.
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Figure 4.4. Ocarina's process after initialization and after processing all command line arguments.
Forth and last, the final AST is saved on the file system as (1) regular source code and library files,
containing the implementation, and (2) Makefiles, which contain the instructions on how to build
the partitions, the kernel, and the integration of the two (i.e., the final kernel image) ready to be
downloaded to the target. This is illustrated by Figure 4.5. With the AST saved on the file system, it
can be built/compiled and then, deployed on the desired target platform.
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Figure 4.5. An example on how the final AST can be stored in the file system. Example based on
Ocarina's POK back-end.
4.5. Privileged Partitions
In this section it is explained how we have chosen to represent a privileged partition in AADL, and
how Ocarina's POK back-end has been modified to support privileged partitions and to generate a
POK configuration accordingly.
In Ocarina's POK back-end a partition is represented as an AADL virtual processor, as illustrated in
Listing 4.3; by default an AADL virtual processor represents an ARINC 653 partition. Support for
privileged partitions has been added by extending Ocarina's POK AADL property set with a new
property: “Virtual_Processor_Type”, applicable only to the virtual processor component category.
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This is illustrated in Listing 4.4. First, the available virtual processor types are declared (lines 5-6):
“arinc_653”,  for  ARINC 653 partitions,  and “privileged”,  for  privileged partitions.  Second,  the
“Virtual_Processor_Type” property is declared (lines 8-10), which can be assigned with any of the
available virtual processor types declared earlier. With this property the developer can declare an
ARINC 653  partition  or  a  privileged  partition  as  illustrated  in  Listing  4.5:  the  AADL virtual
processor  named “partition_1” is  an ARINC 653 partition  (lines  8-12)  while  “partition_2” is  a
privileged partition (lines 14-18).
1 package example -- AADL comment
1 public -- public namespace
2 
3 virtual processor partition_generic
4 end partition_generic;
5 
6 end example;
Listing 4.3. Representation of a generic partition in AADL.
1 property set POK is -- AADL comment
2 
3 -- existing properties...
4 
5 Available_Virtual_Processor_Types:
6     type enumeration ( arinc_653, privileged );
7 
8 Virtual_Processor_Type:
9     POK::Available_Virtual_Processor_Types
10     applies to virtual processor;
11 
12 end;
Listing 4.4. Code added to POK’s AADL property set in order to support privileged partitions
through the new Virtual_Processor_Type property.
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1 package example -- AADL comment
2 public -- public namespace
3 
4 with POK; -- include the POK library
5 
6 -- other components...
7 
8 virtual processor partition_1
9 properties
10    -- other properties
11    POK::Virtual_Processor_Type => arinc_653;
12 end partition_1;
13 
14 virtual processor partition_2
15 properties
16    -- other properties
17    POK::Virtual_Processor_Type => privileged;
18 end partition_2;
19 
20 -- other components...
21 
22 end example;
Listing 4.5. Sample usage of the Virtual_Processor_Type property: the virtual processor named
“partition_1” is an ARINC 653 partition and “partition_2” is a privileged partition.
So far, it has been described how Ocarina's POK AADL property set has been modified to support
privileged partitions. This alone, however, only enables the AADL model in  Listing 4.5 to be a
correct model; it does not enable Ocarina to generate a POK configuration accordingly. For that,
Ocarina has been modified to recognize the new property (i.e.,  Virtual_Processor_Type) and to
generate code for privileged partitions and the kernel accordingly. Ocarina has been modified such
that, as illustrated in Figure 4.6, during privileged partitions' code generation:
• a  flag  to  enable  code  common  to  ARINC 653  and  privileged  partitions  to  take  action
depending on the type of the partition that is being compiled (e.g., select the proper system
call interface as explained in Section 3.3. Privileged Partitions);
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• a flag to inhibit the link stage during compilation of the partition (privileged partitions are
linked together with the kernel during compilation of the final kernel image as explained in
Section 3.3. Privileged Partitions).
Figure 4.6. Ocarina's modified operation during partition's code generation.
During  kernel's  code  generation,  on  the  other  end,  as  shown  in  Figure  4.7,  the  following  is
generated:
• an array describing the type of all partitions (i.e., ARINC 653 or privileged);
• an array with the entry points of privileged partitions which have to be specified manually,
as explained in Section 3.3. Privileged Partitions;
• compilation flags extended with references to compiled-but-not-linked privileged partitions
so that these can be subsequently linked and integrated with the kernel.
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Begin
?
Configure partition as privileged.
End
Inhibit the link stage during compilation.
...
Virtual_Processor_Type = privileged
else
Figure 4.7. Ocarina's modified operation, required by privileged partitions, when generating code
for the kernel.
In summary, adding support for privileged partition to Ocarina required: (1) the addition of new
AADL property,  enabling the specification  of  ARINC 653 or  privileged partitions,  and (2)  the
modification of Ocarina to recognize the new property and to generate code for privileged partitions
and for the kernel accordingly.  Table 4.1 presents the required number of new/modified Ocarina's
source lines  of code (SLOC) and an estimation of the respective development  effort,  schedule,
number of developers, and cost. It is shown that 149 new/modified SLOC were required, with an
estimated cost of $3660.
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Begin
Generate partitions' type array
Generate privileged partitions' entry points
Generate extended/modified compilation flags
End
Table 4.1. The number of new and modified source lines of code (SLOC), and an estimation of the
development effort, schedule, number of developers and cost [81], required in order to add support
for privileged partition to Ocarina.
Metric Value
Architecture-independent (SLOC), Ada programming language 149
Total (SLOC) 149
Development Effort Estimate (Person-Months) 0.33
Schedule Estimate (Months) 1.63
Estimated Average Number of Developers (Effort/Schedule) 0.20
Total Estimated Cost to Develop (average salary = $56,286/year, overhead = 2.40) $3660
4.6. Virtual Machines
Similarly to the previous section, in this section it is explained how we have chosen to represent
virtual machines in AADL, and how Ocarina's POK back-end has been modified to support virtual
machines and to generate a POK configuration accordingly.
In AADL a partition is represented by a virtual processor and, by default, all virtual processors
correspond to ARINC 653 partitions. Similarly to privileged partitions, support for virtual machines
has been added by extending Ocarina's POK AADL “Virtual_Processor_Type” with a new possible
assignment:  “virtual_machine”.  In  Listing  4.6,  the  combined  modifications  to  Ocarina's  POK
AADL property set  required for  privileged partitions  and virtual  machines  is  shown. First,  the
available  virtual  processor  types  are  declared,  “arinc_653”,  “privileged”,  and “virtual_machine”
(lines 5-6). Second, the Virtual_Processor_Type property is declared, which can be assigned with
any of the available virtual processor types declared earlier (lines 8-10). With this property the
developer can declare a virtual machine as illustrated in  Listing 4.7: the AADL virtual processor
named “partition_1” is an ARINC 653 partition (lines 8-12), and “partition_3” is a virtual machine
(lines 14-18).
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1 property set POK is -- AADL comment
2 
3 -- existing properties...
4 
5 Available_Virtual_Processor_Types:
6     type enumeration ( arinc_653, privileged, virtual_machine );
7 
8 Virtual_Processor_Type:
9     POK::Available_Virtual_Processor_Types
10     applies to virtual processor;
11 
12 end;
Listing 4.6. Code added to POK’s AADL property set in order to support virtual machines through
the new Virtual_Processor_Type property.
1 package example -- AADL comment
2 public -- public namespace
3 
4 with POK; -- include the POK library
5 
6 -- other components...
7 
8 virtual processor partition_1
9 properties
10    -- other properties
11    POK::Virtual_Processor_Type => arinc_653;
12 end partition_1;
13 
14 virtual processor partition_3
15 properties
16    -- other properties
17    POK::Virtual_Processor_Type => virtual_machine;
18 end partition_3;
19 
20 -- other components...
21 
22 end example;
Listing 4.7. Sample usage of the Virtual_Processor_Type property: the virtual processor named
“partition_1” is an ARINC 653 partition, and “partition_3” is a virtual machine.
Up to this point, it has been described how POK's AADL property set has been modified to support
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virtual machines. This alone, however, only enables the AADL model in Listing 4.7 to be a correct
model; it does not enable Ocarina to generate a configuration accordingly. For that, Ocarina has
been modified to recognize the new property (i.e., Virtual_Processor_Type) and to generate code for
virtual machines and for the kernel accordingly. Currently, code generation for virtual machines is
not supported; instead, the guest's executable must be provided directly.  Therefore,  Ocarina has
been modified to inhibit code generation for virtual machines. On the other end, Ocarina has been
modified so that, as shown in Figure 4.8, during kernel's code generation the following additional
code is generated:
• an array specifying which partition are virtual machines and which are not;
• several  arrays  describing  the  characteristics/attributes  of  all  the  virtual  machines  (e.g.,
address space, error-handling, etc.).
Figure 4.8. Ocarina's modified operation, required by virtual machines, when generating code for
the kernel.
In summary, adding support for virtual machines to Ocarina required: (1) the addition of a new
AADL  property,  enabling  the  specification  of  ARINC  653,  privileged  partitions,  or  virtual
machines, and (2) the modification of Ocarina to recognize this new property and to generate code
for the kernel accordingly, but to not generate code for virtual machines.  Table 4.2 presents the
required number of new/modified Ocarina's source lines of code (SLOC) and an estimation of the
associated  development  effort,  schedule,  number  of  developers,  and  cost.  It  shows  that  269
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Begin
Generate partitions' type array
Generate virtual machines' characteristics arrays
End
new/modified SLOC were required, with an estimated cost of $6805.
Table 4.2. The number of new and modified source lines of code (SLOC), and an estimation of the
development effort, schedule, number of developers and cost [81], required in order to add support
for virtual machines to Ocarina.
Metric Value
Architecture-independent (SLOC), Ada programming language 269
Total (SLOC) 269
Development Effort Estimate (Person-Months) 0.6
Schedule Estimate (Months) 2.06
Estimated Average Number of Developers (Effort/Schedule) 0.29
Total Estimated Cost to Develop (average salary = $56,286/year, overhead = 2.40) $6805
4.7. Evaluation
In this section the ability of AADL to reduce the development effort is demonstrated. For that, the
source lines of code (SLOC) from all the AADL models developed for this thesis are compared with
the corresponding generated SLOC.
Table 4.3 shows, for all configuration developed for this thesis: (1) the number of AADL SLOC, (2)
the number of generated SLOC, and (3) the ratio of the number of AADL SLOC to the number of
generated SLOC. Similarly,  the graph in  Figure 4.9 presents the ratio of the number of AADL
SLOC to the number of generated SLOC in relation to the number of AADL SLOC.
It can be seen that, the no. AADL SLOC is always lower than the no. generated SLOC. In the worst
case, the no. AADL SLOC corresponds to 56% of generated SLOC, while in the best case the no.
AADL SLOC corresponds to less than 15% of generated SLOC. It can also be seen that as the no.
AADL SLOC increase, the reduction of the engineering effort increases, meaning that AADL-based
engineering/development is the most adequate for large systems. Considering that the higher the no.
SLOC, the higher the development effort, then, using AADL always leads to lower development
effort than a manual implementation; lower development effort, in turn, should lead to lower time-
to-market and costs.
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Table 4.3. For all configuration developed for this thesis: (1) the number of AADL SLOC, (2) the
number of generated SLOC, and (3) the ratio of the number of AADL SLOC to the number of
generated SLOC. The first and second columns represent, respectively: (1) the section where the
configuration has been mentioned, and (2) the reference name of the configuration.
Section Configuration
No. AADL
SLOC
No. generated
SLOC
Ratio (%)
3.5.2. Cumulative 
Virtualization Overhead
L2 81 190 42.63
3.5.4. Footprint A1 116 379 30.61
A2 121 605 20.00
A3 126 831 15.16
A4 131 1057 12.39
P1 116 388 29.90
P2 121 619 19.55
P3 126 850 14.82
P4 131 1081 12.12
V1 104 186 55.91
V2 109 197 55.33
V3 114 208 54.81
V4 119 219 54.34
5.4.  Use Case: Serial Port
Device Driver
Reference 89 393 23.23
5.5.  Use  Case:  Inter-
Partition  Communication
Subsystem
Reference 150 761 19.71
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Figure 4.9. The ratio of the number of AADL SLOC to the number of generated SLOC in relation to
the number of AADL SLOC.
4.8. Future Work
In the context of this chapter, we propose the following as future work:
• Employ MDE not only for generating the implementation but also for generating test cases,
profilers, etc.
• Use REAL [106], [107] to enforce the constrains associated with virtual machines, such as:
only one thread, the minimum size of the address space, etc.
• Ocarina is currently implemented in Ada, and it is not easy to modify; we propose a new
implementation  based  on,  for  example,  Model  to  Text  Transformation  Language  within
OMG's Meta-Object Facility [108].
4.9. Summary
In this chapter, it has been shown that AADL is able to support the representation of privileged
partitions and virtual machines, and thus, it is able to replace conventional development methods.
Moreover, it has been shown that the engineering effort required to modify Ocarina in order for it to
support privileged partitions and virtual machines is low.
Also in this chapter, it has been shown that, at least, for all the configuration developed for this
119
70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Number of AADL SLOC
R
at
io
 o
f t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f A
AD
L 
S
LO
C
to
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r g
en
er
at
ed
 S
LO
C
 (%
)
thesis,  AADL  always  leads  to  lower  development  effort,  when  compared  with  manual
implementation, which should lead to lower time-to-market and costs.
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5. Functionality Farming
5.1. Introduction
As explained in  Section  1.3.  Functionality Farming, nowadays, most operating systems follow a
monolithic architecture; a monolithic architecture, however, leads to a large kernel, which in turn,
leads to low reliability, weak security, high certification effort, as well as poor predictability and
scalability. To reduce the size of the kernel, some authors propose the use of architectures based on:
(1) a virtual machine monitor (or hypervisor), or (2) a microkernel, or (3) a combination of the two
(i.e.,  a  microkernel  with  virtualization  support).  These  architectures,  however,  depend  on  the
development of a new kernel, and thus, of a significant upfront investment; if the development of
the new kernel fails, the cost is huge. And, in the end, these architectures do not tackle the source of
the problem, i.e., the large size of the kernel in commodity operating systems, and just work around
it.
In this thesis, functionality farming is presented, which, instead of a new architecture, consists in
partitioning existing kernels by (1) moving functionality out of the kernel and onto the application
(or partition) level, to reduce the size of the kernel, and by (2) replacing the functionality being
moved with remote procedure calls to the partition level, to bridge the gap between the kernel and
the partition level. Unlike other works, functionality farming tackles the source of the problem (i.e.,
the large size of the kernel in commodity operating systems). It requires a lower upfront investment,
as it enables a progressive reduction of the size of the kernel, instead of an all-or-nothing approach,
and thus, it  is a more agile approach since it enables some decisions to be postponed closer to
delivery time when information about the system's requirements is more precise.
Time and space partitioning an existing kernel, nevertheless, is not an easy task. In some cases,
because  of  a  functionality's  level  of  coupling  with  kernel  or  its  functional  requirements  (e.g.,
compatibility  with  hardware-dependent,  kernel-level  software),  ensuring  that  time  and  space
partitioning is possible, and at the same time, fulfilling the functionality's functional requirements
may depend on a significant engineering effort. To address this issue, functionality farming relies on
various partition types. The different partition types each provide distinct levels of partitioning (e.g.,
from time-only partitioning to both time and space partitioning), as well as they fulfill different
functional requirements (e.g., from compatibility with hardware-dependent, kernel-level software to
compatibility with only hardware-independent software). These different partition types, not only
increase the extent to which functionality farming is more easily accomplished, but also enable an
even more progressive reduction of the size of the kernel.  Thus,  these different  partition types
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enable fast design space exploration, and reduce the associated risk.
In Chapter 3. POK/rodosvisor, it has been described how POK has been extended to support three
partition  types,  becoming  POK/rodosvisor,  namely:  privileged  partitions,  virtual  machines  and
ARINC 653 partitions.
Privileged partitions enforce time-only partitioning and provide compatibility with legacy software.
As explained in Section 3.3. Privileged Partitions, a privileged partition runs at the kernel-level and
thus, also provides compatibility with kernel-level functionality. Being compatible with kernel-level
functionality,  the  effort  of  porting  legacy  kernel-level  functionality  onto  a  privileged  partition
should be low. Privileged partitions, however, by running at the kernel-level are still part of the
kernel. Furthermore, as part of the kernel, only a select few failures can be contained; nevertheless,
in those cases, only the faulty partition needs to be restarted, instead of the entire kernel.
Virtual machines enforce time and space partitioning and still  provide compatibility with legacy
software (as explained throughout Chapter 2. Rodosvisor, and in Section 3.4. POK and Rodosvisor
Integration).  Virtual  machines,  through  virtualization,  provide  compatibility  with  kernel-level
functionality and thus, similarly to privileged partitions, the effort of porting legacy functionality
onto a virtual machine should be low. Unlike privileged partitions, however, virtual machines are
space partitioned and thus, are not part of the kernel. Additionally, because virtual machines are
space partitioned, any failure can be contained and, if  detected, only the faulty virtual machine
needs  to  be  restarted.  The  downside  to  virtual  machines  is  the  virtualization  overhead  and,
consequently, lower performance than privileged partitions.
Finally,  ARINC 653 partitions enforce not only time and space partitioning, but also hardware-
independence. The end goal of functionality farming is to move most of the kernel functionality
onto ARINC 653 partitions; however, in some cases, because of their complexity or size, it is hard
to move functionality directly from the kernel onto ARINC 653 partitions; moving functionality
from the kernel onto privileged partitions or virtual machines, nevertheless, is easier.
Functionality farming, despite the benefits, still depends on a significant engineering effort, as will
be shown later, and its effects are often very hard to predict, meaning that the associated risk is still
high.
This chapter presents FF-AUTO, a tool which performs functionality farming semi-automatically in
POK/rodosvisor.  With  FF-AUTO,  the  engineering  effort,  and  thus,  the  risk  associated  with
functionality  farming  is  significantly  reduced,  making  it  also  an  ideal  tool  for  design  space
exploration.
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This chapter also demonstrates how functionality farming is able to improve the design and the
performance of POK/rodosvisor, as well  as how  FF-AUTO enables a significant reduction of the
required engineering effort. Currently, we are unable to demonstrate a reduction of the size of the
kernel  since  POK/rodosvisor  is  already a  very small  kernel  (very close  to  microkernel).  Even
though  functionality  farming  and  FF-AUTO,  described  here,  are  currently targeted  towards  only
POK/rodosvisor, its underlying methodology can be applied to any other operating system.
5.1.1.Chapter Organization
This chapter is organized as follows.
In the following section, Section 5.2. Related Work, an overview of related work is given.
In Section 5.3. Functionality Farming Automated: ff-auto, FF-AUTO and its underlying methodology
are presented.
In  Section  5.4.  Use Case: Serial Port Device Driver and  Section  5.5.  Use Case: Inter-Partition
Communication Subsystem, two use cases are presented, demonstrating that functionality farming is
able to improve the design and the performance of POK/rodosvisor, and that FF-AUTO contributes to
a significant reduction of the required engineering effort, and thus, of the associated risk.
Finally,  in  Section  5.6.  Future Work and  Section  5.7.  Summary,  future work is proposed, and a
summary of this chapter is given, respectively.
5.2. Related Work
Functionality farming is loosely based on the concept of task farming. Task farming consists on the
decomposition of computations into identical and independent serial tasks, which are then executed
by  different  processor  cores  in  a  multicore  processor  or  in  multi-processor  systems  such  as
computational  grids  [109].  Task  farming  is  suited  for  computations  such  as  a  Montecarlo
simulations in which the same model is run many times but with different start points (or inputs). A
task farm is generically composed by:
1. The farmer, responsible for distributing the input to a pool of tasks and for retrieving and
merging the output;
2. A pool of identical tasks, which perform the actual computation in parallel.
Similarly,  functionality  farming  consists  on  the  decomposition/partitioning  of  the  kernel  into
partitions which perform the actual computation (not necessarily in parallel). Continuing with this
analogy, then, the kernel is the farmer, and partitions are the pool of identical tasks.
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To reduce the size of the trusted computing base (TCB), and thus, to improve security and reduce
the certification effort, some authors propose the use of architectures based on: (1) a virtual machine
monitor (or hypervisor), or (2) a microkernel, or (3) a combination of the two (i.e., a microkernel
with virtualization support), in which the size of the kernel is much smaller than the kernel found in
most commodity operating systems. More specifically, Hohmuth et al. [42] and Garfinkel et al. [44]
propose an architecture based on a hypervisor. In particular, Hohmuth et al. use paravirtualization to
achieve an even smaller size of the kernel (and thus of the TCB); to accomplish communication
between virtual machines, in the approach used by Garfinkel et al., the hypervisor fully virtualizes
one or more network devices, while Hohmuth et al. used paravirtualization to achieve the same
result but with a smaller kernel (at the cost, however, of requiring modification to legacy software).
Similarly, Liu et al. [46] propose an architecture based on a hypervisor to better partition the system
across the cores of a multicore processor system. On the other end, Heiser et al.  [41] propose a
microkernel architecture, and Heiser et al. [47] propose an architecture based on a microkernel with
virtualization  support.  In  these  architectures,  commodity  operating  systems  are  pushed  onto  a
virtual machine (on a hypervisor-based architecture), or onto one or more user-level servers (on a
microkernel-based  architecture),  reducing  the  effects  that  a  compromised  commodity  operating
system can have on the system as a whole. Alongside the operating system, critical services are
deployed on other virtual machines (or user-level servers), which depend on a much smaller TCB
than that in a commodity operating system. These architectures, however, depend on an additional
level  of  indirection  which  leads  to  poor  performance.  Furthermore,  on  a  hypervisor-based
architecture in particular, virtual machines are often coarse-grained and heavyweight leading to high
resource usage.  On a microkernel architecture,  on the other end, there is no compatibility with
legacy  software,  and  the  porting  effort  can  be  very  significant.  An  architecture  based  on  a
“microkernel with virtualization support” solves the issues with the other two architectures, at the
cost,  however,  of  a  larger  size  of  the  kernel.  In  the  end,  these  architectures  depend  on  the
development of a new kernel, and thus, on a significant upfront investment; if the development of
the new kernel fails, the cost is huge. These architectures do not tackle the source of the problem,
i.e.,  the  large  size  of  the  kernel  in  commodity  operating  systems,  and  just  work  around  it.
Conversely,  functionality  farming tackles  the  source  of  the  problem by enabling  a  progressive
reduction of the size of the kernel, and requires a lower upfront investment. Moreover, through FF-
AUTO,  the  associated  engineering  effort  is  significantly  reduced,  facilitating  even  further  the
application of functionality farming.
Similarly  to  FF-AUTO,  other  works  propose  the  improvement  of  existing  software  through
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refactoring. For example: [110]–[113] focus on the parallelization of existing sequential programs,
[114]–[117] on  improving  security,  [118] on  improving  modularity,  and  [119] on  enabling
reentrancy, among others. Similarly to our work, these works enable a reduction of the engineering
effort required to implement and evaluate different design alternatives, and thus, also reduce the
associated risk. These works, however, imply modifications to the original source code, and require
knowledge  of  the  implementation's  details.  Moreover,  these  works  are  limited  to  hardware-
independent applications. Our work, on the other end, instead of transformations at the level of the
source code, relies on link time transformations. The original source code is not modified, and only
the knowledge of external control and data dependencies is required. Lastly, our work addresses the
requirements of hardware-dependent, kernel-level software, and thus, it is not limited to hardware-
independent application.
5.3. Functionality Farming Automated: FF-AUTO
As shown in Figure 5.1,  FF-AUTO requires as input: (1) an AADL model, specifying the reference
configuration,  and  (2)  a  functionality  farming  configuration  (FFC)  file,  which  specifies  the
functions that should be farmed and how, based on the results from a profiler, by manual inspection,
etc. As output,  FF-AUTO generates a POK/rodosvisor configuration (i.e., a modified configuration)
which is the result of applying functionality farming to the reference POK/rodosvisor configuration
specified by the input model.
Figure 5.1. Inputs and outputs of FF-AUTO.
The modified POK/rodosvisor configuration needs, in some cases, to be manually modified as FF-
AUTO is unable to automatically derive all of the necessary parameters, as will be explained later. In
most  cases,  however,  only the scheduler's  configuration needs to be updated.  In the future,  we
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expect  to  enable  the  specification  of  the  modified  scheduler's  configuration  in  the  FFC  file.
Similarly, for optimization purposes, the output from FF-AUTO may be manually modified.
In the following subsections, the FFC file format and the transformations applied to the reference
POK/rodosvisor configuration are described.
5.3.1.Functionality Farming Configuration File
The FFC file format consists of a list of statements preceded by “%” followed by a list of function
prototypes, as shown in Listing 5.1. The following statements are required:
system: this  statement  requires three parameters  separated by a semicolon.  The first  parameter
specifies the name of the AADL system implementation containing the AADL processor which is
being farmed. As explained in Section 4.3. Architecture Analysis & Design Language, in AADL, a
processor represents a combination of software and hardware responsible for scheduling threads,
enforcing  protected  address  spaces,  among  other  things.  In  other  words,  an  AADL processor
corresponds to the operating system, including the underlying hardware platform. In Ocarina, it
corresponds to a POK/rodosvisor kernel. The second parameter specifies the implementation type
name of the AADL processor to be farmed. The third parameter specifies the instance name of the
AADL processor to be farmed in the AADL system specified as the first parameter. This statement
can appear only once. For example, the system statement for the model in Listing 5.2 is: “%system
example::node.impl;  example::pok.impl;  cpu”.  In  this  example,  the  instance  of
“example::pok.impl”, named “cpu” in “example::node.impl”, is the processor to be farmed.
1 %system example::node.impl; example::pok.impl; cpu
2 %worker worker_1; privileged
3 %worker worker_2; vm
4 %worker_thread worker_thread_1; worker_1
5 %worker_thread worker_thread_2; worker_2
6 void pok_port_flushall(); worker_thread_1; call-only
7 void pok_cons_write(char*, int); worker_thread_2
Listing 5.1. A functionality farming configuration file.
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1 package example
2 public
3 
4 processor pok
5 end pok;
6 
7 processor implementation pok.impl
8 end pok.impl;
9 
10 system node
11 end node;
12 
13 system implementation node.impl;
14 subcomponents
15     cpu : processor pok.impl;
16 end node.impl;
17 
18 end example;
Listing 5.2. An incomplete AADL model.
worker: two  parameters  separated  by  a  semicolon.  The  first  parameter  specifies  a  worker's
identifier, and the second parameter specifies its type. Worker is a synonym of partition; we use
“worker” to distinguish the partitions in the reference configuration (partitions) and the partitions
involved  in  functionality  farming  (workers).  Worker  threads,  described  below,  that  should  be
assigned to this particular worker must use the identifier specified as the first parameter. Currently,
there are three types of workers supported, namely: “arinc653” for a worker based on an ARINC
653 partition; “privileged” for a worker based on a privileged partition; and “vm” for a worker
based on a  virtual  machine.  This statement  can be repeated more than once,  as  necessary.  For
example,  “%worker  worker_1;  privileged”,  specifies  a  worker  based  on  a  privileged  partition,
identified as “worker_1”.
worker_thread: this  statement  requires  two  parameters  separated  by  a  semicolon.  The  first
parameter specifies an identifier for a worker thread. The second parameter specifies the worker's
identifier with which the worker thread is assigned to. Functions that should be assigned to this
particular worker thread must use the identifier specified as the first parameter. This statement can
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be  repeated  more  than  once,  as  necessary.  For  example,  “%worker_thread  worker_thread_1;
worker_1”, specifies a worker thread identified as “worker_thread_1” and assigned to the worker
identified as “worker_1”.
The  list  of  statements  just  described  is  followed  by  a  list  of  function  prototypes.  A function
prototype is specified using the syntax of the C programming language, followed by a semicolon
and the identifier  of the worker  thread which the function is  assigned to.  Optionally,  a  second
semicolon followed by the keyword “call-only” can be specified, as shown in  Listing 5.1, line 6.
The “call-only” keyword indicates that only the function call, and not its implementation should be
farmed. Function call farming and its motivation are explained in the following section.
5.3.2.Function Call Farming and Complete Farming
Some partition (or worker) types are unable to support specific kinds of functionality, and therefore,
the implementation of some functions cannot be moved to them. To address this limitation, function
call farming can be performed instead. With function call farming, the function's implementation
remains in the kernel, and only the “function call” is moved. With function call farming, it cannot
be expected that the size of the kernel will ever be reduced, because the function's implementation
is not moved; however, as will be shown later, function call farming alone can still reveal good
design alternatives. And, after finding a good design alternative, the function's implementation can
be modified so as to enable complete farming (i.e., where the function's implementation is actually
moved to the partition).
More  specifically,  ARINC  653  partitions  cannot  support  hardware-dependent  functionality;
therefore, when farming hardware-dependent functionality onto an ARINC 653 partition, function
call farming must be specified. A privileged partition, on the other end, because it runs at the same
level  as,  and  with  the  same level  of  privilege  as  the  kernel,  farming  any functionality  onto  a
privileged partition means that the function's implementation will remain in the same address space,
and  therefore,  only  function  call  farming  is  ever  performed.  A virtual  machine  supports  both
hardware-independent  and hardware-dependent  functionality,  which  means  it  is  able  to  support
complete farming of all kinds of functionality; however, with some exceptions, as explained next.
Independently  of  the  partition  type,  currently,  our  methodology  does  not  support  moving
functionality with kernel dependencies (i.e.,  which requires access to kernel data), and thus, for
those kinds of functionality, function call farming needs to be specified. In the future, we expect to
use existing code rewriting or binary translation techniques to automatically replace direct accesses
to kernel data with other mechanism such as, for example, system calls.
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5.3.3.Workers and Worker Threads
For each worker specified in the FFC file a worker is added to the reference configuration. The type
of  the  worker  is  as  specified  in  the  FFC  file.  Similarly,  worker  threads  are  added  to  the
corresponding  workers,  as  specified  in  the  FFC file.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  transformation
between (a) and (b) in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2. Illustration of the transformations applied to the reference configuration by FF-AUTO:
(a) the reference configuration; (b) workers and worker threads added to the reference
configuration; (c) FCW, FCU, and associated communication channels added to the reference
configuration.
For functions which require access to I/O and which have been assigned to a virtual-machine-based
worker, the output from  FF-AUTO needs to be manually modified to update the virtual machine's
configuration such that it can have access to the required I/O. In the future, it is expected that a
function's I/O requirements could be derived automatically using methods such as those described
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in  [120].  The output from  FF-AUTO also needs to  be manually modified in order  to update the
scheduler's configuration to accommodate the new workers and worker threads, as explained earlier.
In any case, as will be shown in Section 5.4. Use Case: Serial Port Device Driver and Section 5.5.
Use Case: Inter-Partition Communication Subsystem, the required modifications are very small.
5.3.4.Function Call Wrappers and Unwrappers
For  each  function  prototype  specified  in  the  FFC file,  a  function  call  wrapper  (FCW)  and  a
corresponding function call  unwrapper (FCU) is generated.  Additionally,  in the kernel,  function
calls to the functions specified in the FFC file are replaced with function calls to the corresponding
FCW. Finally, for those functions specified for complete farming, the functions' implementation is
moved from the kernel onto the specified worker. This is illustrated by the transformation between
(b) and (c) in Figure 5.2 (shown in the previous section). For those functions specified for function
call farming, on the other end, the functions' implementation remains in the kernel.
A FCW, as shown in  Figure 5.3, serializes function calls through a communication channel, and
returns immediately after. A FCU, conversely, as shown in Figure 5.4: (1) deserializes function calls
from a communication channel, and (2) jumps to the function's implementation. Return values are
currently not supported. Serialization and deserialization of function calls relies on a data structure
declaration that is generated based on the function's prototype. In POK/rodosvisor, communication
channels are queuing communication channels, with one sending port (used by the FCW), and one
receiving port (used by the corresponding FCU), as illustrated in  Figure 5.2(c). For each function
prototype specified in the FFC file, currently, a dedicated communication channel is established. In
the future, it is expected that some functions will be able to share the same communication channel,
forming a function group, and thus, lowering resource usage.
Figure 5.3. Sequence diagram of a generic function call wrapper (FCW).
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Figure 5.4. Sequence diagram of a generic function call unwrapper (FCU).
The process of checking for and receiving new function calls depends on the type of the worker. For
workers  based  on  ARINC  653  or  privileged  partitions,  function  calls  are  received  using  the
communication services provided by the ARINC 653 APEX to which they have access by default.
For  workers  based on virtual  machines,  which  by default  do  not  have  access  to  the  APEX, a
dedicated hypercall controller is generated which, indirectly, enables a virtual machine to access the
communication services provided by the APEX, and thus, receive function calls.
Similarly,  the process of jumping to a function's implementation depends on whether or not its
implementation has been moved from the kernel onto the specified worker, and it depends on the
specified worker's type. For those functions whose implementation is moved from the kernel onto
the specified worker (i.e., complete farming), jumping to its implementation is performed directly.
On the other end, for those functions whose implementation is not moved from the kernel to the
specified worker (i.e., function call farming), jumping to its implementation, which remains in the
kernel,  depends on the specified worker's type.  If  the worker is  an ARINC 653 partition,  then,
support for a dedicated system call is added to the kernel so that the worker can request the kernel
to jump to the function's implementation. If, however, the worker is a privileged partition, then: (1)
preemption is disabled, (2) a direct jump to the function's implementation is performed, and (3)
when the function's implementation returns, preemption is enabled again. Preemption is disabled in
order to prevent the kernel from becoming in a corrupt state. Furthermore, a privileged partition is
part of the kernel and, therefore, it can jump to the function's implementation directly. Lastly, if the
worker is a virtual machine, then, an hypercall is used to request the virtual machine's hypercall
controller to jump to the function's implementation. A hypercall controller is part of the hypervisor,
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which is a part of the kernel, and thus, has access to the function's implementation. A dedicated
hypercall controller is automatically generated whenever necessary.
5.4. Use Case: Serial Port Device Driver
In this section, first, a POK/rodosvisor configuration (i.e., the reference configuration) is described
and it is demonstrated that it reveals a limitation in the design of POK/rodosvisor, more specifically,
in the design of the serial port device driver. Second, it is described how functionality farming has
been  applied  to  the  reference  configuration  and  how  it  is  expected  to  address  the  limitation
identified  earlier.  Third  and  last,  it  is  demonstrated  that  functionality  farming  addresses  that
limitation  by  comparing  the  performance  before  and  after  functionality  farming.  Even  though
functionality farming is used to address a limitation in the design of POK/rodosvisor, we do not
claim it is the only or the best way to do it; our goal is only to demonstrate a possible use case for
functionality farming.
The reference architecture is illustrated in Figure 5.5. It consists of a POK/rodosvisor-based system
with one ARINC 653 partition composed by one thread (the writer). As illustrated in Figure 5.6, for
each partition  window, the writer  sends data  to  the  serial  port,  through an  ARINC 653 virtual
queuing port which, in turn, forwards all data to the serial port. After sending the data, the writer
reports the time (as number of CPU clock cycles) required to so, and then goes idle until the next
partition window.
Figure 5.5. The reference architecture used for the serial port device driver's use case: an ARINC
653 partition which sends data through the serial port.
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Figure 5.6. A sequence diagram illustrating the process performed by the writer in the serial port
device driver's use case.
From the reference configuration, the average number of CPU clock cycles per byte required to
send data to the serial port for various sizes of data have been measured. For each data size, the
configuration ran until 100 samples have been collected; the average number of CPU clock cycles
was obtained by averaging all the samples.
Figure 5.7 shows, for the reference configuration, the average number of CPU clock cycles per byte
required to send data to the serial port for different sizes of data. It can be seen that, the larger the
data, the higher the number of CPU clock cycles per byte, indicating that sending data to the serial
port does not scale well.
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Figure 5.7. The average number of CPU clock cycles per byte required to send data to the serial
port for different sizes of data for the reference configuration.
Further investigation revealed that the lack of scalability identified above could be traced back to a
function in POK/rodosvisor named “pok_cons_write”, illustrated in Figure 5.6. In POK/rodosvisor,
“pok_cons_write” is the function which interacts directly with, and sends data to the serial port.
Once the serial port's transmit buffer (i.e., a 16-byte buffer) becomes full, “pok_cons_write” busy-
waits until the buffer becomes available before sending more data. This means that, when the size of
the data is larger than the serial port's transmit buffer, “pok_cons_write” needs to constantly busy-
wait until all data is sent. Taking into account that the rate at which the serial port dispatches data
into the transmission line is very slow compared to the CPU, then, as illustrated in Figure 5.7, when
the size of the data is larger than the serial port's transmit buffer, the impact on the number of CPU
clock cycles required to send the data is significant.
Hence,  the application of functionality farming has been considered.  More specifically,  to farm
“pok_cons_write” into a dedicated worker. In this way, “pok_cons_write”, instead of interacting
directly with, and sending data to the serial port, sends data to a sending queuing port, which can
feature a much larger buffer and is also much faster than the serial port. The worker, on the other
end, reads data from a receiving queuing port and, only then, sends it to the serial port. Because the
worker is assigned with a dedicated execution time in the major frame, the lack of scalability when
sending data to the serial port does not affect the rest of system.
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Functionality farming has  been applied  using  FF-AUTO and three  FFC files,  which specify that
“pok_cons_write” shall be farmed into one worker with one worker thread. One of the FFC files is
shown in  Listing  5.3 and  it  specifies  a  virtual-machine-based  worker  (configuration  VM);  the
resulting architecture is shown in  Figure 5.8. The other two FFC files specified an ARINC-653-
partition-based worker (configuration AP) and a privileged-partition-based worker (configuration
PP). For configuration VM, complete farming has been specified. For configuration AP, on the other
end,  function call  farming has been specified; “pok_cons_write” is  hardware-dependent  and, as
explained in  Section  5.3.  Functionality Farming Automated: ff-auto, only function call farming is
supported. For a privileged partition, configuration PP, only function call farming is supported. The
output from  FF-AUTO (i.e.,  a modified POK/rodosvisor configuration), for all configurations has
been  manually  modified  in  order  to  accommodate  the  worker  and  its  worker  thread  in  the
scheduler's configuration. For configuration VM, additionally, the virtual-machine-based worker's
configuration has been manually modified in order to enable access to the serial port hardware, as
required by “pok_cons_write”.
1 %system test::node.impl; test::ppc.impl; cpu
2 %worker worker_1; vm
3 %worker_thread worker_thread_1; worker_1
4 void pok_cons_write(char*, int); worker_thread_1
Listing 5.3. FFC file for farming “pok_cons_write” on a worker based on a virtual machine.
Figure 5.8. The resulting architecture for configuration VM on the serial port device driver's use
case.
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Similarly to the reference configuration, from all the modified configurations described above, the
average number of CPU clock cycles per byte required to send data to the serial port for various
sizes of data has been measured. The results are presented in Figure 5.9. It can be seen that, after
functionality farming, for data sizes larger than the serial port's transmit buffer, as the size of the
data increases, the cost per byte decreases, indicating that scalability is good. Furthermore, it can be
seen that the different configurations display very approximate results.
Figure 5.9. Comparison of the average number of CPU clock cycles per byte required to send data
to the serial port for different sizes of data between the reference configuration and after
functionality farming. “VM” is barely seen because it is overlapped by “PP.”
In  Figure  5.10,  the  kernel's  footprint  for  the  reference  and  all  the  modified  configurations  is
presented. It can be seen that the footprint of all the modified configurations is higher than the
reference configuration's.  This  was expected for configurations  AP and PP,  since the function's
implementation is not moved out of the kernel; the added footprint is due to a larger size of the
code, and a larger size of the stacks due to the additional partition/worker. For configuration VM,
where the function's implementation is moved out of the kernel, the added footprint is much higher
than the size of the function's implementation, and thus, overall, the footprint is higher than the
reference configuration's; the added footprint is mostly due to the hypervisor (code, read-only, and
read/write data), and due to a larger size of the stacks.
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Figure 5.10. The kernel's footprint for the reference and all the modified configurations in the serial
port device driver's use case, in terms of the size of the code, read-only (RO) and read-write (RW)
data, as well as the size of the stacks.
Lastly, in terms of the engineering effort, the reference configuration (i.e., the output from Ocarina)
consists  of  393  source  lines  of  code  (SLOC).  As  explained  in  Section  4.4.  Ocarina,  a
POK/rodosvisor  configuration  is  composed  by  the  implementation  and  configuration  of  a
POK/rodosvisor kernel, the implementation and configuration of the partitions/workers, as well as
the implementation of the configuration's build system. The three modified configurations (i.e., the
output  from  FF-AUTO) consist  of  at  least  369  new/modified  SLOC  when  compared  with  the
reference configuration. Using FF-AUTO, 4 SLOC were required for the FFC file and, in the worst
case,  an  additional  14  new/modified  SLOC were  also  required.  Knowing  that,  if  functionality
farming was performed manually, 369 new/modified SLOC would be required, and that, using FF-
AUTO, only 18 SLOC were required, then,  FF-AUTO enabled a reduction of engineering effort by
more than 20 times.
5.5. Use Case: Inter-Partition Communication Subsystem
In this section, similarly to the previous section,  first,  a POK/rodosvisor configuration (i.e.,  the
reference configuration) is described and it is demonstrated that it reveals a limitation in the design
of  POK/rodosvisor's  inter-partition  communication  subsystem.  Second,  it  is  described  how
functionality farming has been applied to the reference configuration, and how it is expected to
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address the limitation identified earlier. Third and last, it is demonstrated that functionality farming
addresses  that  limitation  by comparing  the  performance before  and after  functionality  farming.
Even though functionality farming is used to address a limitation in the design of POK/rodosvisor,
we do not intend to claim that it is the only or the best way to do it. Our goal is only to demonstrate
another use case for functionality farming.
The reference configuration is  illustrated in  Figure 5.11.  It  consists  of  a POK/rodosvisor-based
system with  two  ARINC 653  partitions  which  communicate  with  each  other  through  a  single
queuing communication channel. For each major frame, the “sender” sends data by writing to a
sending  queuing port,  while  the  “receiver”  receives  data  by reading a  corresponding  receiving
queuing port. The size of the data is never larger than the size of the sending and receiving ports'
buffer size.
Figure 5.11. The reference architecture used in the inter-partition communication subsystem's use
case: two ARINC 653 partitions communicating through a queuing channel.
From the configuration just described, the scheduling jitter has been measured for different sizes of
the data that are transmitted between “sender” and “receiver.” To measure the scheduling jitter, the
output  of  the  partitions'  context  switch  times  was  enabled  and  the  configuration  ran  until  300
samples were collected.  To obtain the scheduling jitter,  the expected context switch times were
subtracted from the measured context switch times. The average scheduling jitter was obtained by
averaging the results from all the samples.
Figure 5.12 shows the scheduling jitter for the “receiver” and the “sender,” for different sizes of
transmitted data. It can be seen that, the larger the size of the data, the larger the scheduling jitter of
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the “receiver.” The scheduling jitter of the “sender,” on the other end, is independent of the size of
the data.
Figure 5.12. The average scheduling jitter for the “receiver” and the “sender.”
Further investigation revealed that the issue identified earlier could be traced back to a function in
POK/rodosvisor  named  “pok_port_flushall”.  This  function  moves  (i.e.,  flushes)  the  data  in  all
sending ports into the corresponding receiving ports; the higher the size of transmitted data, the
higher its execution time. It is called at the beginning of a major frame, and thus, at the beginning of
the first partition window in the major frame (i.e., the partition window of the “receiver”). This
approach provides a predictable execution time when sending or receiving data, especially when an
output port is connected to multiple input ports, as it is only necessary to copy data to or from a
buffer  in  the  kernel.  The  execution  time  of  “pok_port_flushall”,  however,  overwrites  the  first
partition window in the major frame, which as demonstrated leads to high scheduling jitter for the
“receiver.”
To  solve  this  problem,  the  application  of  functionality  farming  has  been  considered.  More
specifically, to farm “pok_port_flushall” into a dedicated worker, and allocate it into a predefined
slot in the major frame, such that it does not overwrite other partitions' execution time.
Functionality farming has  been applied  using  FF-AUTO and three  FFC files,  which specify that
“pok_port_flushall” shall be farmed into one worker with a single worker thread. One FFC file,
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shown in Listing 5.4, specifies a worker based on an ARINC 653 partition (configuration AP); the
resulting architecture is  shown in  Figure 5.13.  The other  two FFC files specified a  privileged-
partition-based worker (configuration PP) and a virtual-machine-based worker (configuration VM).
Since “pok_port_flushall” has shared dependencies with the kernel, as explained in  Section  5.3.
Functionality  Farming  Automated:  ff-auto,  function  call  farming  as  been  specified  for  all
configurations. For all configurations, the modified POK/rodosvisor configuration (i.e., the output
from  FF-AUTO) has been manually modified in order to accommodate the worker and its worker
thread in  the scheduler's  configuration.  Furthermore,  because “pok_port_flushall”  is  part  of  the
implementation of the inter-partition communication subsystem, on which functionality farming
depends on,  the output  from  FF-AUTO has also been manually modified such that,  instead of a
queuing  communication  channel,  counting  semaphores  are  used  to  serialize  calls  to
“pok_port_flushall”, requiring 15 new/modified SLOC. Using a counting semaphore to serialize
calls is possible because “pok_port_flushall” accepts no parameters.
1 %system test::node.impl; test::ppc.impl; cpu
2 %worker worker_1; arinc653
3 %worker_thread worker_thread_1; worker_1
4 void pok_port_flushall(); worker_thread_1; call-only
Listing 5.4. FFC file for farming “pok_port_flushall” on a worker based on an ARINC 653
partition.
Figure 5.13. The resulting architecture for configuration AP on the inter-partition communication
subsystem's use case.
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Similarly to the reference configuration, for all the modified configurations described above, the
scheduling jitter has been measured for different sizes of transmitted data. The results are shown in
Figure 5.14. It can be seen that, after functionality farming, the scheduling jitter of the first partition
in the major frame is equivalent to the scheduling jitter of other partitions in the major frame, and it
is independent of the size of the data that is transmitted. These results demonstrate that functionality
farming addressed the limitation identified earlier.
Figure 5.14. The average scheduling jitter for the first partition in the major frame on the reference
and all the modified configurations. “PP” is barely seen as it is overlapped by “AP.”
In Figure 5.15, the kernel's footprint for the reference and modified configurations is presented, in
terms of the size of the code, read-only and read-write data, as well as the size of the stacks. It can
be  seen  that,  as  expected,  the  footprint  for  all  the  modified  configurations  is  higher  than  the
reference configuration's footprint, since only function call farming has been performed. AP's and
PP's  larger  footprint  is  mostly  due  to  a  larger  size  of  the  stacks  because  of  an  additional
partition/worker. VM's large footprint, on the other end, is due to the size of hypervisor (code, read-
only, and read-write data) as well as due to a slightly larger size of the stacks.
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Figure 5.15. The kernel's footprint for the reference and all the modified configurations in the inter-
partition communication subsystem's use case, in terms of the size of the code, read-only (RO) and
read-write (RW) data, as well as the size of the stacks.
Finally, in terms of the engineering effort, the reference configuration consists of 761 source lines of
code  (SLOC).  The  three  modified  configurations,  on  the  other  end,  consist  of  at  least  279
new/modified SLOC when compared with the reference configuration. Using  FF-AUTO, 4 SLOC
were required for the FFC file and, in the worst case, an additional 19 new/modified SLOC were
also required. Knowing that, if functionality farming was performed manually, 279 new/modified
SLOC would be required, and that, using  FF-AUTO, only 23 SLOC were required, then,  FF-AUTO
enabled a reduction of engineering effort by more than 10 times.
5.6. Future Work
As future work, we propose the following.
• Currently, the granularity that is supported is at the level of complete functions, including all
callees. We expect to decrease the granularity to exclude some callees which otherwise limit
the extent to which farming is possible using, for example, code rewriting techniques.
• Similarly, functions with shared dependencies with the kernel are not well supported; we
expect to address this limitation using code rewriting techniques as well.
• Currently, the developer is responsible for understanding to what extend some functionality
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can be farmed; we propose the development of an analysis tool which would enable such
information to be obtained automatically.
• As explained earlier, the POK/rodosvisor configuration output by FF-AUTO needs, in some
cases, to be manually modified as FF-AUTO is unable to derive all the necessary parameters.
In the future, we propose to improve derivation of parameters and, wherever necessary, to
extend the format of the FFC file, enabling it to specify some parameters which cannot be
derived otherwise.
• Currently,  the  I/O  requirements  of  a  functionality  need  to  be  manually  inspected  and
specified; we propose the use of methods such as those described in [120] to automatically
derive a functionality's I/O requirements.
• We also propose the improvement of resource usage through function groups, which enable
a  single  communication  channel  to  be  shared  by  several  function  call  wrappers  and
unwrappers.
• At last, we propose to try the same approach on other operating systems, such as Linux-
based operating systems, where the advantages can be even greater when compared with
small-size POK/rodosvisor.
5.7. Summary
In  this  chapter,  FF-AUTO,  a  tool  which  performs  functionality  farming  semi-automatically  in
POK/rodosvisor, has been presented. Also in this chapter, two use cases which demonstrate how
functionality farming is able to improve the design of POK/rodosvisor, and how FF-AUTO enables a
significant reduction of the engineering effort required, have been presented.
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6. Conclusion
6.1. Full Virtualization on Low-End Hardware
In this thesis it has been explained that, in the domain of safety-critical embedded systems, there is
an ongoing transition from federated architectures to integrated architectures, and that the use of a
hypervisor  as  the separation kernel  is  being considered.  A hypervisor,  similarly to a  separation
kernel,  is  capable  of  enforcing  time  and  space  partitioning;  however,  through  virtualization,  a
hypervisor  also  provides  compatibility  with  legacy  software  and  thus,  the  porting  and  re-
certification  effort  of  legacy software  from a  federated  architecture  is  lower.  It  has  also  been
demonstrated that, however, most hypervisors nowadays either (1) rely on paravirtualization, or (2)
depend  on  high-end  hardware.  Paravirtualization  requires  legacy  software  to  be  ported  to  a
hypervisor-specific interface,  leading to high porting and re-certification effort,  and thus, longer
time-to-market. High-end hardware, on the other end, does not satisfy the constrains associated with
safety-critical  embedded  systems.  Full  virtualization  on  low-end  hardware  has  none  of  these
limitations. Therefore, the development of a hypervisor based on software-only full virtualization
has been proposed, in order to:
• Evaluate the feasibility of full virtualization on low-end hardware to address the limitations
of  existing  hypervisors.  Low-end  hardware  full  virtualization  is  able  to  provide
compatibility with legacy software on low-end hardware; at the cost, however, of higher
virtualization overhead.
• Understand the limitations of existing processor architectures for the realization of low-end
hardware full  virtualization so that  these limitations  can be addressed in  the future.  We
believe  that  virtualization  is  going  to  be  a  recurring  theme  as  long  as  the  software
complexity continues to increase, or as long as new processor architectures are released, or
even as long as there is the need to consolidate legacy alongside new software.
In this thesis, performance and footprint measurements from POK/rodosvisor, featuring low-end
hardware full virtualization, have been presented.
Compatibility  with  legacy  software  has  been  demonstrated  by  showing  the  results  of  some
benchmarks executed on top of a Linux-based operating system as a guest on POK/rodosvisor.
The evaluation of the virtualization overhead, and POK/rodosvisor's performance profile showed
that: low-end hardware full virtualization is more adequate for compute-intensive workloads, with
moderate use of I/O, and with low use of CPU management operations.
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In terms  of  footprint,  it  has  been shown that  the  kernel's  footprint  for  a  virtual-machine-based
system can actually be lower than the kernel's footprint for an ARINC-653-compliant system, which
indicates  that  the  requirements  of  low-end  hardware  full  virtualization  regarding  the  kernel's
footprint are not high.
Altogether, we believe that these results demonstrate that, for many applications, low-end hardware
full  virtualization  can  be  a  serious  alternative  to  high-end  hardware  full  virtualization  and
paravirtualization, enabling:
• a reduction of system size,  weight,  power consumption,  cost,  etc.,  when compared with
high-end hardware full virtualization;
• a reduction (in many cases, elimination) of the effort required to port legacy software to a
hypervisor-specific interface, when compared with paravirtualization;
• as well as, in some cases, a reduction of the kernel's footprint, when compared with ARINC-
653-based systems.
6.2. Model-Driven Engineering
In this thesis it has been explained that conventional development methods are unable to keep up
with the requirements of nowadays and future safety-critical embedded systems. To address this
problem, the approach taken by Ocarina  (i.e.,  model-driven code generation)  has  been used to
support the features developed for this thesis, namely: privileged partitions and virtual machines.
In this thesis it has been shown how AADL can be used to represent privileged partitions and virtual
machines, and thus, that it can replace conventional development methods. At the same time, it has
been explained how Ocarina has been modified to support those representation and to generate a
POK/rodosvisor configuration accordingly. Finally, it also been demonstrated that, at least, for all
the configuration developed for this  thesis,  in the worst  case,  AADL contributes to  56% lower
development effort, and, in the best case, AADL contributes to less than 15% lower development
effort.
6.3. Functionality Farming
In this thesis, it has also been explained that, nowadays, most operating systems follow a monolithic
architecture  which,  however,  leads  to  a  large  kernel,  and  is  associated  with  the  following
drawbacks: low reliability, weak security, high certification effort, as well as poor predictability and
scalability. To reduce the size of the kernel and address those drawbacks, some authors propose new
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architectures. Those architectures, however, depend on the development of a new kernel, and thus,
on a significant upfront investment; if the development of the new kernel fails, the cost is huge.
Moreover, in the end, those architectures do not tackle the source of the problem, i.e., the large size
of the kernel in commodity operating systems, and just work around it.
In  this  thesis,  functionality farming has  been presented,  which,  unlike other  works,  tackles  the
source of the problem (i.e., the size of the kernel in commodity operating systems). It requires a
lower upfront investment, as it enables a progressive reduction of the size of the kernel, instead of
an all-or-nothing approach, and thus, it is a more agile approach as it enables some decisions to be
postponed  closer  to  delivery  time  when  information  about  the  system's  requirements  is  more
precise.
Functionality farming alone, however, is not an easy task. In this thesis,  FF-AUTO has also been
presented, which performs functionality farming semi-automatically in POK/rodosvisor. With  FF-
AUTO, the engineering effort, and thus, the risk associated with functionality farming is significantly
reduced, making it an ideal tool for design space exploration.
Finally, it has been demonstrated that functionality farming is able to improve the design and the
performance of POK/rodosvisor, and that  FF-AUTO enables a significant reduction of the required
engineering effort.
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